History of the child-benefit doctrine as a means for providing governmental financial aid to non-public education. by Bailey, Joseph R.
University of Massachusetts Amherst
ScholarWorks@UMass Amherst
Doctoral Dissertations 1896 - February 2014
1-1-1979
History of the child-benefit doctrine as a means for
providing governmental financial aid to non-public
education.
Joseph R. Bailey
University of Massachusetts Amherst
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.umass.edu/dissertations_1
This Open Access Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by ScholarWorks@UMass Amherst. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Doctoral Dissertations 1896 - February 2014 by an authorized administrator of ScholarWorks@UMass Amherst. For more information, please contact
scholarworks@library.umass.edu.
Recommended Citation
Bailey, Joseph R., "History of the child-benefit doctrine as a means for providing governmental financial aid to non-public education."
(1979). Doctoral Dissertations 1896 - February 2014. 3466.
https://scholarworks.umass.edu/dissertations_1/3466

HISTORY OF THE CHILD-BENEFIT OOCTRINE AS A MEANS FOR
PROVIDING GOVERNMENTAL FINANCIAL AID TO NON-PUBLIC EDUCATION
A Dissertation Presented
By
Joseph R. Bailey
Submitted to the Graduate School of the
University of Massachusetts in partial fulfillment
of the requirements for the degree of
DOCTOR OF EDUCATION
September, 1979
Department of Education
11
Joseph R. Bailey
All Rights Reserved
1979
HISTORY OF THE CHILD-BENEFIT DOCTRINE AS A MEANS
FOR PROVIDING GOVERNMENTAL FINANCIAL AID TO NON-PUBLIC EDUCATION
A Dissertation Presented
By
Joseph R. Bailey
Orf/w':/ /
Dr. Albert Anthony* Chai ri::^erson of Committee
Dr George Urch, Member
Dedicated to
my Mother and Father
Joe T. and Betty A. Bailey
for their continued faith, support, and
encouragement to complete this work.
IV
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
I would like to acknowledge my gratitude to all those who partici-
pated and assisted me in completing this work. It is with professional
respect and admiration that the author thanks Dr. William Griffiths,
not only as my original Chairman of my Dissertation Committee, but for
his encouragement, guidance, suggestions and inspiration. I also wish
to thank Dr. Albert Anthony, my present Chairman, Dr. George Urch, and
Dr. Thomas Derr for their valuable assistance and supportive roles.
A sincere thanks to my wife, Phyllis, for her understanding and
support that has carried me through the completion of each one of my
academic degrees and professional challenges.
Finally, to the God of Heaven who through His grace and love has
made this possible.
V
ABSTRACT
History of the Child-benefit Doctrine as a Means
for Providing Governmental Financial Aid to Non-Public Education
September, 1979
Joseph R. Bailey, B.A., Union College
M.A., Philippine Union College, Ed.D., University of Massachusetts
Directed by: Dr. Albert Anthony
No legislation relating to religion and school has produced such
persistent church-state controversy as that of child-benefit. All
levels of government share in the search for a middle ground, designed
to both strengthen the educational systems and at the same time main-
tain religious freedom.
Purpose
The purposes of this study were to: (1) to trace the historical
development of the child-benefit theory; (2) to examine the judicial
decision in the development of the theory and to ascertain their in-
fluence in defining the theory; (3) to analyze the changing nature of
the theory in the seventies and the implications of such change for
future federal and state financial support to non-public education;
(4) to show how "case law" has established the principles for
the
present position on child benefit.
Procedure
The procedure concentrated on the evolution of the theory by a
systematic historical research derived from pertinent books, documents,
legal journals, and litigations.
Summary of the Findings
For fifty years the Supreme Court has attempted to discover some
fair and workable guidelines for financial assistance to non-public
schools. In summarizing, three major issues have been challenged un-
der the theory: textbook, transportation, and auxiliary services.
Textbook - statutes that allow the loaning of secular textbooks
to non-public students are usually permissible since aid to the child-
ren benefits the state. The argument is that the children are citizens
of the state - that the state is obligated to provide equal educational
opportunities, irregardless of the student's religious creed. Further,
if the student meets the attendance requirements by his attendance at
a non-public school, the state should assist him in his acquisition for
learning. Some textbook programs have been denied due to the wording
of the state statute, which may hold the entanglement clause somewhat
higher than others.
Transportation - has received a favorable ruling since the Everson
case in 1946. The court has maintained that transportation aid is a
health-and-safety measure, and that "incidental" aid to non-public
schools would be the same as police and fire protection. As in the
textbook statutes, the education of the pupils is the main concern of
the state, and not his religious belief, nor the financial relief that
his guardian may profit by a reimbursement for transportation to non-
public schools.
Auxiliary Services - were considered by many of the state courts
prior to 1973 as a secular educational function. In 1973 the Supreme
Court in the Levitt case ruled that mandated services, i.e., student
tests and maintenance of student records amounted to excessive entan-
glement under the First Amendment. Following this decision, the court
ruled against auxiliary services, with the exception of the Wolman
case in 1977.
To conclude, the child-benefit theory is the result of "case law"
as opposed to "statute law". Legislators, educators, and religious
leaders can trace a series of opinions as to determine what proposals
of the future would be allowable aid. From the findings in the study
the child-benefit theory was not necessarily a new concept instituted
in 1930, but can be traced to the Colonial days when a revolution in
education took place in the New World, for it is noted that the legis-
lature from 1642 forward was in the broad sense, child benefit.
Recommendation for Future Study :
1. A study should be made to define direct aid and indirect aid
to sectarian schools.
2. An investigation of the feasibility of an agency, independent
of government, providing services to non-public schools.
3. Further research to define the public or general welfare
con-
cept as a means for financial relief to parochial schools.
4. An exploration of acceptable alternative forms of financial
aid.
5. To trace the history of tax credits and their possible ac-
ceptance under the prohibitions of the Constitution.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
Education of the youth became a primary focus in the early Colonial
times. This can be traced largely to the development of Bible Common-
wealths that tne founding fathers were determined to establish. From
Colonial times and extending to the adoption of the Federal Constitu-
tion, nine of the Colonies had established European churches. Conse-
quently, the schools of the period were denominational in character.^
With the passage of the First Amendment, the ratification of State
Constitutions containing provisions for separation of church and state,
and church-affiliated immigration, a number of schisms developed in the
established denominations which caused a proliferation of sects.
^
During the same period more interest was given to the establish-
ment of common or public schools, to promote the general welfare of
the nation.
The public school system was not established merely for the
sake of the child who would be the direct beneficiary of its ser-
vices. Were education merely for the sake of the child or of the
parent, the latter would have to foot the bill. Taxes are levied
for public purposes. Incidentally, of course, the child derives
a benefit as does a parent. But it was not for that purpose that
Ipeter H. Rossi and Alice S. Rossi, "Some Effects of Parochial
School Education in America" in Society and Education: A Book g^
Readings
,
(ed.) by Robert J. Havighurst, Bernice L. Neugarten, and
Jacqueline M. Falk (Boston: Allyn, 1967), p. 204.
2lbid.
,
p. 205.
1
2the public school system was established. It was brought Into be-
ing in order to promote the general welfare.
3
Even with interest in the development of public education, a great
number of established church-affiliated elementary and secondary schools
were beginning to have financial problems. Congressman Bob Packwood
stated in his speech before the Committee on Ways and Means of the
United States House of Representatives on 21 February, 1978:
Public schools were common in the United States before the
1820's. Public financial aid to church-sponsored schools was
wide spread throughout America, both before and after independ-
ence and the adoption of the First Amendment. The members of
the Continental Congress and the Constitutional Convention knew
about this pattern of support.'^
Through the years it has become increasingly necessary to involve
the state and federal governments in educational policies. Their in-
volvement is economic, judicial, and advisory. The purpose of these
jurisdictions is to protect and enhance the general welfare of the
nation.
Since the Constitution does not mention education as a function
of the federal government, its responsibility has accrued to the States
through the application of the Tenth Amendment, which provides that:
"The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor
prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively
or to the people."^
^Bissel V. Davidson, it. el. 65 Conn. 183 (1894).
^Bob Packwood, "Should Tax Credits for Tuition Payments to
College
and Non-public Schools be Enacted," Congressional Djge^, Vol . 58
(January 1979), p. 12.
5u.S. Const, amend. X.
3While the Constitution does not explicitly delegate education as
a function of the federal government, it has been possible for the fed-
eral government to support the state governments' education program
through the taxing clause and empowers Congress "to lay and collect
Taxes, Duties, Imports and Excises, to pay the Debts and provide for
the Common Defense and General Welfare of the United States."^ The
Supreme Court has interpreted this clause to give authority to Congress
to expend federal tax monies for educational purposes. This interpre-
tation took a period of time to be defined, making the meaning of the
"general welfare" clause a subject of much debate and controversy.
James Madison contended that the framers of the Constitution bor-
rowed the phrase from the Articles of Confederation, and that its in-
tent was not to extend the parameters of federal authority. According
to his view the clause "amounted to no more than a reference of other
pov/ers, enumerated in subsequent clauses of the same section; that,
as the United States is a government of limited and enumerated powers,
the grant of power to tax and spend for the general welfare must be
confined to the enumerated legislative fields committed to the Con-
gress."^ Alexander Hamilton took an opposing view and maintained that
this article conferred upon Congress a substantive power to tax and
spend for the purposes which would champion the general welfare of the
United States.
^U.S. Const, art. I, sec. 8.
^United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1 (1936).
4It was not until 1936 that the Supreme Court adopted a definitive
interpretation. In United States v. Butler the Supreme Court adopted
the Hamiltonian philosophy in testing the constitutionality of the Ag-
ricultural Adjustment Act.^ The court stated that Congress was not
limited in expenditure of public monies to the direct or express grants
of legislative power found in Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution,
but that federal monies could be expended for national or general wel-
fare as opposed to local or state welfare.
Although the court adopted the Hamiltonian philosophy, it circum-
scribed closely the term "general welfare" and held that the Agricult-
ural Adjustment Act was unconstitutional because agricultural problems
were local problems. A year later the court redefined "general wel-
fare" in a decision upholding the Social Security Act which greatly ex-
panded the authority of Congress to tax and spend under the "general
welfare" clause. In Helve ring v. Davis^ the court said that the gen-
eral welfare concept is not static, but is flexible. Congress may tax
and expend public money for general welfare purposes so long as it does
not demonstrate a display of arbitrary power. The court emphasized
that the needs that were narrow or parochial a century ago may be inter-
woven in our day with the well-being of the nation.
It is by authority of the "general welfare" clause that the fed-
eral government is empowered to spend monies for education. Concerning
state expenditures for education, different legal criteria are employed
^United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1 (1936).
^Helvering v. Davis, 301 U.S. 619 (1937).
5under its police power. The state has a right to support, to maintain,
and to control education subject only to restriction imposed by the
state and federal constitutions. Since the state has power over all
aspects of education within its jurisdiction, it can impose standards
upon private education, as well as public education.
In discharging their obligations, some states have sought to as-
sist private education. Their assistance has appeared in several forms.
Some are: grants for student aid, institutional projects, research,
construction, tuition scholarships for economically-deprived students,
tax rebates or credits, salary subsidy, and voucher plans.
In addition to the above, two major concepts have been recognized
as acceptable aid. These concepts have been developed through the
years with the aid of private and parochial educators, politicians,
religious leaders, and others seeking ways to relieve the financial
strain, and at the same time in their opinion uphold the doctrine of
separation of church and state. Their success is measured in occa-
sional victories falling into two major categories: (1) the child-
benefit theory, i.e., public aid primarily assists the children of
the state rather than the religious institution proper; (2) the con-
tract theory, i.e., a non-public parochial school is only helping the
state provide its citizens with secular education and therefore may
be recompensed under a state contract. Contracts of this nature are
carefully worded in an effort to avoid any infringement of the Con-
stitution which may be applied as aid to parochial schools.
The logic of the child-benefit theory is that a state may extend
public aid to assist all children in the acquisition of learning in
6secular subjects, irregardless of the religious persuasions of the
guardians. The deduction affirms that the state is the ultimate bene-
ficiary of all secular learning and, therefore, should contribute to-
wards its financial responsibility. Examples of such aid are as fol-
lows. transportation, books, lunches, and health services.
The contract theory encompasses the right of the state to enter
into legal contracts with any enterprises, including parochial schools,
to buy service that must otherwise be provided by itself. To buy pre-
determined educational services from non-public schools, the state
reasons that it is merely fulfilling the mandated educational pro-
vision preascribed by the constitution or statute. This reasoning
was upheld until the early 1970's when decisions by the court on the
Lemon v. Kurtzman*'^ case modified the position and rejected some con-
tracts that had been provided by state legislation.
The establishment of the child-benefit theory can be traced back
to the Cochran case. The issue involved whether it was permissable to
loan secular textbooks to all students in the state, including those
who attended the parochial school. Chief Justice Hughes announced
the opinion of the court:
Viewing the statute as having the effect thus attributed to it,
we cannot doubt that the taxing power of the State is exerted for
a public purpose. The legislation does not segregate private
schools, or their pupils, as its beneficiaries or attempt to in-
terfere with any matters of exclusively private concern. Its
interest is education, broadly; its method, comprehensive. In-
dividual interests are aided only as the common interest is safe-
guarded.^^
^^Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
^^Cochran v. Louisiana, 281 U.S. 370 (1930).
7In attempting to give aid as suggested above, states have run into
problems related to the First Amendment which declares in part that
"Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion or
prohibiting the free exercise- thereof ; these problems center around
the definition of the 'establishment clause'. Those who are opposed
to federal aid trace their arguments to early Colonial days when the
framers of the Constitution, namely Jefferson in his reply to the Bap-
tists of Danbury and Madison in his Memorial and Remonstrance Against
Religious Assessments, documented the doctrine of separation.
One of the earliest and most detailed analysis of the meaning of
the First Amendment was given in the opinion of the Everson case.
The 'establishment of religion' clause of the First Amendment
means at least this: Neither a state nor the federal government
can set up a church. Neither can pass laws which aid one relig-
ion, aid all religions, or prefer one religion over another.
Neither can force nor influence a person to go to or to remain
away from church against his will or force him to profess a belief
or disbelief in any religion. No person can be punished for enter-
taining or professing religious beliefs or disbeliefs, for church
attendance or non-attendance. No tax in any amount, large or small,
can be levied to support any religious activities or institutions,
whatever they may be called, or whatever form they may adopt to
teach or practice religion. Neither a state nor the federal gov-
ernment can, openly or secretly, participate in the affairs of any
religious organizations or groups and vice versa. In the words of
Jefferson, the clause against establishment of religion by law was
intended to erect a 'wall of separation between church and state. ''3
While this opinion has often been used by the Supreme Court to ex-
plain the meaning of the First Amendment, it has been debated. The
court was divided in the Everson case, and several justices took
^^u.S. Const, amend. I.
^
^Everson v. Board of Education, 300 U.S. 1 (1947).
8another opinion, thus weakening their position. Nonetheless, the ram-
ification of the Everson case has made it a landmark case, and to rein-
force the opinion of the court Justice William 0. Douglas said:
Financing a church either in its strictly religious activities
or in its other activities is equally unconstitutional, as I under-
stand the Establishment Clause. Budgets for one activity may be
technically separable from budgets for others. But the institution
is an inseparable whole, a living organism, which is strengthened
in proselytizing when it is strengthened in any department by con-
tributions from other than its own members. . .What may not be done
directly may not be done indirectly lest the Establishment Clause
become a mockery. 14
This decision established "a wall between church and state which
should be kept high and impregnable,"^^ so as to provide a premise that
the First Amendment can rest upon. It thus allows both religion and
government freedom to operate within their respective spheres.
While Congress has maintained an adherance to the restrictions of
the First Amendment, many proponents stress arguments that may deny
the criteria thus established for separation of church and state.
Constitutional prohibitions against aid to non-public elementary and
secondary schools is avoided by the use of the child-benefit theory
as defined in the textbook case of Cochran v. Louisiana State Board qf^
Education .^^ Delivering the opinion of the court. Chief Justice Hughes
stated: "The schools. . .are not the beneficiaries of these appropri-
ations. . .the school children and the state alone are the benefici-
aries."
^^Abington School District v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963).
15300 U.S. 1 (1947).
15cochran v. Louisiana, 281 U.S. 370 (1930).
9It was this conclusion in the Cochran case and later in the Ever-
son case, 'that the direct benefit is conferred upon the child with the
school receiving only incidental aid, "17 that established the concept
of child benefit. Some still may have difficulty in accepting that no
benefit was conferred to the non-public schools, when in fact financial
relief came when the state supplied free textbooks. In any event, this
decision would appear so very nondiscriminatory that attendance in the
private schools, if not the schools themselves, received encouragement. 1^
Commenting on the Everson case. Professor Cushman said that it:
. . .leaves several questions unanswered. How far may the
state validly go, under the "child-benefit theory", in granting
benefits to parochial school children? If it may provide free
textbooks and bus transportation, may it also provide free lunches,
free gymnasiums and swimming pools, free school clinics, and so on?
Also, if a community is not forbidden to give free bus service to
all school children, including parochial school children, may Cath-
olic parents demand such service as a constitutional right from
communities which now extend it only to public school children?^^
With the ruling on Lemon v. Kurtzman ,^0 the court finally held
that Pennsylvania's 1968 Elementary and Secondary Education Act, for
which the Secretary of Education could purchase certain secular edu-
cational services from non-public schools, directly reimbursing those
schools solely for teacher's salaries, textbooks and instructional ma-
terials, was unconsti tutional .2^
^^Harvard Law Review , 60:796 (1947).
^^Clark Spurlock, Education and the Supreme Court (Urbana, 111.
:
University of Illinois Press, 1955T7 p. 78.
"'^Robert Eugene Cushman, Leading Constitutional Decisions (10th
ed.*, New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts , Inc., 1950j, p. 145.
^^Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
Nonpublic Education and the Public Goo_d , The President's
Panel
on Nonpubl i c Educati on (WasHiligton : Government Printing
Office, 1972}
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Further, that the programs would have excessive entanglement between
government and religion. 22
While the questions of Professor Cushman and others remain un-
answered, three underlying tests will be applied on all parochial aid
legislation appearing in court: (1) what is the secular purpose; (2)
what will be the primary effect of the financial aid; (3) will the pro-
grams have excessive entanglement between government and religion?
Statement of the Problem
The United States Supreme Court has set defined guidelines for
evaluating the government's involvement in church-state relationships
and for disbursing of federal and state aid to non-public education.
Hence, it is imperative that the nature of the child-benefit theory be
understood by educators, legislators, and church leaders. While a host
of legal and pedogogial articles, position papers, books and pamphlets
have examined the above mentioned cases and their antecedents, few have
considered whether the child-benefit theory has been modified or
strengthened during the same period.
Purpose of the Study
The purpose of this study is:
1. to trace the historical development of the child-benefit
theory;
22Harvard Law Review 85:169 (1970).
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2. to examine the judicial decision in the development of the
child-benefit theory and to ascertain their influence in defining the
theory;
3. to analyze the changing nature of the child-benefit theory in
the 70 's and the implications of such change for future federal and
state financial support to non-public elementary and secondary educa-
ti on
;
4. to show how "case law" has established the principles for the
present position of the courts.
Method of Procedure
The procedure used in this study will be to concentrate on the
evolution of the child-benefit theory by a systematic historical re-
search derived from pertinent books, historical documents, legal
journals, and federal and state litigations. Together the primary
and secondary sources will provide the basic content necessary for
this study. The data gathered for this historical research is from
the basic references listed:
a. Educati on Index
b . Readers ' Gui de Periodic Literature
c. Pi ssertati on Abstracts
d. Encyclopedia of Educational Research
e . Documents , ERIC Clearinghouse
f . Ameri can Pi gest System
g. Ameri can Law Reports
h. Corpus Juris Secundum
1.
Federal Digest
j . Modern Federal Practice Digest
12
Finally, the review of the federal and state litigation relevant
to definitions, extensions, and limitation of the child-benefit theory
was researched from the following references:
a. Congressional Quarterly A1 manac
b. Nati onal Reporter System
c. The Federal Reporter
d. Shepard's United States Citations
The basic substance of this study will be presented in the follow-
ing format:
1. Chapter I is a general introduction to the problem.
2. Chapter II will be a historical review of the formation of
and aid to non-public schools from 1642-1840.
3. Chapter III will focus upon the establishment of the child-
benefit theory prior to 1970 and will include an investigation of se-
lected court cases that defined the concepts for either rejection or
acceptance of the theory. As a result, relevant and significant
changes within the child-benefit theory will be cited as they relate
its future status.
4. Chapter IV will be an analytical investigation of the status
of the child-benefit theory from 1970 to the present with a review of
the citations that have contributed to its modification or strengthen-
ing.
5. Chapter V will include the summary and conclusion.
13
Limitation of the Study
This work will confine its attention to publications and federal
and state litigations which in the writer's opinion has a direct bear-
ing on the development of the child-benefit theory and its implications
for governmental aid to non-public, religiously-affiliated elementary
and secondary schools. It should be noted that none of the court cases
deal specifically with church-affiliated colleges and universities,
though implication may extend to them in some areas.
Since it is the author's purpose to show that "case law" has es-
tablished the principles for present court opinions, limited consider-
ation must be given to those cases dealing with the legality of relig-
ious practices in public schools, as well as those dealing entirely
with governmental aid to non-public schools.
The analysis will be restricted selectively to the court cases
during the 1970' s, and all documents of legal and historical material
is limited to the author's interpretation and judgment.
CHAPTER II
COLONIAL BACKGROUND
One of the most persistent issues in America today concerns the
proper role of federal government in education. From the beginning the
role has not been defined clearly: for education began as a local con-
cern and responsibility; and therefore it was delegated to the state as
the agency which should survey, provide, and maintain the provisions
that the constituents of the territory demanded. In recent years the
greatly increased involvement of the federal government in education
has heightened the need to clarify the proper sphere of federal author-
ity in the educational arena.
The United States is faced with few public issues in which evalu-
ation of public policy and constitutional law are so intrinsically
joined together as financial aid to non-public education. Legislation
often depends on the interpretation of the courts concerning the con-
stitutionality of the aid programs. If the legislators expect their
programs to survive constitutional attack they must look to the courts
for guidance.
Traditionally, the support of education has been determined pri-
marily by state and local communities, not by the federal government.
Nevertheless, the federal government has concerned itself with and has
taken active steps to assist education by various means.
The history of governmental involvement in education dates back to
14
15
the beginning of the Colonies with the granting of public lands to the
states for the support of seminaries, colleges and universities. How-
ever, the Twentieth Century has brought on an expanded range of activi-
ties which include direct loans and grants to institutions, fellowships
and loans for students, research contracts, extension programs, child
benefits, contract for services, tax credits, direct assistance, and a
wide variety of other forms of support. Due to the many forms of sup-
port it is a simple fact that the federal government is involved in ed-
ucation, both in the public and private sectors.
This chapter will focus on (1) the background of the federal gov-
ernment's expanding involvement in educational aid; (2) tracing the
steps from 1642 - through the Federal Educational Acts which have laid
the groundwork for the present support programs enacted by federal and
state legislation. A review of Colonial educational history points out
some very distinct principles that were woven into the development of
education in the New World.
For more than two-hundred years statesmen have promoted the separ-
ation of church and state in America. However, this principle has not
always been definable in American history, and especially in the devel-
opment of education itself. While there is no doubt that "in New Eng-
land a high culture level, an intense Biblicism, concentrated settle-
ment, and thriving town institution. . influenced the thinking of
the settlement, they did not come empty handed. They brought
to Amer-
ica a "fully developed language with a wealth of fine
literature. They
^Bernard Bailyn, Education in the ol
(Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1960), p.
4/.
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had a highly developed social organization which included elaborate ec-
onomic, political, legal, and religious systems. And they had an edu-
cational system that extended from the elementary school throughout the
p
university.
While the above characteristics helped to formulate the educational
patterns for the Colonies in the early 1600's, there remains one charac-
teristic that stands out in the founding of education. The Colonies ab-
sorption in religion was most prominent. Power stated that "the typical
attitude of the New England Colonist was that educational goals had to
subserve superior interest; the most superior of all interest was re-
ligion. Education, then, was set in this context. It was religious in
content and purpose. It was practical. "3 This initiated the stimulus
that to a greater degree caused the people to leave Europe and settle
in the New World. Here they sought to establish for themselves and
their posterity what had been denied them in their motherland. With
religion as a dominant intellectual interest, the men concerned with
the course of events endeavored to establish Bible commonwealths, and
with the maintenance of an ecclesiastical social order sustained by a
class-structured society."^
The people of the Colonies were of mixed origins, but they shared
2Raymond E. Callahan, An Introduction to Education in American So-
ciety (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1968], p. 108.
^Edward J. Power, Main Currents in^ History of Education (New
York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc., 1962), p. 427.
^Ibid.
,
p. 426.
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in common the fact that "they came to America to enjoy religious free-
dom."^ This seems to be especially true of the French Huguenots of
Carolines; Cal vini Stic Dutch and Walloons of New Amsterdam; Scotch and
Scotch-Irish Presbyterians of New Jersey; English Quakers, Baptists,
Methodists in Pennsylvania; Swedish Lutherans along the Delaware; Ger-
man Lutherans, Moravians, Mennonites, Dunkers and Reformed-church Ger-
mans of the mountains of Pennsylvania; and the Calvinist dissenters
from the English National Church, known as the Puritans of New Eng-
1 and.^
The original settlements (1607-1635) can be divided into three
groups: New England of Massachusetts and Connecticut, Central group
of New York, New Jersey, Delaware, Pennsylvania, and the Southern group
of Virginia, Carolines, and Georgia. They commonly held that the na-
tive Americans should be driven from the land, and that Protestant re-
ligion would be a decided influence in the formation of schools. How-
ever, this was as far as they agreed. There were striking differences
in attitude in each of the original colonial groups.
The Anglicans, dominant in the south, would recreate the Old
England here, but the Puritans would create a New England as an
escape from the evils of the old one. Between New England and
the south lay the Middle Colonies settled by Europeans of diverse
national and cultural inheritances, but generally middleclass in
their social outlook, and dissenters in their theologies.
^
^Ellwood P. Cubberley, Public Education in the United States (Cam-
bridge: Riverside Press, 1947), p. VZ.
^Ibid.
7james Mulhern, A History of Education (New York: Ronald Press,
1959), p. 570.
18
Southern Colonies
In the spring of 1607 one-hundred and five men settled at James-
town. They came seeking wealth and adventure. The married men had
left their families behind in their homelands.® For the first ten
years there was no evidence of schools, but in "1616 the King ordered
the Bishop of London to collect money for a college to be founded in
Virginia." The warm climate, the ample rainfall "led to large plan-
tation-type settlements."^® This economic basis caused the people not
to cluster in towns as they did in New England. The population con-
sisted of well-to-do planters, wealthy merchants, a few tradesmen, and
indentured white servants.
This unfortunate and dispossessed class was composed of polit-
ical offenders, convicted criminals, paupers from the workhouses,
vagabonds from city streets, and some fairly well educated persons
who were so poor that they would bind themselves to a period of
service for a chance in a new land. The ship captain brought them
to the planter, who paid their transportation in return for the
right of their labor for the period of indenture--usually five
years, but ranging from two to seven. Some of these indentured
servants later became renters or tenants, and a few eventually be-
came planters. On the other hand, many others, unable to gain a
foothold, came in time to form the 'poor white' class of the
South.
Eventually negro slaves were brought as plantation workers, adding
to the cosmopolitan population. All of these factors led to the
®Edward Grast Dexter, History of Education (New York: Macmillan,
1904), p. 1.
®Ibid.
^®Ibid.
^^Cubberley, op. cit., p. 22.
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development of social classes in society—unlike the democracy of New
England—making common schools virtually impossible.
The South, faced with the savage environment of the wilderness and
isolation from the motherland, became aware that only by conscious, de-
liberate effort would their inherited culture be preserved and trans-
mitted to their future descendents. The lack of strong formulated set-
tlements, church institutions, and maintenance of transportation facili-
ties led to the adoption of English practices instead of the development
of common schools. Cubberley stated these practices were "the tutor in
the home, education in small private and select pay-schools, or educa-
tion in the mother country for the sons of the well-to-do planters.
Central Colonies
The Central Colonies, unlike the other two areas, developed their
schools around the parish system. The parish system provided for church
control over all educational effort throughout the Colony. "In Dutch
America ... the bond between school and church was close ... the
paramount educational influence was religion." Into the Central Col-
onies came a mixture of people representing different Protestant faiths.
Therefore, no monopoly was evident as in New England. All were Prote-
stant in faith, though representing different creeds and
nationalities;
all believed in the importance of being able to read the
Bible as a
l^Cubberley, op. cit., p. 23.
T^Adolphe E. Meyer, An Educational Histm. 9l^
(New York: McGraw-Hill, T967), p. 86.
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means to personal salvation; and all made efforts looking toward the
establishment of schools as a part of their church organization."^^
In 1633 a schoolmaster named Roelandsen was sent to the Central
Colony by the Dutch West India Company. There was no school house and
no regular provisions for teaching. The school was opened at irregu-
lar intervals at the uncertain choice or pleasure of the teacher or
parents. At this time Dutch schools were strictly elementary, teach-
ing primarily small children. The other two Colonies concerned them-
selves with mission schools in Virginia and education for the clergy
in New England. After the English takeover, Dutch schools did not
prosper, but were allowed to continue to operate. Since they no longer
enjoyed official favor, they now functioned periodically as did other
schools in the Central Colonies.
The settlers of Pennsylvania became the leaders in the Central
Colonies in the formation of schools with the passing of the law of
1683 and later 1693. The law reads:
And to the end that poor as well as rich may be instructed in
good and commendable learning, which is to be preferred before
wealth, be it enacted, etc., that all persons in this Province and
Territories thereof, having children, and all guardians and trus-
tees of orphans, shall cause such to be instructed in reading and
writing, so that they may be able to read the Scriptures, and to
write by the time they attain to twelve years of age; and that
then they be taught some useful trade or skill, that the poor may
work to live, and the rich if they become poor may not want; of
^^Cubberley, op. cit., p. 20.
A. Doyle, The Middle Colonies (New York: Longman's Green,
1907), p. 59.
^^Meyer, op. cit., p. 88.
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which GVGry County Court shall takG carG. And in casG such par-
ents, guardians, or overseers shall be found deficient in this
respect, every such parent, guardian, or overseer shall pay for
every such child, five pounds, except there should appear an in-
capacity in body or understanding to hinder itJ'
The settlers of the- territory were too poor, too busy earning a
livelihood, too severely pressed by the hardships of the wilderness,
and preoccupied with the political and religious agitations to make
the necessary effort to provide adequate education for their children
In these primitive conditions, the interest in education, even in
religious education, frequently declined, with the settlers mentality
assuming a do-nothing attitude. In New York and New Jersey the same
policy prevailed. Each parochial group did as it wished, including
financial aid to private and church schools. With apprenticeship train-
ing for the poor and orphans, it thus provided practically all the
school facilities avail able.^^ This accounts for the small number of
educated men in the colony. "Comparatively few grown persons could do
more than read, write and calculate according to elementary rules of
on
arithmetic, and many remained wholly illiterate." Thus, it happens
that education in the Central Colonies was left to the ministers, in-
dividual congregations, businessmen or masters, or the wealthy. This
lack of unified effort resulted in a retardation of the education proc-
ess during this period.
^
^Colony Records: Penn. Law, 1683.
'*®James P. Wickersham, History of Education in Pennsylvania (Lan-
caster, Pa.: Inquirer Publishing, lW8), p. 226.
^^Cubberley, op. cit., p. 21.
2^Wi ckersham, Loc. cit.
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New England Colonies
Massachusett s attitude was completely different from that of the
other Colonies since they were of one Protestant church. Cubberley
felt that the Puritans who settled New England contributed the most
that was valuable for the future educational development in the Colo-
nies. From the development of the first educational laws, the Puritan
Church controlled the state, and thus the schools. The church was the
state; furthermore, it took upon itself power to establish in practice
principles which would be adopted by all the Colonies. While there are
various opinions as to why the Colonies wanted schools, the most widely-
held view was to subserve superior interest, and in the case of New
England the most important was the church. "Education, then, was set
in this context. It was religious in content and purpose. Other
writers pose additional reasons. Bailyn felt that a fear of the im-
minent loss of cultural standards, of the possibility that civilization
itself would be "buried in the grave of our fathers. He further
states that "New Englanders equated savagery and barbarianism with
illiteracy, and because of this the leaders of society thought it
23
their duty to establish schools and colleges and to support education."
George Haskins, Law and Authority in Early Massachusetts (New
York: Macmillan, 1960), p. 12.
22Bernard Bailyn, Education in the Forming of American Spcje^
(Chapel Hill: University of North Caroline Press, I960), p. 27.
23lbid., pp. 82-84.
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Haskins stated that "the men who carried out the Massachusetts
enterprise were neither adventurous nor victims of persecution. They
were persons of wealth and ability brought together by ties of marriage
and friendship and by a sense of common purpose. "24
However, the church used schools to promote their tenets of faith.
More than the Puritans' need for literacy, they sought knowledge—not
simply as a polite accomplishment, nor as a means of advancing material
welfare—but because "salvation was impossible without it."^^ They
further maintained that man's "chief enemy was ignorance, especially
ignorance of the Scripture. "2^
Thomas Fox Croft is even more explicit in his explanation of the
need for education. He said:
The Word written and preacht is the ordinary medium of conver-
sation and Sanctification. Now in order to obtaining these benefits
by the Word, it is requisite that Person be diligent in Reading and
Hearing of it; And in order to these, how expedient and necessary
is it, that there be schools of learning; those of a lower charac-
ter, for the instructing of youth in reading, and those of an high-
er, for the more liberal education of such, as may be devoted to
the work of the Ministry? "27
Like all the colonies, the Puritans concerned themselves with the
problem of "perpetuating their faith". They were searching for answers
to questions such as: How does one implant God's transcendental truth
24Haskins, op. cit., p. 12.
25Edmund S. Morgan, The Puritan Family (New York: Harper & Row,
1944), p. 89.
26 ibid.
27ibid.
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in the young? How does one assure the colony a corp of learned men of
God when the present ones transferred their operations to their eternal
predestination? Their first concern about their children can be summed
up by four assumptions according to Morgan: (1) that children are born
without knowledge; (2) that they are born with the capacity of obtaining
knowledge; (3) children are born evil as well as ignorant; (4) finally,
that evil as well as ignorance could be overcome by education.
Their second concern was the maintaining of an educated ministry,
who were the philosophers, counselors, at times medical physicians,
politicians, and religious leaders of the community. Education became
a tool to advance salvation and the church. It follows that since the
church and state were one, education then had a dual purpose. ^8 This
can be discerned from the Old South Leaflets:
After God had carried us safe to New England, and we had builded
our houses, provided necessaries for our livelihood, reared conven-
ient places for God's worship, and settled the Civil Government, one
of the next things we longed for, and looked after, was to advance
learning, and to perpetuate it to Posterity; dreading to leave an
illiterate ministry to the churches, when our present ministry shall
lie in the dust. 29
Society in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries was hierarchial
in both theory and practice., It's government did not represent the
whole of society, but rather a political, religious, social and finan-
cial oligarchy, bulwarked by church and state. The purpose of educa-
tion was to make Christians, rather than citizens; justification for
^^Morgan, op. cit., p. 90.
29Di rectors of the Old South Work: Old South Leaflets, New England
First Fruits, Vol . XIII, No. 51 (Boston: Old South Meeting House), p. 1.
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and for this end they, or the greater part of them, shall have
power to take accompt from time to time of their parents and mas-
ters, and of their children, concerning their calling and impliment
of their children, especial lity of their ability to read and under-
stand the principles of religion and the capital lawes of the coun-
try, and to impose fines upon all those who refuse to render such
accompt to them when required; and they shall have power (with con-
sent of any Court or magistrates) to put fourth apprentice the
children of such as shall not be able and fitt to employ and bring
them up, nor shall take course to dispose of them, of such as they
shall find not to bee able and fit to imply and bring them up, nor
shall take course to dispose of them themselves; and they are to
take care that such as are set to keep cattle bee set to some other
impliment withall, as spinning up on the rock, kniting, weveing
tape, etc.; and that boyes and girles bee not suffered to converse
together, so as may occasion any wanton, dishonest, or immodest be-
havior, and for their better performance of this trust committed to
them, they may divide the towne amongst them, appointing to every
of the said townsmen a certeine number of families to have speciall
oversight of; they are also to provide that a sufficient quantity
of material Is, as hempe, flaxe, etc. may bee raised in their sev-
eral 1 townes, and tooles and implements provided for working out
the same; and for their assistance in this so needful and benefic-
iall impliment, if they meete with any difficulty or opposition
which they cannot well master by their owne power, they may have
recourse to some of the magistrates, who shall take such course for
their help and incuragment as the occasion shall require, according
to justice; and the said townsmen, at the next Court in those lim-
its, after the end of their yeare, shall give a breife account in
writing of their proceedings hearin; provided, that they have bene
so required by some Court or magistrate a month at least before;
and this order to continue for two yeares, and till the court shall
take further order. 31
Later, to correct some of the abuses and neglects of the early
laws by parents, masters and others, there was the formation of the Old
Deluder Law of 1647. It read as follows:
If being one chief project of that old deluder, Satan, to keep
men from the knowledge of the Scriptures, as in former times keep-
ing them in an unknown tongue, so in these later times by perswad-
ing from the use of tongues that so at least the true sense and
meaning of the Original! might be clouded with false glasses of
Sai n-seeming-decei vers ; and that Learning may not be buried in the
31jennegan, op. cit., pp. 87, 88.
25
its continuation rested on design for leadership and not for scholar-
ship. The church relied on the practice of royal governors, legisla-
tion of colonial assemblies, and acts of the Crown to accomplish their
educational goals.
The cornerstone of public education in America is dated with the
enactment of the Massachusetts Bay Laws of 1642 and 1647. The purpose
of these laws was to educate the people adequately so as to enable them
to read the Bible. These laws were to serve societal aims in the New
World and guard its population from being corrupted by the "Old Deluder,"
Satan.
The authority behind the Massachusetts Act of 1642, and other such
legislation, was nothing short of political and religious motives. Ed-
ucation was designed to enable the masses to understand and to obey the
regulations of the church and the laws of the state, which, in turn.
were religiously orientated.
The educational legislation of the Massachusetts Bay indicates that
the various assemblies sought two principal ends: "... namely, com-
pulsory education and compulsory schools. The Act of June 14, 1642
revealed these characteristics, and reads as follows:
This Court, taking into consideration the great neglect in many
parents and masters in training up their children in learning, and
labor, and other imployments which may bee profitable to the conmon
wealth, do hearupon order and decree, that in every towne the chosen
men appointed for managing the prudencial affaires of the same
shall
hencefourth stand charged with the care of the redresse ot this
evill, so as they shalbee liable to bee punished or fined for
the
neglect thereof, upon any presentment of the grand jurors , or other
information or complaint in any plantations in this jurisdiction.
30Marcus Jennegan, Laboring and Dependent Cjasse^ in. Col oni£L
ica (New York: Ungar, 1960) , pi^
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graves of our forefathers in Church and Commonwealth, the Lord as-
sisting our indeavours: it is therefore ordered by the Court and
authorities thereof;
(1) That every Township in this jurisdiction, after the Lord
hath increased them to the number of fifty Householders shall then
forthwith appoint one within their Town to teach all such children
as shall resort to him to write and read, whose wages shall be paid
either by the Parents or Masters of such children, or by the Inhab-
itants in general by way of supply, as the major part of these that
order the prudentials of the Town shall appoint. . . .
(2) And it is further ordered that where any Town shall in-
crease to the number of one hundred Families or Householders they
shall set upon a Grammar-School, the Masters thereof being able to
instruct youth so far as they may be fitted for the University.
And if any Town neglect the performance hereof above one year
then everie (sic.) such town shall pay five pounds per annum to the
next school, till they shall perform this Order (1647). 32
The Selectmen in every town were required to know what the fami-
lies were doing, and to have a vigilant eye over their brethren. The
neighbors were to report any negligence of parents in performing their
duties. Evidently because of a neglect of parents in the matter of ed-
ucation, a revision of the Act of 1642 was passed. The importance of
this Act is the amendments, changes, and revisions, "were the work of
the Children Law Committee which prepared the code and that it was rat-
ified by the General Court as a whole. "^3
The Children's Law read:
Forasmuch as the good education of children is of singular be-
hoof and benefit to any Common-wealth; and wheras many parents and
masters are too indulgent and negligent of their duty in that kinde.
It is therefore ordered that the Select men of everie town, in the
severall precincts and quarters where they dwell, shall have a
32The Laws and Liberties of Massachusetts , Reprinted from the
copy oftHelMSldition in the Henry E. Huntington Library (Harvard:
University Press, 1929), p. 47.
33 Ibid.
,
p. 91
.
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vigilant eye over their brethren and neighbours, to see first that
none of them shall suffer so much barbarism in any of their fami-
lies as not to indeavour to teach by themselves or others, their
children and apprentices so mucy learning as may inable them per-
fectly to read the english tongue, and knowledge of the Capital
lawes; upon penaltie of twentie shillings for each neglect therein.
Also that all masters of families doe once a week (at the least)
catechize their children and servants in the grounds and principles
of Religion, and if any be unable to doe so much: that then at the
least they procure such children or apprentices to learn some short
orthodox catechism without book, that they may be able to answer
unto the questions that shall be propounded to them out of such
catechism by their parents or masters or any of the Select men when
they shall call them to a tryall of what they have learned in this
kinde. And further that all parents and masters do breed and bring
up their children and apprentices in some honest lawful calling,
labour or imployment, either in husbandry, or some other trade prof-
itable for themselves, and the Commonwealth if they will not or can
not train them up in learning to fit them for higher imployments.
And if any of the Select men after admonition by them given to such
masters of families shal finde them still negligent of their dutie
in the particulars aforementioned, wherby children and servants be-
come rude, stubborn and unruly; the said Select men with the help
of two Magistrates, or the next County court for that Shire, shall
take such children or apprentices from them and place them with
some masters for years (boyes till they come to twenty-one, and
girls eighteen years of age compleat) which will more strictly look
into and force them to submit unto government according to the rules
of this order, if by fair means and former instructions they will
not be drawn into it. (1648)34
The significance of the children laws was to make compulsory book
and religious education the responsibility of the state for all of the
children within its boundaries.
The 1647 law marked a tremendous step forward. It has been the
model for a vast amount of subsequent legislation. It contained all
the essentials of the purest democracy. The teachers were hired by the
people and paid by them to teach all their pupils to write and read,
without a shadow of class distinction. "Nor was the law simply permis-
sive; it was mandatory as well, requiring that schools be
established.
34The Laws and Liberties of Massachusetts, op. cit., pp. 91,
92
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and there was a penalty of five pounds for those communities that
failed to comply with the edicts. There was to be an elementary school
for towns of fifty families and a grammar school for those of one hun-
dred families."^^
The consequence of the law of 1642 could hardly be realized by the
founding fathers. "For the first time in the English-speaking world,
a legislative body representing the state ordered that all children
should be taught to read."^^ it can safely be stated that these two
laws together with the laws of 1634 and 1638 "providing for the equal-
ized and compulsory taxation of all town charges, also represent the
very foundation stones upon which our American public school system
have later been constructed. "37
An analysis by Martin indicates that these statutes have been part
of Massachusetts educational history from the beginning. His reasons
are as follows:
(1) The universal education of youth is essential to the well-
being of the state.
(2) The obligation to furnish this education rests primarily
upon the parent.
(3) The state has a right to enforce this obligation.
(4) The state may fix a standard which shall determine the kind
of education, and the minimum amount.
^^Edward Grast Dexter, History of Education (New York: Macmillan,
1904), p. 34.
^^Ellwood P. Cubberley, Public Education in the Unitej.
(Cambridge: Riverside Press , 1947) , p. 17.
37lbid., p. 18.
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(5) Public money raised by general tax may be used to provide
such education as the state requires. The tax may be general,
though the school attendance is not.
(6) Education higher than the rudiments may be supplied by the
state. Opportunity must be provided at public expense for youths
who wish to be fitted for the university. 38
More important is his comment of interpretation:
It is important to note here that the idea underlying all this
legislation was neither paternalistic or socialistic. The child is
to be educated, not to advance his personal interests, but because
the state will suffer if he is not educated. The state does not
provide schools to relieve the parent, nor because it can educate
better than the parents can, but because it can thereby better en-
force the obligation which it imposes. 39
The 1652 law may well be called the first academic standard regu-
lation and financial assistance for the future. It points out that
with the increased number of graduates the school system was accomplish-
ing its manditory design. It reads as follows:
It is therefore ordered and hereby enacted by this court that a
voluntary collection be commended to the inhabitants of this juris-
diction for the raising of such a sum as may be employed for the
maintenance of the president, certain fellows, and poor scholars
• • •
In 1654 the first certification law was passed and a teacher was
required to meet a given standard. Notice that not only the moral
standing, but orthodoxy of the teacher was required:
Ordered, Forasmuch as it greatly concerns the welfare of this
country that the youth thereof be educated not only in good liter-
ature, but sound doctrine, this court doth therefore commend it to
38George H. Martin, Evaluation of the Massachusetts Public School
System (New York: Appleton, 1902), pp. 14, 15.
^^Ibid.
,
p. 16.
^^Mass. Law (1652).
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the serious consideration and special care of the overseers of the
college and the selectmen in the several towns not to admit or suf-
fer any such to be continued in the office or place of teaching,
educating, or instructing of youth, or child, in the college or
schools that have manifested themselves unsound in the faith or
scandalous in their lives, and not giving due satisfaction accord-
ing to the rules of Christ.
All of these laws laid the foundation that would serve the nation
in the forthcoming expansion of the frontier, "as continued immigration
and natural increase the population of the colonies reached 1,600,000
by 1760. "42
It can be noted by the table below that compulsory town schools
were mandatory in most of the New England Colonies by the end of the
Seventeenth Century.
TABLE I
DATE OF MANDATORY TOWN SCHOOLS
For all Children
Massachusetts
Including New Hampshire
Including Maine
Including New Plymouth
New Haven
New Plymouth
Connecticut
Including New Haven
Optional book or religious education
(including New Haven)
1642-1695
1641-1679
1652-1695
1691-1695
1655-1665
1671-1691
1650-1702
1665-1702
1702-1776
For Children Apprenticed Only
Massachusetts (including Maine and New
^^Mass. Law (1654).
42Henry G. Good and James D. Teller, A mstory.
of
tion (New York: Macmillan, 1973), p. 18.
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Plymouth)
.
New Hampshire
. 1703-1776
. 1766-1776^3
This table points out that with the succession of laws after 1647
in Massachusetts and Connecticut the legislator recognized, beyond the
need of literacy, an avenue to maintain their cultural, political, and
religious heritage. Martin Luther expressed such a truth, kept alive
during the Reformation and implemented by the American founding fathers
when they gave birth to the idea of universal elementary education for
all children.^^ It is this principle that has influenced all educa-
tional legislation since that time and has involved federal and state
governments in financial aid to both public and non-public education.
REVOLUTIONARY PERIOD
Following the settlement of the Colonies the people began to take
an active role in the politics and laws effecting the new country.
Their involvement centered around England's unreasonable taxation de-
mands affecting the economic structure of the Colonies. Three of the
champions for freedom during this period were: Patrick Henry, James
Madison, and Thomas Jefferson. Their contribution is repeatedly cited
in the United States Constitution, Bill of Rights, and other
national
documents.
For the purpose of this study their concepts toward separation
of
church and state related to education are of notable
importance.
Patrick Henry
33
While New England legislated compulsory education, mandatory school
buildings, and taxation, a battle for separation of church and state was
born in Virginia. The events that lead to this battle came as special
instruction from Bishop Fulhan in 1650 to Governor Berkeley of'Virginia:
Article 1st. That in the first place you be careful. Almighty
God may be duly and daily served, according to the form of Religion
established in the Church of England, both by yourself and all the
people, under your charge, which may draw down a Blessing upon all
your Endeavors; and let every Congregation, that hath an able min-
ister, build for him a convenient Parsonage House: To which for
his better maintenance over and above the usual Pension, to lay 200
acres of Gleable Land; For the clearing of that Ground, every of his
Parishioners, for 3 years shall give some days labors, of themselves
and their servants; and see that you have a special care that the
Glebe Land be set as near his Parsonage House as may be, and that
it be of the best conditioned Land; Suffer no Invassion in matters
of Religion, and be careful to appoint sufficient and comformable
ministers to each congregation, that may catechise and Instruct them
in the Ground and Principles of Religion. 45
This gave the clergy a pension or salary and a parsonage in which
to live. On the surface this was reasonable instruction. However, the
pay came from taxation of the government, which in turn was state sup-
port of church and education.
Tobacco was the exchange or currency to meet this demand. As
early as 1696, the salaries of the clergy of the Established church had
been fixed by statute at sixteen thousand pounds of tobacco, to be lev-
ied by the several vestries on their parishes. 46 Beside their yearly
income, they received their "lawful perquisites", the use of the glebe.
45ibid.
^^William Waller Hening, Statutes at Large , Vol . Ill (Philadelphia
Thomas Desilver, 1823), p. 152.
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marriage, birth and burial fees. In 1748 this law was revised and re-
enacted, approved by the General Assembly and King George II of Great
Britain.^^
The Act of 1752 set the price of tobacco at sixteen shillings and
eight pence per hundred pounds. While these laws were designed to com-
pensate for losses due to overflowing of tide water damages in the
warehouses, they also set a standard of exchange. ^8
The clergy were faced with inflation since this represented a
fifty percent advance based on the value of tobacco in 1696, when their
salaries were set at sixteen thousand pounds. In 1755 the Colonies
faced a drought cutting the crop short, making it impossible for debts
to be paid in kind. The House of Burgesses passed an act, to be en-
forced for ten months, making it lawful to exchange tobacco for deprec-
iated colonial paper money, at the rate of sixteen shillings and eight
pence for every hundred pounds of tobacco. This then set the rate at
two pence per pound, a price below the market value, and became known
as the "two-penny Act".^^
Three years later the legislation passed in 1758^8 an act which
forced the clergy to accept in lieu of his salary of 400 pounds (six-
teen shillings and eight pence per hundred pounds of tobacco), 133
pounds of paper money of the colony, good only within the colony.
^^Ibid., Vol . VI, p. 88.
48ibid., pp. 236, 237.
^^William Wert Henry, Patrick Henry , Vol. 1 (New York: Bart
Franklin, 1969), p. 31.
^^Hening, op. cit., Vol. VII, p. 240.
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With the loss of their incomes, the Parsons appealed to the King.
The Reverend John Comm was sent by the clergy to England with a peti-
tion for a veto of the Act, He obtained an Order of Council to this
effect dated 10 August, 1759. He was instructed by the Lords of Trade
and the Privy Council that the Act was void, ab initio. Upon his re-
turning to Virginia the clergy sought redress in the courts.
The clergy argued that their salary was fixed at sixteen thousand
pounds per annum whether an abundant or a short crop, and that they
were entitled to that which had been withheld since the law was void,
lacking the King's signature.
The Assembly urged that the small crop made it impossible for
debtors to meet their tobacco dues, rendered large by taxation of the
French Wars; further, the act had not singled out the clergy but ap-
plied to all, and finally, the clergy above all other citizens should
sympathize with the distress of the people.
The Reverend James Maury was not pleased with the decision of the
case of Reverend John Comm and requested a jury trial which was granted.
Acting for the defense attorney for the Assembly was a young previously
unknown lawyer, Patrick Henry. Henry's argument has become the found-
ation of religious freedom and the separation of church and government.
He argued:
That the Act of 1758 had every characteristic of a good law;
. . .
that it was a law of general ability , and could not, consis-
tently with what he called the original compact between the king
and people, ... be annulled; . . , that a king, by disallowing
SlHenry, op. cit., p. 33.
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^ this salutary nature, from being the father of his people,degenerated into a tyrant, and forfeits all right to his subjects'
obedience
. . . that the only use of an established church and
society, is to enforce obedience to civil sanctions
. . .that when a clergy ceases to answer these ends, the community have
no further need of their ministry, and may justly strip them of
their appointments; that the clergy of Virginia, in this particular
instance of their refusing to acquiesce in the law in question, hadbeen so far from answering, that they had most notoriously counter-
acted, those great ends of their institution;
. . . that instead of
countenance, and protection and damages, [the clergy] very justly
deserved to be punished with signal severity.
The defense was so convincing that the jury found in favor of the
Plaintiff and awarded him one penny in damages. He had not only proved
to be an orator, but he had openly attacked the tyranny of church and
state and on 5 July, 1776 became the first Governor of the State of
Virginia. During his governorship he was recognized as one of the
champions of religious freedom. He incorporated this principle into
the Virginia Bill of Rights as found in the Sixteenth Article. It
reads
:
That religion, or the duty we owe to our Creator, and the man-
ner of discharging it, can be directed only by reason and convic-
tion, and not by force or violence; and, therefore, that all men
should enjoy the fullest toleration in the exercise of religion,
according to the dictates of conscience, unpunished and unre-
strained by the magistrate, unless, under color of religion, any
man disturb the peace, the happiness, or the safety of society;
and that it is the mutual duty of all to practice Christian for-
bearance, love, and charity towards each other. 53
This Article established a sound principle of separation of church
and state, another victory for liberty. The general populace was jubi-
lant, the bondage of the state church had been broken, the clergy had
^^Moses C. Tyler, Patrick Henry , American Statesman, Vol . Ill
(Boston: Houghton, Mifflin, 1887), p. 53.
53 Ibid., pp. 208, 209.
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become unpopular, and moral decline was seen throughout the colony.
Henry, as Governor, gave his support in 1784 to a Bill Establish-
ing a Provision for Teachers of the Christian Religion. 54 This Bill
would tax the people for financial support of religious schools, the
taxpayer could designate the school to receive the state financial aid.
"It was in effect a tax for the support of secular education" with
a provision for religion. Henry's fight for separation seems to take a
reverse position at this point, but under the circumstances he thought
he was taking a correct position to bring order back to society. He
was later to recognize that his "advocacy of the bill . . . was a
blunder. But his views were approved by Washington, Richard Henry Lee,
John Marshall, and Henry Tozewell. Whatever may have been his error,
it was on the side of virtue. His design was to support Christianity
against French infidelity. "56
James Madison
James Madison vigorously opposed the Bill of Assessment and counted
largely on Henry's political maneuver for the governorship to gain ad-
vantage. He made a motion to allow the vote of the people to approve
it before it would become law. Since the bill was "stripped of nearly
every objectionable feature, and was as perfect as such a measure could
^^Letters and Other Writings of James Madison , Vol . 3 (Philadel-
phia: J. B. Lippincott, 1865), p. 543.
^^Henry, op. cit., p. 207.
56ibid., p. 211.
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well be, 57 Henry was confident that it was the voice of the people.
Madison's outline of the bill to Thomas Jefferson in a letter dated
9 January, 1785 records that:
A resolution for a legal provision for the 'teachers of the
Christian religion' . . .its present dress, proposes a tax of —
percent on all taxable property for support of teachers of the
Christian religion. Each person . . . is to name the society to
which he dedicates it; and in case of refusal to do so, the tax
is to be applied to the maintenance of a school in the county. 58
Madison's plan was for the bill to be postponed, printed, and dis-
tributed among the people of the Commonwealth so they would have time
to signify their opinion on its adoption. He then prepared his "Memor-
ial and Remonstrance against Religious Assessments" which aroused in-
tense interest throughout the state. The important section for this
study is as follows:
Who does not see that the same authority which can establish
Christianity, in exclusion of all other religions, may establish
with the same ease any particular sect of Christians, in exclusion
of all other Sects? That the same authority which can force a cit-
izen to contribute three pence only of his property for the support
of any one establishment, may force him to conform to any other es-
tablishment in all cases whatsoever. 59
His masterly discussion of the subject, arguments for separation
of church and state based on the Henry Bill of Rights, caused the
Presbyterians in May, 1785, to unanimously disapprove of "any kind of
57ibid., p. 208.
58will iam C. Rives, History of the Life and Times of JajTes^ Mas-
son
,
Vol. I (1859; rpt. New York; Books for Libraries Press, 1970),
p. 610.
59Basic Documents Relating to the Rel igious Clau ses^ of .
Amendment%ashington, D.C.; Americans United for Separation of Church
and State, 1965), p. 9.
39
assessments for the support of religion", ^0 and on August 10 to ask
that Jefferson's bill reported in 1779 be adopted. The legislature
of 1785 defeated Henry's Bill of Assessments and passed Jefferson's
bill for the "Establishment of Religious Freedom."
Thomas Jefferson
In the preamble of Jefferson's Establishment Bill, he argued that
to compel a man to furnish contributions of money for the propogation
of opinions which he disbelieves, is sinful and tyrannical. Then in
Article II he established religious liberty as follows:
Be it enacted by the General Assembly, That no man shall be
compelled to frequent or support any religious worship, place or
ministry whatsoever, nor shall be enforced, restrained, molested,
or burthened in his body or goods, nor shall otherwise suffer on
account of his religious opinions or belief; but that all men shall
be free to profess, and by argument to maintain, their opinions in
matters, of religion, and that the same shall in no wise diminish,
enlarge, or affect their civil capacities.62
Jefferson's concern is illustrated by his statement: "lest as
time would pass some Zealot might endeavor to nulify the bill."^^ The
doctrine of Civil and Religious Liberty could not boast of more abler
proponents than Madison and Jefferson. "They were strenuously opposed
to the Civil governments having anything to do with regulating and
^^Henry, op. cit., Vol . II, p. 208.
61 Ibid., pp. 342-344.
^^Basic Documents Rel ati ng to the Religious Cl auses o£ the First
Amendment
,
op. cit., p. 16.
63william Addison Blakely, ed. American State Papers (Washington
D.C.: Review and Herald, 1949), p. 101
.
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enforcing by law religious customs and observance of any kind."^^ This
voluntarism concept causes the Bill of Rights of the United States to
ring with a certain and clear concept of separation of church and state.
This is constitutionalized with the ratification of the First Amendment
on 25 September, 1789: "Congress shall make no law respecting an es-
tablishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof . .
Since ratification it has been necessary to subject these words, as well
as other portions of the Bill of Rights, to careful interpretation in
order to establish a constitutional precept by which the courts and gov-
ernment can be guided in religious matters.
Jefferson now became the leader in educational thought. As early
as 1779 he proposed a comprehensive plan of education to the Virginia
legislature. It failed to be approved, but in his explanation the im-
portant provisions are clarified. They are: (1) local control, (2)
forward looking, (3) a national duty, (4) as growth, (5) learning by
and for doing, (6) pupil experimentation, (7) self-government for self-
development.^^ Liberty and the inalienable rights of man was the cen-
tral commitment of Jefferson's educational plan. He wanted to keep a
clearly-defined wall of separation between church and state.
In a letter to the Danbury Baptist Association of Connecticut
Jefferson re-emphasized his declared position on the religion clause
^^Ibid., p. 100.
^^U.S. Const. Bill of Rights, amend. I.
^^Allen Oscar Hansen, Liberalism and American Education (New
York:
Octagon Books, 1965), pp. 180-188.
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of the 1st Amendment of the United States Constitution. It read:
I contemplate with sovereign reverence that act of the whole
American people which declared that their legislature should 'make
no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the
free exercise thereof, thus building a wall of separation between
Church and State. 67
His critics propose that the wording was accidental, and that he
was not prepared for the complete separation that was interpreted from
his answer to the Danbury Baptist Association. However, the following
letter to Levi Lincoln, his Attorney General, would indicate that it
was prepared deliberately, and that he sought counsel and comment on
his separation doctrine:
Adverse to receive addresses, yet unable to prevent them, I
have generally endeavored to turn them to some account, by making
them the occasion, by way of answer, of sowing useful truths and
principles among the people, which might germinate and become
rooted arnong their political tenets. The Baptist address, now en-
closed, admits of a condemnation of the alliance between Church
and State, under the authority of the Constitution. It furnishes
an occasion, too, which I have long wished to find, of saying why
I do not proclaim fastings and thanksgivings, as my predecessors
did.
The address, to be sure, does not point at this, and its intro-
duction is awkward. But I foresee no opportunity of doing it more
pertinently. I know it will give great offense to the New England
clergy; but the advocate of religious freedom is to expect neither
peace nor forgiveness from them. Will you be so good as to examine
the answer, and suggest any alterations which might prevent an ill
effect, or promote a good one among the people? You understand
the temper of those in the North, and can weaken it, therefore, to
their stomachs: it is at present seasoned to the Southern taste
only. I would ask the favor of you to return it, with the address,
in the course of the day or evening. 68
67Basic Documents Rel ati ng to the Rel igious Clauses o£ the First
Amendment, op. cit., p. 19.
68paul Leicester Ford, The Works of Thomas Jefferson , Vol . IX
(New York: G. P. Putnam and Sons, 190'5]’, pp. 346, 347.
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There can be no doubt that Jefferson's position remained the same
after his presidency concerning what he and Madison had been espousing
from the year, 1776. Jefferson's influence can be traced from the
writing of the Declaration of Independence, the Declaration of Rights
of the Virginia Constitutions, the Virginia Statute for Religious Free-
dom, to the First Amendment of the United States Constitution. This
doctrine of "a wall of separation between church and state" was care-
fully considered. Likewise, it was followed by the first Presidents
of the United States.
With the establishment of the New Nation a vast unsettled frontier
stretched westward forcing the government to provide some form of sys-
tematic regulatory control. The Land Ordinance Acts became that solu-
tion. These Ordinances, however, provided more than boundaries for
townships. They allowed the government to accrue revenue from land
sales for the establishment of public education. In as much as the
Ordinances had significant impact on education leading to the first
phase of the federal aid struggle, they are considered in this study.
Land Ordinance of 1785
While the preceding factors influenced the establishment of the
principle of separation of church and state in education, it was not
until after the Revolutionary War that the government became directly
involved in education. Between 1776 to 1800, seven of the thirteen
states, as well as Vermont (admitted in 1791), recognized education to
69Freeman R. Butts, The American Tradition in Religion ^ Educ^
tion (Boston: Beacon Press, 1950), p. 93.
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be important enough to include an article in the state Constitution.
With a growing interest in nationalism, the federal government began to
take an active part in education by accepting from the original colo-
nies all lands from beyond the Alleghenies to the Mississippi. Thus a
National Domain was established for future states. This now became
a vast unsettled area which the new immigrants, displaced persons of
the Revolutionary War and the people from New England, wanted to set-
tle. They demanded the right to purchase land and to receive a clear
title. However, the government refused until it was surveyed. It was
the Land Ordinance Act of 1785 that established townships, counties,
municipalities, and territorial boundries. Accordingly, Congress, in
1785, adopted a rectangular form of land survey, under which the new
territory was laid out into "Congressional Townships"--six miles square.
Each township was in turn subdivided into sections one mile square and
into quarter sections and a regular system of numbering for each was
begun. The clause within the Ordinance of 1785 providing lot No. 16
of every township for the maintenance of public schools, is felt to be
the beginning of the federal government's role in granting financial
aid to education.
Article Three of the 1787 Act reads: Religion, morality, and
knowledge being necessary for good government and the happiness of man-
kind, schools and the means of education shall forever be encouraged,
^^Ellwood P. Cubberley, Public Education in the United Sta^
(Cambridge, Mass.: Houghton Mifflin, 1947), p. 91.
71 Ibid.
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and all persons while young shall be taught some useful occupation. "^2
There is little doubt that the federal government began to real-
ize that there was a certain moral obligation of the government to the
people of the nation. While there is some doubt as to the motive of
government involvement with these Ordinances, Daniel Webster clearly
stated: "It set forth and declared it to be a high and binding duty of
government to support schools and the means of education.
The Ordinance of 1787 was a governmental ordinance rather than a
land law and therefore contained no land grants for education. It did
set forth a principle for later developments. The full influence of
the Ordinance on education cannot be measured, but the fact remains
that the language of this ordinance secured the importance of education
in the territory for the future.
The Morrill Act
From 1859-1862 Justen Smith Morrill of Vermont fought for the pas-
sage of his now famous "Morrill Bill", seen by some authorities as one
of the first attempts by the federal government to involve itself in
the policies of education. The purpose of his bill was to provide
30,000 acres per congressman for the establishment of a college to im-
prove knowledge in agriculture. The heart of Morrill's proposal ap-
pears in Section IV:
72u.S. Statutes at Large, Land Ordinance 1787, 1 Stat., ch. 8,
art. III.
73journals of the Continental Congress 1774-1789, Vol . XXVIII ed.
John C. FitzpatrTck from the Original Records in the Library
of Con-
gress (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1933), p. 254.
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That the money so invested or loaned shall constitute a perpet-
ual fund ... to the endowment, support, and maintenance of at
least one college ... to teach military tactics . . . agriculture
and mechanic arts . .
.
promote the liberal and practical education
of the industrial classes.
After the Congress approved this bill, President Lincoln signed it
on 2 July, 1862. It is well to note that the word "college" in 1862
was synonymous with all instruction above the level of the common
schools. High schools were non-existent and academies were furnishing
the major instruction.
With the passage of the three Land Ordinances noted above, public
education was beginning to take a revolutionary form that would provide
instruction for the mass of children. It would secure public funds for
the future to develop institutions as the population grew. It would
protect the nation against a foreign invasion, an illiterate populace,
or a deficiency in technology.
FEDERAL AID STRUGGLE
First Phase
American public schools— free, secular, and opened to all— is felt
by many to be the supreme achievement of American democracy. Concern-
ing the Land Acts Daniel Webster remarked:
I doubt whether one single law of any lawgiver, ancient or mod-
ern, has produced effects of more distant, marked and lasting
7437 th Cong., 2nd Sess., Ch. 129, 130 (1862).
75Edward Danforth Eddy, Jr.. Colleges for our 1^ and jime (New
York: Harper and Harper, 1957), p. 37.
7^Leo Pfeffer, Church State and Freedom (Boston:
Beacon Press,
1967), p. 336.
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character than the Ordinance of 1787.
. . .It set forth and de-
clared it to be a high and binding duty of Government to support
schools and advance the means of education.''
This principle became the hope of the New Nation. It would rest
on three assumptions: First, that the legislature has the right to tax
all in order to provide free public education; second, that every parent
is required to provide for his children a basic education in secular
subjects; third, that the education provided by the state in its free
schools must be, i.e., secular free from religious bias.^^ These prin-
ciples were not accepted without a struggle. Presently, these same
principles are still being argued in the courts. Yet, in spite of the
struggle, all fifty of the state constitutions cite tax-supported secu-
lar public education as the right of its citizenry. The Indiana Con-
stitution words the mandated provision as follows:
Knowledge and learning, generally diffused throughout a commun-
ity, being essential to the preservation of a free government; it^
shall be the duty of the General Assembly to encourage, by all suit-
able means, moral, intellectual, scientific, and agriculture im-
provement; and to provide, by law, for a general and uniform system
of common schools, wherein tuition shall be without charge, and
equal ly open to al
1
This struggle and the acknowledgment in the state constitutions
for common schools came about as a result of many forces. It was felt
that education was the source of republican strength. With the follow-
ing fears common education became an accepted critical need for the
77conrad Henry Moehlman, School and Church (New York: Harper and
Brothers, 1944), p. 87.
^®Ibid.
,
p. 327
.
79indiana Const, art. VIII, sec. 1 (1851).
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republic: organized labor's demands for free and equal common schools;
natural science transforming the mind's of the intellectual classes,
working for a secularization of social processes; the multiplication of
religious sects; the increased number of immigrants, mostly Catholics,
which frightened the Protestants into accepting secular, rather than
Papal authority; and finally, the property owners' willingness to be
taxed for education. 80
There was only one form of education to keep the self-respect of a
nation of farmers and mechanics, bent on freedom and possessed with the
elective vote to choose its government; namely, a free non-sectarian
open public school system supported by taxation. 81
The major issue became sectarianism in the schools. Horace Mann
of Massachusetts successfully led a crusade against sectarianism with
the enactment of the law of 1827 which "provided that the school com-
mittee would not purchase any school books to be used in any schools
under their superintendence, calculated to favor any particular relig-
ious sect or tenet.
Later in 1837, Mann became the Secretary of the first Board of
Education. At once he preceded to enforce the law of 1827. The non-
sectarian school was the transition from the religiously dominated
80charles A. and Mary R. Beard, The Rise of American Civilization
(New York: Macmillan, 1946), p. 811.
^hbid., p. 810.
82|vioehlman, op. cit., p. 91.
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school of colonial times to the public schools of today. 83 it must
therefore be realized that public education is concerned with citizen-
ship, character development and the integration of personality, and
not with the religious tenets of a denomination.®^
There remained one more issue before non-sectarian public tax-
supported schools would be fully established: the development and es-
tablishment of Catholic parochial schools. With the immigration into
the United States of more than one and a quarter million German and
Irish Catholics during 1845-1855,®® the church more than doubled in
size. Catholic immigrants felt the need for parochial schools to pre-
serve their religious heritage. Consequently, the parochial school
was interested in teaching religion as the church understood it, not
only as a specific subject but permeating the whole curriculum.®®
This proved unsuccessful in view of the American public school system.
While the first school was erected in 1782 by St. Mary's Church in
Philadelphia,®^ it was not until 1808 when Mrs. Elizabeth Seton organ-
ized her school, later known as Sisters of Charity at Emmetsburg,
oo
Maryland, that the parochial system was establ ished.°°
®®Ibid.
®^Ibid., p. 95.
®^John R. Comons, Races and Immigrants in Ameri^ (New York:
Macmillan, 1920), p. 66.
®®Joseph H. Fichter, Parochial School (Notre Dame, Indiana:
Notre Dame Press, 1958), p. 86.
®7Anson Phelps Stokes & Leo Pfeffer, Oiur^^ St^ In ^
United States (New York: Harper and Row, 1964), p. 228.
®®J. A. Burns, Catholic School Systems (New York: Benziger
Brothers, 1912), p. 211.
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Subsequently, the Catholic Provincial Council issued the following
decrees in connection with the establishment and development of the par-
ochial school system in the United States.
1st Council 1829 - declared it necessary that Catholic schools
be established to avoid the danger of loss of faith among the chil-
dren.
2nd Council 1833 - appointed a standing committee to supervise
the preparation of textbooks.
4th Council 1840 - pastors were to prevent Catholic pupils in
public schools from using Protestant Bible, hymns and prayers.
1st Plenary Council 1852 - bishops were to have a school in
every parish supported from the parochial fund.
2nd Plenary Council 1866 - teachers of the congregations should
be employed in the parochial schools and every parish should erect
a school.
3rd Plenary Council 1884 - parochial schools should be without
cost.°^
These announced goals of the bishops, "that every Catholic child
be in a Catholic school", set the stage for the battle between public
and parochial schools. The first significant battle for parochial aid
was in New York City where 20,000 children refused to attend school be-
cause of religious objections. Although the Public School Society's
trustees argued that the public schools were free of sectarianism.
Bishop Hughes declared that there could be no Christianity without
sectarianism. He further stated that, by the practices of reciting
the Protestant Bible reading, hymn singing and prayers fostering the
Protestant doctrine of private interpretation of Holy Writ, and library
89stokes, op. cit., pp. 218-229.
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dnd school books' denunciation of Catholic personages, the public
schools were becoming centers of Protestantism and of Deism.^^
Recognizing this problem. Governor Seward urged the reorganization
of the New York City school system to include the Catholic system. His
plan stated:
The existing Catholic schools would become part of the state's
common school system - Catholic public schools - even though they
retained their private charters and religious affiliation. Public
funds would thus be appropriated to finance denominational schools
which Catholic children could attend without violating their relig-
ious convictions.^'
Catholic leaders petitioned the city's Common Council for a share
of the common school fund. Briefly, the petition requested that the
existing Catholic schools within the city, providing free instruction
to approximately three thousand boys and girls, would close unless they
received financial relief from the Common Council. They reminded the
Council that taxes were collected from Catholics for the Common Fund.
Therefore, they were entitled to a pro-rated share of the fund. It
would be this clause that would eventually defeat their request.
Within a few days both Jewish and Presbyterian groups presented
accompanying petitions to demand a proportional amount of the school
funds if the Catholic request was to be granted. The petition reads
in part: "If your Honorable Body shall determine to grant their (Cath-
olic) request, and thus establish the principle that this fund, though
^^Vincent P. Lannie, Public Money and Parochial Education (Cleve-
land: Case Western Reserve Univ. Press, 1968), pp. 54, 55,
91lbid., p. 21.
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raised by general tax, may be appropriated to church or sectarian
schools, then your Memorialists respectfully but earnestly contend,
that they are entitled to a rateable portion thereof.
.
.••92 serious
consequences were predicted if the Common Council granted this request.
On 12 March, 1840, a three-man Alderman Committee had an open hearing
allowing both sides to present their views. The Catholic representa-
tives stated their objection to the religious influence of the common
schools and gave reason for their request. Their final request was
that, even though religious instruction was an important part of their
curriculum, they agreed to limit it to after school hours if funds were
granted. 93
The Common Council came to a decision based on the following:
that Catholics
. . . are taxed not as members of the Roman Catholic Church,
but as citizens of the State of New York; and not for the purposes
of religion, but for the support of civil government. . . .Admit
the correctness of the [Catholic] claim, that the Common Council
of the city, or the Legislature of the State, may rightfully ap-
propriate the public money to the purposes of religious instruction
of any kind, in any school, and the consequence will be, that the
people may be taxed by law, for the support of some one or other
of our numerous religious denominations. . . .by granting a portion
of the School Fund to one sect, to the exclusion of others, a 'pref-
erence' is at once created, a 'discrimination' is made, and the ob-
ject of this great Constitutional guarantee is defeated. . .9^
To support this argument, the Council on 27 April, 1840, declared
that the conclusions were based on two inter-related questions: First:
^^Ibid., p. 33.
^^Ibid.
,
p. 44.
94ibid., p. 48.
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Have the Common Council of this city, under the existing laws relative
to common schools in the City of New York, a legal right to appropriate
any portion of the School Fund to religious corporations? Second:
Would the exercise of such power be in accordance with the spirit of
the Constitution and the nature of our Government?^^
After hearing the arguments, it was concluded that the Board re-
ject the Catholic position. It found that Catholics did not possess a
valid claim for a participation in the school fund in their present
capacity as an "incorporated religious society", nor that religious
instruction should have any part of a public school education. The
recommendation was approved with only one dissenting vote. Although
the Catholics made a second attempt, the decision remained the same
and public money was denied. Two arguments remain as the essential
points of debate today - that Catholic schools would close, and that
a large percent of the population being Catholic are entitled to a
pro-rated share of taxes.
As the battle continued, Hughes changed his approach and empha-
sized that public schools were "dens of infidelity". He characterized
the common school as a "dragon" . . . devouring the hope of the coun-
try as well as religion. He denounced it as "godless education ,
equivalent to Socialism, Red Republicanism, Universalism, Infidelity,
^^Ibid., p. 45.
^^Ibid., p. 49.
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Deism, Atheism, and Pantheism - anything, everything, except religion-
ism and patriotism. turned his back on the issue and aban-
doned the public schools, making the decision to concentrate on build-
ing and developing his diocesan parochial schools. He voiced: "Let
parochial schools be established and maintained everywhere i the days
have come, and the place, in which the school is more necessary than
the church. "98
During a forty-year period (1840-1880), a separate parochial sys-
tem emerged and developed parallel to the public school. The strength
for the system would be dictated by the Third Plenary Council of 1884
removing all options from both clergy and laity, it became a require-
ment for bishops and priests to build schools, and parents were bound
to enroll their children in the parochial school. The council decreed
that near each church, where it did not exist, a parochial school was
to be erected within two years of the promulgation. It was to be main-
tained in perpetuum, unless the Bishop made an exception on account of
grave difficulties. The success of the plan can be seen with a growth
from 3,000 students in 1840 to 28 schools and 10,000 students in 1854.
The enrollment increased to 5,600,519 in 1964, but declined to 3,364,000
in 1977, which are the latest statistics available. These include 9,902
elementary and secondary schools. 99
97ibid., p. 253.
98ibid., p. 256.
Vance Grant, Digest of Education Statistics-1977-78 (Washing-
ton: Government Printing Office, 1978), p. 47\
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The school controversy in New York convinced the Catholic educators
throughout the nation that the only way to meet their needs was the de-
velopment of the Catholic parochial school system. This system would
serve as a cataylist in the eventual secularization of American public
education. The persistence of Catholic schools in light of the secular-
ization of the public school can only be accounted for by the importance
the church places in fostering its religious beliefs.^®® Fichter
stated that "religion permeates the whole curriculum, and is not con-
fined to a single half hour period of the day."^^^ Finally, "religion
must, of necessity, permeate all life and education . . . the very core
and foundation upon which all education for the true, the good, and the
beautiful must be founded . . . religious education is the most impor-
tant agent in the development of the whole child and must be made the
central theme in all education. 102
The first phase of the battle concerning parochial aid came to an
end. However, the future will see additional phases fought, as well as
a restatement of the original argument that Bishop Hughes presented in
the New York City struggle.
SUMMARY
The historical review of governmental aid and the development of
education in America indicates that the founding fathers were keenly
l*^®Andrew M. Greeley and Peter H. Rorsi , The Education
Catholic
Americans (Chicago: Aldine, 1966), p. 4.
lOlpichter, op. cit., p. 86.
102john D. Redden and Francis A. Ryan, A Catholic Phi losophy^
of. Ed-
ucation (Milwaukee: Bruce, 1956), pp. 173-75.
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aware of the need for education to maintain the society that they came
to establish. In order to prevent this, free common schools, compul-
sory attendance, taxation for support, and professional standards were
mandated by the legislature.
While each colonial section contributed to the formation of public
education, it must be recognized that New England, with one person in
forty families, i.e., one in every two-hundred persons, had received
university training, led the way in establishing the common school.
Early documents show that the intellectual interest of these Oxford
and Cambridge graduates was the cornerstone of the new settlement.
Littlefield identifies the home as the major influence for the forma-
tion of New England Schools. He stated:
It was the conviction that every child born into the world is
the child of God, capable of becoming a vital and useful member of
society: and the corresponding obligation of the community to give
to it the opportunity of that training at home, in the church, and
in the school, which would send it forth at early manhood and wo-
manhood a self-di recti ng, competent person and a respectable citi-
zen of a self-governed state. This conviction was the corner-stone
of every respectable New England home, and explains the domestic
life of that people as nothing else can. . . .Out of the home was
born the New England school. T 04
lOS^i^gPQus Wilson Jennegan, Laboring and Dependent Classes in Colo-
nial America (New York: Ungar, I960), p. 65. The migration to New
England to 1643 is commonly reckoned at about 20,000 or 4,000 families.
Thus, there would be about one person in 40 families, or one for every
200 or more imigrating, who had received university training. Of these
over one hundred graduates were from Oxford and Cambridge universities
in England who settled in New England before 1650.
lO4Q0orge Emery Littlefield, Early Schools and School Books o^ New
England (New York: Russell and Russell , 1965)
," p. 86.
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For the first time in history, a free and public education was
available, over which neither the state, nor church, nor private corp-
oration, nor benefactor had control. It was a "permanent gift to the
Republic, from New England.
The battle in Virginia built a wall of separation between church
and state and thus contributed to the founding of religious freedom,
as well as influencing the sectarianism of the public school. It was
this concept that became the guiding principle for the educational
struggles of 1840 and onward. If Henry, Madison, and Jefferson had
not clearly recorded the purpose and content of this principle, it
would have fallen under severe attack during future struggles.
The full influence of the Land Ordinance upon public education
can be measured only by the impact of education on society. The Ordi-
nance of 1787 was the organic law of the Northwest territories, in
which land grants for education were realized. These provisions were
to be extended later to other territories. The language of this Ordi-
nance has inspired other policies for the development of education.
National land grants were the foundation of public education in the
United States which prepared the way for making federal money grants
for education. It is not difficult to realize that it is only a small
step to convert money from the sale of public land to money grants
out
of the tax revenue of the federal and state governments.
With the opening of the frontier, the large Catholic immigration
to the United States, and the religious code of the
Catholic Church,
105 Ibid.
,
p. 79.
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it was natural evolution for a parochial educational system to develop.
These factors lead to financial problems in the early 1800's. They
were significant enough to urge Bishop Hughes and his advisers to make
a petition to the Common Council of New York City for financial assist-
ance. Their request was first reviewed by the Assistant Alderman Coun-
cil. Later it went to the Common Council, and there it was denied.
The first governmental struggle with the Catholic Church was de-
feated. However, the same principle voiced by the church is heard to-
day. The Catholic Church desired either the right to bring its own
dogma into public schools for the teaching of Catholic children, or a
share of the public school funds for the support of Catholic parochial
schools.
With the defeat of the Catholic petition to the New York Common
Council, a dual educational system was founded. While both systems
have grown, the continued requests for governmental aid in the financ-
ing of parochial schools has caused legislators, educators and relig-
ious leaders to re-evaluate the principle of separation of church and
state.
lO^Leo Pfeffer, Church State and Freedom (Boston: Beacon Press,
1967), p. 336.
CHAPTER III
EVOLUTION OF THE CHILD-BENEFIT THEORY PRIOR TO 1970
Pre-Cochran Cases Serve as a Foundation for Child-Benefit - 1840-1920
This chapter treats the data through an historical interpretation
of the child-benefit theory. The federal acts and court cases within
this interpretation are only those that were significant to the found-
ing of the theory. The development of a comprehensive educational sys-
tem is a significant contribution by those who, over a century ago, be-
lieved that free public schools would lay the foundation for the ideals
of democracy. They fought a battle to keep the schools free from de-
nominational influences as had been typical of its past history.
After the secularization of the public school and the defeat of
the Catholic struggle in New York City, Horace Mann and other educators
turned to strengthening the public system. The first step was the for-
mation of a graded system. This involved building larger schools with
smaller school rooms, sorting and grading the students, outlining the
instructional material by years, and organizing the division of the
school building into an educational unit.^ The important changes
in
the following years would be the development of the District
system,
teacher training in the colleges, the acceptance of
kindergarten, cur-
riculum reorganization, compulsory attendance laws, and
vocational or
"•Ellwood P. Cubberley, Public Education in the UrnM
bridge: Riverside Press, 1947), p. 315.
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industrial training. Basically, this was the educational format of the
United States prior to 1920.
Earliest federal efforts to provide aid to education came in the
form of the Land Ordinance of 1785. The years from 1785 to 1900 pro-
vided many precedents in legislation. An analysis of the major efforts
to obtain federal aid for the schools by Gordon Lee indicated a long
heritage of interest by various public and professional groups in such
proposals. The awakening to the importance of education as a national
concern may be recognized by the voluminous proposals to Congress, the
partisan positions regarding the federal government's role in public
and non-public education, and the nation's press coverage of the issues.
Perhaps the most significant evidence was the failure of Congress to
pass even one of these aid bills, the considerations of constitutional-
ity of states' rights. Thus, centralization or federal control of ed-
ucation prohibited a ratification of any of the proposal s.^
On the other hand, there are writers who express that "changing
conditions in American life have made it increasingly apparent that the
maintenance of a democratic school system depends upon a more liberal
support of education by the national government.^ An educated citizenry
is essential to the public welfare. The "maintenance of a system of
public education is as much an attribute of government as the police
power, the power to tax, to administer justice, or to maintain military
^Gordon Canfield Lee, The Struggle for Federal Aid^ (New York: Co-
lumbia University Press, 1949) , pp. 163-165.
^Newton Edwards, Equal Educational Opportunity for Yo^ (Washing-
ton: American Council on Education, 1939) , p. vii
.
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forces, ^ This was supported by the Supreme Court of New Hampshire in
Fogg Board of Education :
^
The primary purpose of the maintenance of the Common school
system is the promotion of the general intelligence of the people
constituting the body politic and hereby to increase the usefulness
and efficiency of the citizens, upon which the government of society
depends. Free schooling furnished by the state is not so much a
right granted to pupils as a duty imposed upon them for the public
good. If they do not voluntarily attend the schools provided for
them, they may be compelled to do so. While most people regard the
public schools as the means of great personal advantage to the pu-
pils, the fact is too often overlooked that they are governmental
means of protecting the state from the conseguences of an ignorant
and incompetent citizenship.
While safety of the state and eguality of opportunity for the cit-
izenry have been the educational goals, the public schools have not lost
sight of their responsibility to improve the guality of individual liv-
ing and to advance the American culture. They are considered the "guard-
ian of those accumulations of ideas, knowledge, skills, values, and at-
titudes which constitutes what has been happily described as the "funded
capital of experience."^
The excesses of the 1920's with its successes and failures prepared
the stage for phase two of the struggle for federal aid. This period
has been described by many writers as "The Jazz Age", "The Lawless Dec-
ade", "The Age of the Flapper", "The Era of Flaming Youth", ^ the "Golden
Twenties", the "Roaring Twenties", the "Age of Disillusionment , the
^Ibid., p. 2.
^76 N.H. 296 (1912).
^Edwards, op. cit., p. 148.
^Dumas Malone and Basil Rauch, Empire for Liberty. ^ Vol . II (New
York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1960) , p. 499.
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"Decade of Wonderful Nonsense", and the "Ballyhoo Years ".8 All of
these terms suggest a period of unequaled freedoms and economic secur-
ity. Every phase of society came under attack. Religion wanted to re-
turn to pre-war days; fashion became expressive of nonconformativeness;
moral standard broke down; women wanted to be liberated; and a general
disrespect for authority flourished in all aspects of society: legal,
q
social, and religious.
With the change of people's values, more thought was given to equal
educational opportunities for the nation's children. They required ac-
countability of the public schools and encouraged a dual educational
system by developing more private schools.
Finally, the Wall Street Crash of October 1929, and the Depression
that followed, amounted to a major national crisis. In the midst of
this turmoil, the educational decisions which were made would formulate
the future governmental role in aid to non-public education.
The educational decision and legislative arguments of the period
from 1900 to 1930, involving public support of parochial education, are
related to action taken by the state courts rather than the federal
courts. From 1819 until 1899, Congress funded religious schools for
the Indians without being challenged.^0 However, in 1896, the following
^Lewis Paul Todd and Merle Curti , Rise of the Arne ri can Nati^ 2d.
ed. (New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, 1966T7^p. 646.
^Malone, loc. cit.
''^Robert Fairchild Cushman,
in American Constitutional Law"
"Public Support of Religious Education
Illinois Law Review 45:334 (1947).
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opinion was published by Congress: "And it is hereby declared to be
the settled policy of the government to hereafter make no appropriation
whatever for education in any sectarian school. This appears to be
the stand of the federal government until the 1930' s. During this same
period, a series of governmental aid cases were argued. In the case of
Quick Bear v. Luepp it was decided that funds owed to the Indians
under the treaty agreements were their property to be spent as they saw
fit in bringing aid to their religious schools. The rationale used in
reaching this decision was that since the hospitals which ran the
schools were chartered as a secular corporation, there was no violation
of the First Amendment, and the aid could not be challenged on consti-
tutional grounds.
The issue of the child-benefit theory began to materialize in 1922
when New York State attempted to distribute free textbooks to pupils in
parochial schools, thus acting beyond the approved and established pol-
icy for the public schools. This law merely stated schools and did not
identify them according to category. The opinion of the court in Smi th
y_. Donahue , that free textbooks were supplied to schools, could only
mean public schools under the control of the Board of Education. These
schools were parish schools and the pupils of the schools were not pu-
pils of the district as considered in the statute. On this part the
court ruled that:
1129 Stat. 345 (1896); 30 Stat. 62 (1897).
^^210 U.S. 50 (1908).
1^195 N.Y. Supp. 715 (1922).
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We find that the parochial schools of the city of Ogdensburg
are not a part of the education system of the state; that those
schools are not "schools of the school district", but are "schools
of the Parish", and the pupils of those schools are not pupils of
the school district; that those schools are not schools of the city
of Ogdensburg in which free textbooks or other school supplies were
lawfully provided for; that under the Constitution of the state,
textbooks as school supplies cannot be furnished by defendants to
the parochial schools, or the pupils of parochial schools, in the
city of Ogdensburg.
The court argued further that:
The school is not the building and its equipment; it is the or-
ganization, the union of all the elements in the organization, to
furnish education in some branch of learning--the arts or sciences
or literature. It is the instruction and the teachers and scholars
together that make it up. The pupils are part of the school. . . .
It seems to us to be giving a strained and unusual meaning to words
if we hold that the books and the ordinary school supplies, when
furnished for the use of pupils, is a furnishing to the pupils, and
not a furnishing in aid or maintenance of a school of learning. It
seems very plain that such a furnishing is at least indirectly in
aid of the institution and that if not in actual violation of the
words, it is in violation of the true intent and meaning, of the
constitution and in consequence equally unconstitutional.
The first textbook case dealing with aid to the child was over-
ruled, but the principles developed in this case laid a foundation for
subsequent Supreme Court rulings in favor of aid centered on the child-
benefit theory.
The following year (1923) in Nebraska, Robert T. Meyer, an instruc-
tor in a Zion Evangelical Lutheran school, was found guilty for teach-
ing a foreign language to a child still in the elementary school.
Nebraska state law prohibited the teaching of a foreign language to a
child below the eighth grade. It reads:
Section 1. No person, individually or as a teacher, shall in
any private, denominational, parochial or public
subject to any person in any language other than the English lang-
uage.
Section 2. Languages, other than the English language, may
be
taught as languages only after a pupil shall have
attained and
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successfully passed the eighth grade. . . .This was designed to
Americanize foreigners who had immigrated to the states and to se-
cure the protection and the general welfare of the people.
Meyers appealed the case to the United States Supreme Court on the
grounds that the state law interfered with the teacher's right to teach,
the child's right to acquire knowledge, and the parent's right to con-
trol the education of their children, all of which the Fourteenth Amend-
ment guarantees: "No state . . . shall deprive any person of life, lib-
erty, or property without due process of law."^^ Mr. Justice McReynolds
delivered the opinion of the court:
Mere knowledge of the German language cannot reasonably be re-
garded as harmful. Plaintiff's . . . right to teach and the right
of parents to engage him so to instruct their children, we think,
are within the liberty of the amendment. Evidently the Legislature
has attempted to interfere with the . .
.
power of parents to con-
trol the education of their own.
Justice McReynolds went further to say that: "the individual has
certain fundamental rights which must be respected. The protection of
the Constitution extends to all, to those who speak other languages
as well as those born with English on the tongue."!^
While this case, Meyer v. Nebraska ,!^ did not involve appropria-
tion of aid to non-public schools, it did, however, establish another
l^Nebraska Laws 1919 Chap. 249.
l^U.S. Const, amend. XIV.
l^Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
17id.
^®262 U.S. 390 at 400 (1923).
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principle that would be applied in future cases to support the child-
benefit theory.
The judgment of the Nebraska Supreme Court was reversed and the
plaintiff rights were upheld. The main contribution in this case was
the establishment of the principle that parents share in the control of
the education of their children. To strengthen this principle Pierce
y_. Society of Sisters and Pierce y^. Hill Military Academy^ ^ depended
heavily on the United States Supreme Court's decision of Meyers. In
Oregon, the law required that the parents send their children ... to
a public school for a period of time ... a public school shall be held
during the current year in the district where the child resides.
The Society of Sisters Orphanage, an Oregon corporation, was ap-
pointed by the Catholic Church to care for, to educate, and to instruct
the youth within their domain in the tenets of the Roman Catholic Church.
The appellants argued that the law conflicted with the right of the par-
ent or guardian to choose schools where their children would receive ap-
propriate mental and religious training. The United States Supreme
Court handed down the following opinion which affirmed the lower court:
Under the doctrine of Meyer v. Nebraska we think it entirely
plain that the Act of 1922 unreasonably interferes with the lib-
erty of parents and guardians to direct the upbringing and educa-
tion of children under their control. The child is not the mere
creature of the state; those who nurture him and direct his destiny
have the right, coupled with the high duty, to recognize and prepare
him for additional obligations. 21
^^268 U.S. 510 (1925).
^^Oregon Laws 1923 Sec. 5259.
2lMeyer v. Nebraska, loc. cit.
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In 1929 and 1930, sevGral statG courts hoard casGS concorning free
tGxtbooks bGing furnishod to public and non-public schools. Tho first
onG to bG considorod in this study is tho StatG Board of Education v.
KGnnGy_.22 jhG constitutionality of tho Kontucky FroG Toxtbook Act was
sustainod on tho following points: Tho Franklin Circuit Court had
Grrod on tho grounds that tho purchasG of toxtbooks would croatG a dobt
beyond the limits contained in the law, and that the appropriate langu-
age was too general and unlimited. The statute was not put into oper-
ation since the legislature did not make provision, either in the act
itself or any other one, for the creation of a fund for the payment of
the books. Nevertheless, this did establish that the state was respon-
sible to provide free textbooks for the children of the non-public
schools.
In the next case, Borden v. Louisiana State Board of Education ,^^
the issue of providing textbooks for the children of the public and
non-public schools of Louisiana was ruled unconstitutional according to
Acts No. 143 and 100 of the state constitutions. However, the federal
court ruled that the furnishing of books to children for their use
while attending school, would come within the police power; therefore,
the court sustained the constitutionality of the free textbook statute.
The important issue of the textbook case was whether the state has
the right to provide tax funds for the support of private and sectarian
schools which may teach religion, and if so, would this consist of
aid
22230 Ky. 287, 18 SW 2d 1114 (1929).
23168 La. 1005, 123 Sa 655 (1929).
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to religion and/or denomination. The court said: "The school books
are not granted or donated to the children. It is only the use of the
books that is granted to the children. "24 ip other words, the books
are loaned to them; they are not granted as gifts from the state.
Therefore, the furnishing of school books to the children of the state
would tend to promote their education and to obliterate illiteracy,
"thereby improving the morals of the children and promoting the gen-
eral welfare and safety of the people, and hence comes within the po-
lice power. "25 jhe court took the position that the books were on loan
and would be returned by the students at the end of the year. Further,
it upheld that this loan did not provide aid to the sectarian schools,
but that the state was only following the mandates of the law for the
public welfare.
The decision was based on the following factors:
(a) The law did not provide for the purchase of the book for
sectarian schools; (b) by providing for free books for the children
of the state the law was obviously enacted for the benefit of the
children and the "resulting benefit of the state"; (c) the schools
are not the beneficiaries of the statute; (d) the books furnished
by the state are not sectarian books; (e) "none is to be expected,
adapted to religious instruction. "26
Cochran Case
The case that would be recognized as a landmark of the child-bene-
fit theory was taken from Louisiana Supreme Court to the United States
^^"Aid to Sectarian Schools", NEA Research Bulletin Vol . XXIV No.
1, February 1946, p. 20.
25ibid.
26 ibid.
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Supreme Court during 1930 and was affirmed. This was Cochran v. Louis-
iana Bo^ of Educajy^ The United States Supreme Court approved
the theory that the justices rendered in the Borden case.
Cochran objected to the free textbook law of Louisiana and sought
an injunction on the grounds that supplying books to private schools
amounted to a tax for a private rather than a public purpose, and there-
fore violated the prohibition of the Fourteenth Amendment against state
laws depriving persons of property without due process of law. 28
In order to establish the public purpose of the textbook legisla-
tion, Chief Justice Hughes quoted at length from sections of the Louis-
iana lower court for his majority opinion. He cites the operation and
effect of the state legislation in question as follows:
One may scan the acts in vain to ascertain where any money is
appropriated for the purchase of school books for the use of any
church, private, sectarian or even public school. The appropri-
ations were made for the specific purpose of purchasing school
books for the use of the school children of the state, free of
cost to them. It was for their benefit and the resulting benefit
of the state that the appropriations were made. True, these child-
ren attend some school, public or private, the latter sectarian or
non-sectarian, and that the books are to be furnished them for
their use, free of cost, whichever they attend. The schools, how-
ever, are not the beneficiaries of these appropriations. They ob-
tain nothing from them, nor are they relieved of a single obliga-
tion, because of them. The school children and the state alone are
beneficiaries. It is also true that the sectarian schools, which
some of the children attend, instruct their pupils in religion, and
books are used for that purpose, but one may search diligently the
acts, though without result, in an effort to find anything to the
effect that it is the purpose of the state to furnish religious
books for the use of such children. . . .What the statutes contem-
plate is that the same books that are furnished children attending
2^281 U.S. 370 (1930).
28Leo Pfeffer, Church State and Freedom (Boston: Beacon Press,
1953), p. 559.
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public schools shall be furnished children attending private
schools. This is the only practical way of interpreting and exe-
cuting the statutes, and this is what the State Board of Education
IS doing, tong these books, naturally none is to be expected, ad-
instruction. Viewing the statute as having the
attributed to it, we cannot doubt that the taxing power
Of the state is exerted for a public purpose. The legislation does
not segregate private schools, or their pupils, as its beneficiaries
or attempt to interfere with any matters of exclusively private con-
cern.
^
Its interest is education, broadly; its method, comprehensive
Individual interests are aided only as the common interest is safe-
guarded.
The Borden and Cochran cases established the much controverted and
argued interpretation of the child-benefit theory. One writer points
out that "reaction to the Cochran case was scattered and slight. "30
However, one article in the Illinois Law Review states that (The fed-
eral tribunals):
. . . escapes the ban of the Fourteenth tondment and of these
state provisions by saying that the gift is not made to the schools
but to the children themselves, and, being such, is not a gift to
private persons or private institutions and not a gift for private
purposes, but a gift, as it were, of the state to itself, which is
given to the children of all classes and of all schools alike, not
only that these children may be benefited but that the state itself
may be benefited through them. . . .It is true that the opinions
. . . take it for granted that the books will be non-sectarian and
non-religious in their nature. But the line will always be hard to
draw. The field of mathematics is perhaps a safe one, but the his-
tories of Galilo and Capernicus would lead us to believe that astron-
omy is a dangerous one. The same thing is true of all textbooks on
biology, anthropology, history and philosophy. The policy in short,
may be a questionable one. 31
Boles referred to an article in Commonwealth (12:35, 1930), which
acclaimed "the Cochran case a decision of far-reaching importance."
The author considered the possibility of some undesirable implications
^^Cochran v. Louisiana Board of Education 281 U.S. 370 (1930).
^^Donald E. Boles, The Two Swords (Ames, Iowa: Iowa University
Press, 1967), p. 126.
^^Andrew A. Bruce, Illinois Law Review 25:548 (1931).
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ensuing from the case. "May it not be deduced
. . . that state educa-
tional authorities might justifiably claim other forms of controls,
(besides textbooks), in the interest of education
. .
.?"32
The Cochran case aroused little public interest due to the absence
of the question of church and state separation, and not until the Ever-
son case seventeen years later would it be classified as an important
factor in the development of a new concept in permissable government
aid.^^
While the Supreme Court determines the meaning of the federal con-
stitution, its opinion was not binding on the state constitutions.
Furthermore, each state would have to interpret their own constitution
in applying the theory. The logical application of the child-benefit
theory could frustrate the principles of prohibitions contained in the
state constitution. As one court said, "practically every proper ex-
penditure for school purposes aids the child. "^4 However, aid would
usually include school bus transportation, secular textbooks, and medi-
cal care. Those who oppose the theory argue that the doctrine proves
too much, and constitutional prohibitions on aid to non-public schools
35
become meaningless.
The proponents of government aid for non-public schools trace the
^^Boles, op. cit.
,
p. 126.
^^Anson Phelps Stokes and Leo Pfeffer, Church and State in
United States (New York: Harper and Row, 1961 ) , p. 432.
^^Gurney v. Ferguson 190 Okla. 254 (1941).
35Robert Fairchild Cushman, "Public Support of Religious Education
in American Constitutional Law", Illinois Law Review 45:391 (1947).
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origin of the child-benefit theory to the Cochran case, where it re-
ceived judicial acceptance: "For just as Cochran ... has opened the
way by oblique ruling for this decision, so will the two make wider the
breach for a third. It is further noted that "constitutional pro-
hibitions against aid to sectarian schools are then avoided by the use
of the "child benefit" theory, which was first successfully used in the
textbook cases. "37
From the Cochran Case to the Everson Case
Change of Catholic Position - Pro Aid
It did not take long for the Catholic educators to recognize an
opportunity for financial aid to their parochial system. From 1840 to
the early 1930' s, they maintained a fixed position in opposing govern-
ment involvement in sectarian education. Nevertheless, following the
decision made in the Cochran case and its antecedents, the Catholic
Church underwent a major shift to qualified support of federal aid pro-
posals. The shift in legal philosophy and arguments was accompanied by
an effort of Catholic writers to reassert the claim that Catholic par-
ents are merely demanding that they be reimbursed for the public service
they are performing by maintaining parochial schools, and that privately-
38
supported schools should share in the administration of the aid relief.
36Everson v. Board of Education 67 Sup. Ct. 504 - at 518 E. 20
(1947).
^^Editors, "Public Funds for Sectarian Schools", Harvard 1^ Re
-
view 60:796 (1947)
.
^®George Johnson, "Should Federal Funds be Spent for
cation?", Congressional Digest XIII, February, 1934, pp. 51-53.
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Based largely on the economic and political philosophies of President
Roosevelt's New Deal and the preceding judicial decision, Catholics
changed their philosophy and developed a rationale to share in a fi-
nancial aid program. 39 This new position reflects first a general
change of the position that education was not exclusively the respon-
sibility of the state, but that parents had a right in the educational
choice of their children. ( Meyers v. Nebraska 262 U.S. 390 [1923] and
Pierce v. Society of Sisters 268 U.S. 510 [1925]), and secondly that
under General Welfare (which was used so successfully at the time of
the New Deal), the federal government should provide some type of gen-
eral aid to education, irrespective of its control. This aid was made
available to all school children.
For a number of years after the Cochran case the child-benefit
theory neither received acceptance nor came before the Supreme Court
again until Everson v. Board of Education . An investigation of the
appellate courts since 1930 discloses a trend of acceptance of the
child-benefit theory between Cochran and Everson and a rejection after
Everson until 1970.
^^Ambrose A. Clegg, Jr., "Church Groups and Federal Aid to Educa-
taion". History of Education Quarterly IV, 1933-1939, p. 143.
^^Ibid.
,
p. 150.
^b30 U.S. 1 (1947).
^^Roy A. Allen and Robert Marshall, "Child Benefit Has Lost Its
Glitter", Phi Delta Kappen XLIII, November, 1962, p. 77.
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Permitting Aid Between 1930-1947
In Le^ V. Bp^ of Education, the plaintiff sought an injunc-
tion against transporting public and non-public school children in the
city of New York at public expense on the grounds that it violated New
York State Constitution. The court, in an opinion at Special Term,
held that "the constitution no more forbids transportation to school
children than it forbids supplying them with lunch. The case was
dismissed and future appeals denied.
Board of Education v. Wheat^^ regarded the transportation of a
minor to a Roman Catholic parochial school in accordance with the
county law. The court's judgment was:
With that purpose possible, then, is the act to be regarded as
a provision for supplying the public school facilities to private
schools? The question includes provision to parochial schools,
one kind of private schools. Courts elsewhere, which in cases
cited to us have dealt with somewhat similar questions, have not
agreed in their views. In Cochran v. Louisiana State Board of Ed-
ucation
,
281 U.S. 370, 50 S.Ct. 335, 74 L.Ed. 913, the Supreme
Court of the United States decided than an appropriation of tax-
payers money to provide textbooks to children of private schools
did not violate the Fourteenth Amendment, mainly because the books
were, by the terms of the authorizing statute, to be supplied di-
rectly to the children. In the state court from which the appeal
was taken three of the seven judges sitting dissented from that
view.
It is, however, not found necessary to consider in the present
case whether textbooks or any facilities other than that of trans-
portation of the children may be supplied for they may be differ-
entiated. Starting with the interest which the State is acknow-
ledged to have in seeing that all children of school age acquire
N.E. 2d. 743 (1937).
A. 628 (1938).
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an education by attending some school, and the fact that they are
complying with the law in going to such a school as the parochial
school involved in this case, their accommodation in the buses ap-
pears to the court to be within the proper limits of enforcement
of the duty imposed. Compliance having been made dangerous in a
much greater degree, removal of the danger to any extent would seem
to be within the same public function. Even though the statute or-
dering it may be open to another interpretation, if the transporta-
tion with this object is a constitutional action, the statute must
be construed as having the object, because the court is required to
admit the constitutionality of an act of assembly if it can be
brought within the exercise of any constitutional power.
The danger of perversion of private purposes may be admitted,
but the Legislature is primarily entrusted with the care of that,
and the courts have no duty in relation to unless and until a per-
version should be obvious. The fact that the private schools, in-
cluding parochial schools, receive a benefit from it could not pre-
vent the Legislature's performing the public function.
This conclusion that the act must be regarded as one within the
function of enforcing attendance at school, renders it unnecessary
to consider separately the objection that a religious institution
is aided. Art. 36, Declaration of Rights. The institution must
be considered as aided only incidentally, the aid only a by-product
of proper legislative action.
One further objection is that the accommodation of private
school children violates the requirement of section 3 of article 8
of the State Constitution, that, 'The School Fund of the State
shall be kept inviolate, and appropriated only to the purposes of
education.' Apart from any other reason, this interprets 'purposes
of education' too narrowly. It is not denied that transportation
comes within the purposes for which the public money may be ex-
pended when public school children are carried, and that must be
equally true when private school children are carried, if carrying
them is found to be within the public functions.
Four years later, the Court of Appeals upheld the Wheat decision
in Adams v. St. Mary's County case^^ and finally, Clauss v. Board^ of
Education.^® Justice Marbury delivered the opinion of the court:
^^Id., 628-630.
^^180 Md. Rep. 556 (1942).
^8
i 81 Md. Rep. 522 (1943).
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The appeller raises a constitutional objection to a construct-
ion of Section 46 of Article 101 which requires it to use its funds
to pay compensation or to pay premiums for compensation insurance.
This point is based upon Section 3 of Article VIII which provided:
'The School Fund of the State shall be kept inviolate and appropri-
ated only to the purposes of education.' This contention depends
entirely upon what are considered purposes of education. The sys-
tem in use now is very different from that in use at the time of
the adoption of the Constitution. Then, the children of the State
were taught in one-room schools, heated by wood stoves which the
pupils took turns in keeping supplied with fuel. These pupils came,
for the most part, from within walking distance of these schools.
With the passage of time, the necessity of teaching more subjects
and of having specially trained teachers for such purposes has been
recognized. For these reasons, among others, schools have been con-
solidated, and teachers instruct in single subjects or confine
their work to specific grades or classes, instead of teaching all
of the pupils in any community in all subjects and grades. This
has resulted in the building of large consolidated schools, and the
transportation of pupils to these schools by buses furnished with
county funds. In two recent cases ( Wheat and Adams v. $t . Mary's
County ) , this court held that the expenditure of public funds to_
carry children to parochial schools under certain circumstances is
an expenditure for purposes of education within the Constitution.
It took approximately six years to establish the transportation
concept in Maryland.
Chance y_. Mississippi State Textbook Rating and Purchasing Board^
O
was the first textbook case after the Cochran decision. The plaintiff
sought an injunction based on section 23 of the laws of 1940 which vio-
lated section 208 of the Mississippi Constitution of 1890 which denied
any religious sects to share in the educational funds of the state.
The opinion of Justice Alexander stated:
There is no requirement that the Church should be a liability
to those of its citizenship who are at the same time citizens
of
the state, and entitled to privileges and benefits of the
church.
49id.
5^200 So. 706 (1941).
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Indeed, the state has made historical acknowledgement and daily
legislative admission of a mutual dependence one upon the other.
It is the control of one over the other that our Constitution
forbids.
The religion to which children of school age adhere is not
subject to control by the state; but the children themselves are
subject to its control. If the pupil may fulfill its duty to the
state by attending a parochial school it is difficult to see why
the state may not fulfill its duty to the pupil by encouraging it
by all notable means? The state is under duty to ignore the
child's creed, but not its need. It cannot control what one child
may think, but it can, and must do all it can to teach the child
how to think. The state which allows the pupil to subscribe to
any religious creed should not, because of his exercise of this
right, proscribe him from benefits common to all.
If throughout the statute there are words which arrest the
attention of over-sensitized suspicion and are seen by a jaun-
diced eye as symptoms of secular control, one may regain compos-
ure by viewing the state's book depository as a great public li-
brary of books available to all, which sells any book to anybody,
and which, subject to reasonable regulation, allows the free use
thereof to any child in any school. 51
The privilege of requisition by qualified private or sectarian
schools for the loan of such books to its pupils does not place in
such school the 'control of any part of the school or other educa-
tional funds' of the state. The mere availing of benefits of an
appropriation law fully made does not result in a control of such
funds. Its use is controlled, only by the purpose for which the
legislature designated it. Nor is the loaning of such books under
such circumstances to the individual pupils a direct or indirect
aid to the respective schools which they attend, although school
attendance is compulsory. Such pupil is free to attend a proper
public or private school, sectarian or otherwise. 52
The opinion that the state is responsible for the education of the
child and not the religious creed, strengthened the textbook aspect of
the child-benefit theory and suggested that it would be an avenue by
which to proceed. At least, it was a beginning. However, with the
^hd., 710.
52id., 713.
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consolidation of school districts, transportation seemed to get a
wider acceptance than other phases of the concept.
The next three cases
—
Adams County Commissioners 26 A 2d 377
(1942), Nichols v. Henry 191 S.W. 2d 930 (1945), and Bowker v. Baker
167 P. 2d 256 (1946)— all permitted aid and upheld the state constitu-
tion to provide transportation service to non-public school children
for their safety which "is an important function of government, just
as much so as their education.
Prohibiting Aid Between 1930-1947
The following five cases rejected child benefit regarding the
transporting of children to and from school. Their rejection was
based primarily upon the nebulous wording of the state laws.
In State v. Brown^^ the following comment was given as the. reason
for rejecting the child-benefit theory: "We are of the opinion that
to furnish free transportation to pupils attending sectarian schools
is to aid the schools. It helps build up strength and make successful
the schools organization."^^
In Judd V. Board of Education^^ a lengthy argument ensued over
the child-benefit theory. The opinions of the justices were widely
varied. Finally, an agreed decision was revised by amendment (Article
^^Bowker v. Baker 167 P. 2d 250-262.
^^172 A. 835 (1934).
A Id., 835.
5^15 n.E. 2d. 576 (1938).
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XI, section 4) of the New York Constitution permitting public transpor-
tation of parochial school pupils.^^ The opinion of Justice Rippy is
given:
The argument is advanced that furnishing transportation to pu-
pils of private or parochial schools is not in aid or support of
the schools within the spirit or meaning of our organic law but,
rather, is in aid of their pupils. The argument is utterly with-
out substance. It not only ignores the spirit, purpose and intent
of the constitutional provisions but, as well, their exact wording,
the object of construction as applied to a written constitution is
to give effect to the intent of the people in adopting it and this
intent is to be found in the instrument itself unless the words or
expressions are ambiguous ( Cooley's Constitutional Limitations (8th
ed.), vol . 1, pp. 124-126). There is nothing ambiguous here. The
wording of the mandate is broad. Aid or support to the school "di-
rectly or indirectly" is proscribed. The two words must have been
used with some definite intent and purpose; otherwise why were they
used at all? Aid furnished "directly" would be that furnished in
a direct line, both literally and figuratively, to the school it-
self, unmistakably earmarked, and without circumlocution or ambig-
uity. Aid furnished "indirectly" clearly embraces any contribution,
to whomsoever made, circuitously, collaterally, disguised, or other-
wise not in a straight, open and direct course for the open and a-
vowed aid of the school, that may be to the benefit of the institu-
tion or promotional of its interests and purposes. How could the
people have expressed their purpose in the fundamental law in more
apt, simple and all-embracing language? Free transportation of pu-
pils induces attendance at the school. The purpose of the trans-
portation is to promote the interests of the private school or re-
ligious or sectarian institution that controls and directs it. "It
helps build up, strengthen and make successful the schools as organ-
izations". (State ex rel . Traub v. Brown , 36 Del. 181, 187, writ
of error dismissed, February 15, 193^}"] Without pupils there could
be no school. It is illogical to say that the furnishing of trans-
portation is not an aid to the institution while the employment of
teachers and furnishing of books, accommodations and other facili-
ties are such an aid. 58
The statute, in so far as it authorizes the use of public funds
for transportation of pupils to and from any school or institupon
of learning wholly or in part under the control or direction of
any
^^New York Law art. XI, sec. 4 (1936).
5815 N.E. 2d. 582 (1938).
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religious denomination or in which any denominational tenet or doc-tine IS taught, is repugnant to our fundamental law, unconstitu-
tional and void.^y
The findings in the Judd case that aid in any form, help to build
up, strengthen and make successful the schools as organizations, would
be used in the future for child benefit cases and would influence later
court opinions and decisions.
Justice Crane's dissent was concerned with the compulsory aspect of
the educational law of the state. He stated:
Having made attendance upon instruction compulsory and having
approved of attendance at certain schools other than public schools,
the Legislature determined that the inhabitants of the district
should have the power, under certain conditions, to provide for the
transportation of the pupils to and from the school house in the dis-
trict or the school which they legally attend. The object of such
legislation is apparently to insure the attendance of the children
at their respective schools for the requisite period of instruction
and, perhaps, to safeguard the health of the children. The statute
is not designed to aid or maintain the institutions themselves.
Recognizing the right of the children to be sent to such schools,
and enjoining upon them the duty of regular attendance, the Legis-
lature gave the authorities power, in a proper case, to assist the
children in getting to their schools. The law says to the children
and parents: Having chosen a proper school, you must attend regu-
larly. The school district has been given the power to add to that:
Where necessary, we shall assist you in getting there. 60
Commenting on the Judd case. Professor Manning forcibly identified
a concept that would be developed and used in later cases. He argued
that the direct line of aid was broken when the student chose the school
he wished to attend.
The Judd case had the persuasive force of a judicial precedent.
It left TtFmark upon the lower courts in New York and upon admin-
istrative agencies. Yet I rather suspect that the imprint was left
59id., 585.
®°Id., 586.
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not because of the rule it announced. Judd distorted its own rule
and it was the Judd result rather than the Judd rule which aroused
popular protest. The rule which Judd formulated was a reasonable
one. Judd said, "Aid furnished "directly" would be that furnished
in a direct line . . . Aid furnished "indirectly" clearly embraces
any contribution, to whomsoever made, circuitously, collaterally,
disguised, or otherwise not in a straight, open and direct course."
There is nothing profound in the rule. Judd was talking elementary
geometries. It is difficult to understand how there can be a di-
rect line, a curved line, a looping line or any kind of an indirect
line when there is interposed between the legislative appropriation
and the school itself the individual 's expression of a free will.
It would appear that the line is broken by the individual's exer-
cise of his freedom to choose his school and that there is there-
after neither a direct line nor an indirect line but rather two
disconnected points.
It may well be that the difficulties attendant upon the lack of
transportation in rural areas, or the difficulties with which lack
of transportation plagues the parent of the invalid child, would be
taken into account by parents and would influence them in a choice
of schools. But I do not believe that our law is dedicated to the
proposition that we must do all we can to compel the child to at-
tend public school.
Judd V. Board of Education crystallized the reasoning that
there could be no aid for church-related elementary schools be-
cause the legislature was required to maintain a system of common
schools for the education of all the children of the state. Judd
quite obviously talked only of elementary education.
Under this provision (Section 1), the schools provided must be
sufficiently numerous so that all the children of the State may re-
ceive their education, whatever may be their race, creed, color, or
condition. Private, denominational and sectarian schools, and
schools or institutions of learning in which denominational tenets
or doctrines are taught or those wholly or in part under the con-
trol of any religious denomination are no part of and are not with-
in that system.
Quite obviously the legislature does not now feel nor has it
ever felt compelled to provide public higher education for al 1 the
children of New York. Historically, traditionally, private col-
leges have been and are today within the system of higher education
in New York. "Thus common school education within the State, Judd_
said further, "came exclusively under public control and has since
so remained." Quite obviously higher education for all the citi-
zens of New York has never come exclusively under public control.
Judd spoke of the severance of sectarian schools and
lie c^on schools" and it noted that "while education is
"the pub-
compulsory
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in this State between certain ages, the State has no desire to
and could not if it so wished compel children to attend the free
public common schools when their parents desire to send them to
parochial schools." Thus the common school is the school which the
legislature is required to provide to satisfy the compulsory educa-
tion laws of the state. This includes no more than elementary and
secondary education. There is nothing in Judd to suggest that the
state is forbidden to foster a blended system of public and private
higher education. There is much in Judd which suggests the con-
trary.®'
Other cases followed with ( Gurney v. Ferguson^ ^ (1941), Sherrard
y_. Jefferson County Board of Education^ ^ (1942), Mitchell v. Consoli-
dated^^ (1943), and Costigan v. Hal 1^ ^ (1946). The evidence of all
these cases indicates that the state constitution must be specific in
authorizing transportation aid to non-public school children. Because
of the ambiguous wording of the constitutions, many of the states would
undergo constitutional referendums to provide the necessary assistance
to parochial education.
By 1946, the allowable aid was divided into two categories. Text-
books were furnished by five states— Louisiana, Mississippi, New Mexico,
Oregon, and West Virginia, and nineteen states—California, Colorado,
Connecticut, Hawaii, Illinois, Indiana, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland,
Massachusetts, Michigan, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, New
filLeonard F. Manning, "Aid to Education—State Styles", Fordto
Law Review 29:542 (1961).
^^122 P. 2d 1002 (1941).
^^171 S.W. 2d. 693 (1942).
^^135 P. 2d. 79 (1943).
^^23 N.W. 2d. 493 (1946).
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York, Ohio, OroQon, Rhodo Isldnd dnd Wyoin1ng--provid6d froo trdnspor-
tation.^^ Confusion increased as each court decision was reached. It
seemed only reasonable that a set of guidelines should be developed
that would assist legislature, educators and religious leaders in es-
tablishing petitions that would reach the public. Therefore, the fol-
lowing set of guidelines was developed by the National Education Assoc-
iation.
Guidelines for Child Benefit and Laws for Sectarian Education
On the basis of state constitutional provisions, statutes, and
court decisions, the following points can be stated as generally
true. In some issues the principles stated have not been tested
in all states. Where not previously tested, the court in any given
state would consider the general principles enunciated in other
states, but would not be bound by decisions of other states, and
would render its decision in terms of its own state law and the
facts of the particular case.
1. A tax levied for the benefit of a sectarian school would
be unconstitutional in all states.
2. An appropriation of any public-school funds to a sectarian
school would be unconstitutional in most states, and such
an appropriation could not be made from certain funds in
any state.
3. While in most states an appropriation of any state or lo-
cal school moneys to a sectarian school would be unconsti-
tutional, in several states the constitutional limitation
may be interpreted by the courts as applying only to state
school funds or to certain named state school funds (e.g.,
the New Jersey case)
.
4. Constitutional limitations on the use of public funds for
sectarian purposes are applicable to prevent the payment to
a sectarian school for services rendered the state under a
contract (South Dakota case), although one case sanctioned
such payment on the ground that the state benefited from
a
low-cost service (Illinois).
66"Aid to Sectarian Schools", NEA Research Bulletin,
February 24,
1946, p. 36.
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5. An appropriation which in its general terms could be ap-
plicable to sectarian schools as well as to public schools
would be unconstitutional as to the sectarian schools if
the source of the revenue used in the appropriation is
within the constitutional restriction against use of pub-
lic funds for sectarian purposes.
6. Payment of rent to a church for the use of its building as
a public school is usually not considered aid to the church,
if the local school board acts under permissive legislation
empowering it to rent school facilities. However, even in
the face of such permissive legislation, such action would
be invalid if the public-school authorities do not maintain
control of the school conducted in the church-owned building.
7. Most states exclude sectarianism from the public schools at
least to the extent that no particular religious tenets may
be taught therein. Moral education can exist in the public
schools, and to this end the legislatures have generally re-
quired or permitted the reading of the Bible and the teach-
ing of its precepts. However, most courts have held that
the Bible is not a sectarian book. The minority view, held
by courts in several states, is that reading of the Bible
in the public schools is a violation of the religious lib-
erty of non-Christians and unconstitutional for that reason.
8. Public-school teachers may wear religious dress and insig-
nia unless there is a law or regulation against the prac-
tice. The state, however, has power to enact prohibitory
legislation and such enactment is not a denial of religious
liberty but merely the control of the state over its public
servants.
9. In the state of New York, public school pupils may be ex-
cused from school during school hours to attend religious
instruction elsewhere, provided public funds are not used
in carrying out the plan, and provided no pupil is com-
pelled to attend an exercise against his conscience. Per-
missive legislation has been adopted in many states and a
number of communities have adopted this plan of the "week-
day church schools," but nowhere has the question of at-
tendance been reviewed by any court of record except in New
York.
10. Church groups may use public-school buildings and facili-
ties after school hours in some states even for religious
meetings. This situation has been held not to violate the
constitutional separation of church and state.
11. General legislation authorizing the state to supply
free
textbooks both to public schools and sectarian schools
has
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seldom been attempted by legislatures and rarely tested by
the courts. Louisiana and Mississippi courts have sanc-
tioned the practice; New York declared it to be unconsti-
tutional. The question has not been adjudicated in any
other state.
12. Furnishing transportation to sectarian school pupils has
been approved by the courts in Maryland and New Jersey;
it has been disapproved by the courts in Delaware, Ken-
tucky, New York, Oklahoma, South Dakota, Washington, and
Wisconsin. New York later amended its constitution to
permit transportation of parochial -school pupils.
13. The state, under its police power, may regulate and super-
vise sectarian schools for the purpose of ensuring each
child an education equivalent to the education offered in
public schools. State statutes have not attempted to go
beyond the state's police power (i.e., the state's power
to safeguard the health, morals, and safety of its citi-
zens), and practice in most states falls short of the
legislative directions.
While these guidelines are comprehensive, there would still be
situations that would need clarifying as to the establishment clause
of the First Amendment.
Everson Case
The "child-benefit" theory did not come before the Supreme Court
again until the Everson v. Board of Education^^ case in 1947, nearly
twenty years later. In this case, New Jersey authorized its local
school districts to make rules and contracts for the transportation of
children to and from schools. The statute authorized reimbursement of
the money expended by parents for bus transportation of their
children
on regular buses operated by the public transportation system.
Some
^^ibid., p. 44.
6^330 U.S. 1 (1947).
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Of the money went to pay for the transportation of children attending
the Catholic parochial schools. Everson objected to the law because it
allegedly took his property or taxes and bestowed it for private usage
without due process of law— a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Furthermore, he proposed that such a statute and resolution forced in-
habitants to pay taxes to help support and maintain schools which are
dedicated to, and which regularly teach, the Catholic faith— a viola-
tion of the First Amendment.
The first charge, i.e., the due process argument that the state
law taxes some people to help others carry out their private purposes,
is framed in two phases. The first is that the state cannot tax one
person to relieve another the cost of transportation. Otherwise, it
would violate the due process clause since children are sent to par-
ochial schools to satisfy the personal desire of their parents, rather
than the public interest. However, the New Jersey legislature has de-
cided that a public purpose is served by using tax-raised funds to pay
transportation costs of all school children, including those who attend
parochial schools. Justice Black delivered the majority opinion of the
court. His logic is as follows:
Measured by these standards, we cannot say that the First A-
mendment prohibits New Jersey from spending tax-raised funds to
pay the bus fares of parochial school pupils as a part of a general
program under which it pays the fares of pupils attending public
and other schools. It is undoubtedly true that children are helped
to get to church schools. There is even a possibility that some of
the children might not be sent to the church schools if the parents
were compelled to pay their children's bus fares out of their own
pockets when transportation to a public school would have been paid
for by the State. The same possibility exists where the state re-
quires a local transit company to provide reduced fares to school
children including those attending parochial schools, or where a
municipally-owned transportation system undertakes to carry all
86
school children free of charge. Moreover, state-paid policemen,
detailed to protect children going to and from church schools from
the very real hazards of traffic, would serve much the same pur-
pose and accomplish much the same result as state provisions in-
tended to guarantee free transportation of a kind which the state
deems to be best for the school children's welfare. And parents
might refuse to risk their children to the serious danger of traf-
fic accidents going to and from parochial schools, the approaches
to which were not protected by policemen. Similarly, parents
might be reluctant to permit their children to attend schools
which the state had cut off from such general government services
as ordinary police and fire protection, connections for sewage dis-
posal, public highways and sidewalks. Of course, cutting off church
schools from these services, so separate from the religious function,
would make it far more difficult for the schools to operate. But
such is obviously not the purpose of the First Amendment. That
Amendment requires the state to be a neutral in its relations with
groups of religious believers and non-believers; it does not re-
quire the state to be their advisary. State power is no more to
be used so as to handicap religions than it is to favor them. 69
The court argued further that the statute was intended to facili-
tate the opportunity of children to get a secular education, and there-
fore any service provided for students serves a public purpose. The
legislature has the right to reimburse needy parents or all parents for
payment of fares incurred by their children so they may ride in public
buses to and from schools rather than facing the dangerous alternative
of traffic and other hazards incident to walking or "hitchhiking."^^
The law then, is not in the private interests, but rather the public
interest since it provides that tax-raised funds will be paid to re-
imburse individuals for the money spent by them in a way which fur-
thers a public program. jhus the court contended that the aid was
69330 U.S. 1 (1947).
^^Cochran v. Louisiana, 281 U.S. 370 (1930).
^^Barbier v. Connally, supra, 113 U.S. 31 (1885).
72carmichael v. Southern Coal and Coke Co., 301 U.S.
495 (1937).
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given as a safety measure for the children of the public.
Everson's second charge was that the New Jersey statute challenged
the establishment of the religion clause of the First Amendment. The
court set about to review the history of the First Amendment and then
discussed its meaning.
The "establishment of religion" clause of the First Amendment
means at least this: Neither a state nor the federal government
can set up a church. Neither can pass laws which aid one relig-
ion, aid all religions, or prefer one religion over another.
Neither can force nor influence a person to go to or to remain
away from church against his will or force him to profess a be-
lief or disbelief in any religion. No person can be punished for
entertaining or professing religious beliefs or disbeliefs, for
church attendance or non-attendance. No tax in any amount, large
or small, can be levied to support any religious activities or
institutions, whatevever they may be called, or whatever form they
may adopt to teach or practice religion. Neither a state nor the
federal government can, openly or secretly, participate in the
affairs of any religious organizations or groups and vice versa.
In the words of Jefferson, the clause against establishment of
religion by law was intended to erect "a wall of separation be-
tween church and state".
The First Amendment has erected a wall between church and
state. That wall must be kept high and impregnable. We could
not approve the slightest breach. New Jersey has not breached
it here.
In spite of their affirmation just mentioned, the court refused
to admit that the New Jersey statute had made the slightest breach in
the wall between religion and government, and that the First Amendment
does not exclude people of any or no religion from receiving the bene-
fits of public welfare legislation. The decision was a five to four
division. The dissenting justices, Jackson and Rutledge, took issue
with the court's "general welfare" and "child benefit" interpretations
as follows:
^^Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
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Catholic education is the rock on which the whole structure
rests, and to render tax aid to its church school is indistinguish-
able to me from rendering the same aid to the church itself.
Justice Rutledge said:
By no declaration that a gift of public money to religious uses
will promote the general or individual welfare, or the cause of ed-
ucation generally, can legislative bodies overcome the Amendments
for, nor may the courts sustain their attempts to do so by finding
such consequences for appropriations which in fact give aid to or
promote religious uses. 75
There was considerable criticism on the Everson case. Boles
stated that four of every five reviews gave a negative report, and or-
ganized the reviews as follows:
Mere physical transportation to the doors of a parochial school
was considered by Rev. Kenneth R. O'Brien and Daniel E. O'Brien in
The Jurist (7:259) to be, without qualification, a temporal matter.
A contrary argument was advanced in the Oregon Law Review (27:150)
where it was suggested that children in other than public schools
have no more right to public school bus transportation than do way-
farer travelers.- An argument of expediency was made in the St .
John's Law Review (21:176). There it noted that making attendance
at private schools more difficult would result in channeling more
students into the public school system, thus increasing taxpayers'
costs.
Several reviewers plus the New York Times applauded the child
benefit rationale as a sensible approach. On the other hand this
position was characterized as "legal fiction" by Leo Pfeffer in
the Lawyers Guild Review (8:387) and as clumsy and fictional in
a note in the University of Pennsylvania Law Review (96:230).
Correspondingly, a reviewer in the Virginia Law Review (33:349)
concluded that both the school and the children were being aided.
Just how far such aid, armed with the logic of the Everson opin-
ion, would be allowed to expand into other areas was viewed with
concern in several reviews. Professor Thomas Reed Powell asked
in the Harvard Educational Review (17:73):^ ''How can it be proper
for the public to pay for transport to religious instruction and
worship from Monday through Friday if it could not provide free
rides to Sunday or Saturday worship?"
74ld., 24.
75id., 52.
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^Murray, writing in Law and Contemporary Problems (14:
23), could find no historical, legal, or political support for
Justice Black^sconcept of absolutism. Moreover, the Marquette
Law Review (32:138) charged that the Everson decision amended the
First Amendment by expanding its historical ly exclusive prohibi-
tion of governmental preference of one religion over others to
now implant a Godless principle demanding complete separation.
Other reviewers, however, supported the decision's accord with
the purpose of the Founding Fathers in demanding an absolute sep-
aration of church and state.
Many observers objected to Black's historical interpretation
of the Establishment of Religion Clause which held that no state
aid was to be given to any religions. Others, agreeing with Black,
declared that the Founding Fathers demanded that there be no^ state
aid to religion. The whole question of aid to religious schools
was dismissed as insignificant in the Louisiana Law Review (22:266)
where an alternative test was prescribed in 1961 which would eval-
uate the extent to which the program "aids secular education which
is objectionable colored by sectarian philosophy." As such, the
Everson program merely relieved parents of expenses, and did noth-
ing to impose religious concepts on the secular education of child-
ren, it was argued.
The Public welfare argument was rejected in the Michigan Law
Review (45:1001) as obscuring the underlying issues of indirect
aid to religious institutions. Similarly, the fact that pupils
attending schools run for profit were excluded from such public
benefits was viewed with scorn in the Cornell Law Quarterly (33:
122) where the validity of the safety-measure argument was severly
assailed.
Of the education journals that took a definite stand on the
Everson case, somewhat more than half viewed the decision with
disfavor. Some, however, agreed completely with the Court's ra-
tionale. Others agreed with the philosophy of the child benefit
doctrine, but would not apply it to public transportation for par-
ochial schools. Still others objected to the Court's definition
of the Establishment of Religion Clause of the First Amendment.
The child benefit theory was supported by J. L. Toner in Th^
American Teacher (32:2, 1948). He included transportation in the
same category as health services and school lunches.
L. R. Kuenzli in The American Teacher (32:2, 1948) saw trans-
portation as benefiting the church rather than the child. While
F. E. Johnson would have preferred to see this issue worked out
on the local level, he speculated in Religious Education (43:201,
1948) that apparently a majority of the public condemned the
Court's opinion that public transportation of parochial school
children did not violate the concept of separation of church and
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state He further contemplated that the Supreme Court would re-
verse the Everson decision if a similar transportation case camebefore it, as adjudged by the tone of the then-recent McCollum
decision. In this same vein, the National Education AFsociation
Research Bulletin (24:1, 1946) found that a majority of the state
courts had not followed the child benefit doctrine in transporta-
tion cases. E. Fuller in The Education Digest (14:3, 1949) viewed
the child benefit doctrine", however, as one which could, in fact,
ultimately nullify the constitutional concept of separation of
church and state. Concurring with this idea, B. H. Jarman in
School and Society (67:44, 1948) was apprehensive that any^ prac-
tice of allotting public funds for parochial schools would open
the floodgate to more extensive public financing of such schools.
W. W. Brickman in School and Society (67:245, 1948) took a
completely opposite stand. He contended that the state should
share in the upkeep of parochial schools since they help to reduce
the load of public schools. Brickman saw no difference between
public transporting of parochial school children and public fi-
nancing of a chaplain in the United States Senate.
Both E. H. Dana in Education (69:124, 1948) and W. A. Wetzel
i n the National Association of Secondary-School Principals ' Bul-
letin (33:66, 1949) did not agree with the Supreme Court's defi-
nition of the Establishment of Religion Clause in the Everson
case. Dana argued that the church and the state have never been,
and should not be, totally divorced. Wetzel, agreed in part, but
suggested that the line of demarcation be drawn not between the
state and religion, but rather between the state and ecclesiasti-
cal religion. Some might speculate upon the meaningful differ-
ences between religion and ecclesiastical religion.'^
The Everson decision had many references to the concept of child
benefit. The most important ones have been mentioned previously. The
Everson decision marked the end to phase one of the development of
the concept of child benefit. Phase two covers the period from post-
Everson to 1959 with the advent of the A1 len case in New York State.
The Harvard Law Review notes that the Everson case faces only the
problem of the upper limits of what a state can do. But it is clear
^^Donald E. Boles, The Two Swords (Ames, Iowa: Iowa University
Press, 1967), p. 11-14.
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that any definition of the limits of state aid which may be derived
from the First Amendment as it is reflected in the Fourteenth will also
be a definition of the absolute limits of aid by the United States, to
which the prohibition in the First Amendment expressly applies.
As a "line-drawing" decision, the Everson case is a failure. It
fixes a single point in space, with little indication of why the point
was chosen or where the next one will be placed. The line which the
dissenters drew was simple: Outlaw aid that directly or indirectly
benefits the school. But the minority might recant if faced with long-
recognized exemptions from taxation and from compulsory public school
attendance laws. Insofar as the majority attempts a predictive prin-
ciple, it is based primarily upon the child-benefit theory. However,
this theory is open to the serious objection that it might allow virt-
ually any aid to sectarian schools, since it will always be possible
to find that the welfare of the child was furthered. Nevertheless,
the care with which the decision was limited suggests that, should the
court be confronted with aid that is obviously more direct than trans-
portation, it may still invoke the First, or the First and Fourteenth
Amendments.^^
Even with the court's division on the Everson case, it has an im-
portant status in regard to child-benefit theory aid support. The fre-
quency of its use can be noted in the opinions of the court as
seen in
related subjects.
^^"Public Funds for Sectarian Schools", Harvard Review
60:799
(1947).
92
From the Allen Case to the Lemon Case
For twenty years following the Everson case, the acceptance trend
of "child benefit" by state appellate courts has been restricted.^®
The reasons are found in the Everson decision and in a changing atti-
tude of legislators, educators, and religious leaders toward the logic
of the theory caused by the split decision of the Justices.^^ But
following the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965 statutes
began to be legislated to give aid to the child and his parents.
The first case reaching the United States Supreme Court after the
Federal ESEA Assistance Act was Board of Education v. Allen®® in 1968.
With the 1966-1967 school year, local school boards were required to
purchase textbooks and lend them without charge "to all children resid-
ing in such district who are enrolled in grades seven to twelve of a
^®Roy A. Allen and Robert Marshall, "Child Benefit Has Lost Its
Glitter", Phi Delta Kappen XLIII, November, 1962, p. 77.
Permitting aid: Schade v. Allegheny County Inst. Dist., 126 A.
2d 911 (1956); Board of Education, etc., v. State Board of Education,
141 A. 2d 542 (1958); Board of Education, etc., v. Allen, 192 N.Y. S,
2d 186 (1959); Application of Silver, 205 N.Y. S. 2d 650 (1960).
Prohibiting aid: Connell v. Board of School Directors, 52 A. 2d^
645 (1947); Silver Lake Cons. School Dist. v. Parker, 29 N.W. 2d 214
(1947) Visser v. Nooksack Valley School Dist., 207 P. 2d 198 (1949);
McVey v. Hawkins, 258 S.W. 2d 927 (1953); Almond v. Day, 89 S.E. 2d
851 (1955); Rawlings v. Butler, 290 S.W. 2d 801 (1956); Donohue v.
Smith, 126 A. 2d 93 (1956); School District of Robinson Township v.
Houghton, 128 A. 2d 58 (1956); Squires v. Inhabitanp of C^ty of
Augusta, 153 A. 2d 80 (1959); Snyder v. Town of Newtown, 61 A.
2d
770 (1960); Swart v. South Burlington Town School Dist., lb/ a.
514 (1961); Matthews v. Quinton, 362 P. 2d ®32 (1961);
Dickman v.
School Dist., No. 62c, Oregon City, 366 P. 2d 533 (1961).
^^Ibid., p. 78.
8O392 U.S. 236 (1968).
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public or private school which complies with the compulsory education
QT
law." The books loaned were textbooks that were designated to be
used in any public, elementary or secondary schools of the state.
These books must be used for one semester by the student in any school
he legally attends.
The plaintiff sought an injunction to refrain James E. Allen,
Commissioner of Education, from "apportioning state funds to school
districts for the purchasing of textbooks to be lent to parochial stu-
dents. The appellants argued that the New York statute was uncon-
stitutional since it was a law respecting the establishment of religion
or prohibiting the free exercise thereof, bringing it in conflict with
the First and Fourteenth Amendments. The appellants felt that the
practice was a violation of these Amendments. The trial court took
this stand also, but the New York Court of Appeals reversed the judg-
ment and finally the Supreme Court upheld the decision. The Supreme
83
Court applied the test that was established in the Schempp v. Abington
case. This formula determined the constitutionality of assistance to
church-related programs. The test was twofold: (1) a secular legis-
lative purpose; (2) a primary effect that neither advances nor inhibits
religion. When the test was applied to the New York case the court de-
clared it constitutionally sound. It is interesting to see how Justice
Slid.
82
id.
®^374 U.S. 203 (1963).
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Black apparently reversed himself from the Everson case to the Allen
case. Here are his comments:
It requires no prophet to foresee that on the argument used to
support this law others could be upheld providing for state or fed-
eral government funds to buy property on which to erect religious
school buildings or to erect the buildings themselves, to pay the
salaries of the religious school teachers, and finally to have the
sectarian religious groups cease to voluntary contributions of mem-
bers of their sects while waiting for the government to pick up all
the bills for the religious schools. 84
In Justice Douglas' dissent, he noted that the selection of the
textbooks would be by the parochial schools, and later approved by the
State Board of Education. He further stated that "powerful religious -
political pressures will therefore be on the state agencies to provide
the books that are desired."®^
Flast et al v. Cohen®^ argued for an injunction against the use
of Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965 funds to purchase
textbooks and other materials for parochial schools. The establish-
ment clause of the First Amendment was used in their argument. Flast
lost in the lower court, but the Supreme Court reversed the lower
court's decision.
Perhaps the most significant case in the last ten years is the
Lemon v. Kurtzman®^ case. This was the combination of two cases that
had been denied in lower courts. They were based on the Non-public
^^Board of Education v. Allen, 292 U.S. 236 at 253 (1968).
®^Id.
®^392 U.S. 83 (1968).
®^310 F Supp. 35 at 45 (1969).
95
Elementary and Secondary Act of 1968 of Pennsylvania and Rhode Island's
1969 Salary Supplement Act. In this suit, Lemon and other plaintiffs
sought to enjoin the appropriation of state funds allowed in the Penn-
sylvania Non-public Elementary and Secondary Act. This act authorized
the state superintendent of education to enter into contract with non-
public parochial systems for the purchase of secular educational ser-
vices, providing direct reimbursement to those schools for the benefit
of teachers' salaries, textbooks, and instructional materials. Reim-
bursement was restricted to courses in mathematics, physical science,
modern foreign languages, and physical education. It was required that
all textbooks and materials be approved by the superintendent.
A school seeking reimbursement must maintain an accounting system
that will show the cost of secular educational services. The accounts
are subject to state audit. The funds were derived from the proceeds
on horse and harness racing and later a portion of cigarette taxes.
The plaintiffs declared that the statute violated the Establish-
ment and Free Exercise Clauses of the First Amendment and the due pro-
cess clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Specifically, they charged
that the church-related elementary and secondary schools were control-
led by religious organizations for the purpose of propogating and pro-
moting their respective religious faiths, and that the intent of
the
legislatures was to aid religious schools. However, when the
lower
courts considered the case, they disagreed with the
plaintiffs and
pointed out that the act was for the protection of the
school children
so as not to allow the non-public schools to close
due to financial
burdens. They quoted from the Everson case: "The
fact that a state
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law, passed to satisfy a public need, coincides with the personal de-
sires of the individuals most directly affected is certainly an inade-
quate reason ... to say a legislature has erroneously appraised the
public need. It was on this basis that the plaintiffs were denied
relief by the district court.
In Pi Censo v. Robinsen case, 89 the plaintiffs filed suit, alleg-
ing that the Act of Rhode Island benefited the Catholic schools by pro-
viding fifteen per cent of the teacher's salary, thus, establishing a
religion by the act of providing appropriations to further the opera-
tion of the school systems whose goal was the propogation of their re-
ligion. The defendents, on the other hand, argued that the aid was for
those teachers who qualified, and that the appropriation did not go to
the school directly. The lower court examined the act and governmental
regulations designed for its implementation. Its findings revealed
that (1) one branch of non-public schools (the Catholic) had faced a
financial crisis. This was caused by the change of religious teachers,
which put them on an estimated ratio of one to one in five years; (2)
that only substantially greater appropriations for lay teacher salar-
ies would relieve the crisis and permit the act to achieve its object-
ive. The justices held firmly to their opinion that the statute gave
evidence of interweaving of financial aid to the Catholic schools and
their mission.
In concluding, they cited the following:
88id., 45.
^^316 F Supp. 120 (1970).
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We find that the statute will have the significant or tempor-
ary secular effect of aiding the quality of secular education in
Rhode Island's Roman Catholic elementary schools. On the other
hand, we think it equally clear that the Act gives significant aid
to a religious enterprise. 90
This case was appealed to the United States Supreme Court and
joined the Lemon case where both became one, and a decision was made
on June 28, 1971
.
In giving the majority opinion of the court, Chief Justice Burger
cited three tests to be used that had been developed during the same
year as the result of analysis of past cases. They are: (1) the
statute must have a secular legislative purpose; (2) its principle
or primary effect must be one that neither advances nor inhibits re-
ligion; (3) the statute must not foster "an excessive government en-
91
tanglement with religion." Investigation into the legislative pur-
poses of the statutes indicates no basis for any conclusion that its
intent was to advance religion, but are intended to enhance the qual-
ity of secular education in all schools covered by the compulsory at-
tendance laws. Both legislatures of Rhode Island and Pennsylvania
have concluded that secular and religious education are identifiable
and separable, and that the parochial schools have a significant re-
ligious mission and that a substantial portion of their activities are
religiously orientated. Therefore, they have sought to create statu-
tory restrictions designed to separate the secular and religious
func-
tions of school systems that may receive financial support.
It was
^\emon v. Kurtzman and Di Censo v. Robinsen, 91 S. Ct. 2111
(1971).
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the third test, excessive entanglement, that became the important con-
sideration. Chief Justice Burger stated: "The cumulative impact of
the entire relationship arising under the statutes in each state in-
volves excessive entanglement between government and religion. ^e
further stated that "in order to determine whether the government en-
tanglement with religion is excessive, we must examine the character
and purpose of the institutions which are benefited, the nature of the
aid that the state provides, and the resulting relationship between
the government and the religious authority.
It was found that the schools receiving the aid were located
nearby the church. They revealed many religious symbols, such as
crosses on the exterior, crucifixes, religious paintings, and statues
in classrooms and hallways. Findings indicated that religious teach-
ing lasted only about thirty minutes, but that extracurricular activi-
ties were interwoven deeply within the academic program. On the basis
of these findings, the court found that the parochial school was an
intregal part of the mission of the church.
It was also noted that the ideological character of books and
teachers may be quite different at times. However, since the teachers
were employed by a religious organization, they were subject to both
the direction and the discipline of the religious authorities. It was
felt that they would not remain neutral in their religious beliefs even
if they put forth an effort to do so. It would become impossible to
92id., 2112.
93id., 2114.
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inspect the teachers' instruction as they could the contents of the
textbook. The teachers' ideology would be changing each day. Finally,
the opinion of the court concluded: "Surveillance of teachers and in-
spection of school records and religious contents of programs are
fraught with the sort of entanglement that the constitution forbids. "94
In their examination, the justices found that the schools were
governed by the standard set forth in a "Handbook of School Regulations"
which had the force of synodal law of the diocese. It points out the
importance of the role of the teacher in the parochial schools. The
"prime factor of the success or failure of the school is the spirit and
personality, as well as the professional competence, of the teacher."
The handbook also states that "Religious formation is not confined to
formal courses; nor is it restricted to a single subject area." Fin-
ally, the handbook advises teachers to stimulate interest in religious
vocations and missionary work. Understanding the mission of the church
school, the instructions were consistent and logical in nature. It was
excessive entanglement of government and religion that influenced the
court in their decision of eight to zero on the Lemon case to eight to
one on Di Censo. Both acts were held to be unconstitutional. This was
a heavy blow to the child-benefit theory which had gained strength
through the years and was accepted as a reasonable method for
obtaining
federal and state funds.
The litigation of the future may well be decided on
the rationale
94id., 2115.
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of the Lemon decision, especially the concurring opinions of Justices
Brennan, Douglas, and Black. They concluded that four significant is-
sues were at stake: (1) how direct aid to religious organizations dif-
fers from tax exemptions for churches; (2) how direct aid differs from
child-benefits; (3) why direct aid cannot be allowed under the public
relief theory; (4) why the state through direct aid cannot claim to as-
sist the secular as opposed to the sectarian function of a religious
body. Justice Brennan summarized these issues:
In quoting the opinion of Walz v. Tax Commissi on, he established
a line of argument to which this study will refer to in the future.
Is there a significant difference between direct aid to religious in-
stitutions and the accepted stand of tax exemptions? The Justice
thought there was, thus leading him to make the following statement:
Tax exemptions and general subsidies, however, are qualita-
tively different. Though both provide economic assistance, they
do so in fundamentally different ways. A subsidy involves the
direct transfer of public monies to the subsidized enterprise and
uses resources exacted from taxpayers as a whole. An exemption,
on the other hand, involves no such transfer. It assists the ex-
empted enterprise only passively, by relieving a privately funded
venture of the burden of paying taxes. In other words, in the
case of an exemption, the state merely refrains from diverting to
its own uses income independently generated by the churches through
voluntary contributions. Thus, "the symbolism of tax exemption is
significant as a manifestation that organized religion is not ex-
pected to support the state; by the same token the state is not
expected to support the church. "96
In recounting the child-benefit theory. Justice Brennan pointed
out that the law had made provision for textbooks, transportation, etc.,
95397 U.S. 664 (1970).
96 Id., 690.
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which went to aid the child or the parents of the children, and not to
the school itself. Any other kind of aid would involve "excessive en-
tanglement" which would necessarily call for surveillance or supervis-
ion by the state audit, even going so far as to require public invest-
igators in every classroom monitoring the teacher and textbooks to
maintain the requirements by the secular authorities, so that the in-
stitution was not infringing upon the requirements of the grants. The
direct aid goes to the schools perpetuating the church/body en ma64e
to insure the existence of the religion. "[W]e cannot blink at the
fact that the secular education those schools provide goes hand-in-hand
with the religious mission which is the only reason for the schools'
existence.
To bring public relief to the public schools is not a justifiable
argument according to Justice Brennan, but is a direct aid to the non-
public schools. He believes that one cannot separate the secular and
religious purposes of the parochial schools; rather, they are inter-
wound around each other. Quoting from Cook County v. Chicago Indust-
rial School :
The recurrent argument, consistently rejected in the past, has
been that government grants to sectarian schools ought not be
viewed as impermissible subsidies "because [the schools] relieve
the state of a burden which it would otherwise be itself required
to bear. . . .they will render a service to the state by perform-
ing for it its duty of educating the children of its people.
^^Lemon, op. cit., 2133.
98i8 N.E. 183 (1888).
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Justice Brennan quotes from two major cases on the point of secu-
lar functions of a religious body. He acknowledged that the state has
an undisputed interest in ensuring that all children receive a minimum
level of secular education. He stated:
Nonetheless, it is argued once again in these cases that sec-
tarian schools and universities perform two separable functions.
First, they provide secular education, and second, they teach the
tenets of a particular sect. Since the State has determined that
the secular education provided in sectarian schools serves the
legitimate state interest in the education of its citizens, it is
contended that state aid solely to the secular education function
does not involve the State in aid to religion.^^
Secondly:
[T]his Court has long recognized that religious schools pursue
two goals, religious instruction and secular education. In the
leading case of Pierce v. Society of Sisters , 268 U.S. 510 (1925),
the Court held that Oregon had not shown that its interest in secu-
lar education required that all children attend publicly-operated
schools. A premise of this holding was the view of the State's
interest in education would be served sufficiently by reliance on
the secular teaching that accompanied religious training in the
schools maintained by the Society of Sisters . . . [T]he contin-
ued willingness to rely on private school systems, including par-
ochial systems, strongly suggests that a wide segment of informed
opinion, legislative and otherwise, has found that those schools
do an acceptable job of providing secular education to their stu-
dents. This judgment is further evidence that parochial schools
are performing, in addition to their sectarian function, the task
of secular education.
Holding firm to his position, Brennan concludes that the Allen
and Pierce decision supports the proposition that, as an identifiable
set of skills and an identifiable quantum of knowledge, secular
educa-
tion may be provided either in public or parochial schools.
^^Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
^^^Board of Education v. Allen, supra, 392 U.S. 236 (1968).
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The state's interest in education is only in "definable" secular
education and providing the opportunity that all of its children can
acquire skills and reach a minimum level of competency in reading,
writing, arithmetic, and other subjects such as history, geography,
science, literature, and law. However, the state has no interest as
to how this is accomplished. It is the teachers' prerogative to in-
struct.^^^ Up to this time the child benefit cases were gaining
strength and the logic was clearly being promoted as a way to secure
funds to relieve the excessive weight of the financial crises now on
the parochial elementary and secondary school system.
The George Washington Law Review made this comment on the Allen
policy of a lack of academic standards--perhaps a policy that would be
considered in the future:
Of more persuasive utility is Allen's policy argument that par-
ochial schools need, and are entitled to, some public support to
keep pace with others in educational training. The court was ex-
tremely concerned that pupils in parochial schools should not be
outdistanced by those in public schools. Assuming the existence
of a potential educational lag, however, any student can avail
himself of the right to a public education. It is settled that
students may, if they so desire, attend instead accredited private
schools. The free exercise clause and the Fourteenth Amendment
secure that right but do not, it would seem guarantee that public
aid will extend to one exercising his choice.
Summary
With the conclusion of World War I, illiteracy in the United
States was a significant problem. Many changes began to take place
^^\emon. Id., 2122.
102''constitutional Law", George Washington Law Review, 36:248
(1967).
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to strengthen the schools, and the federal government became more in-
volved, especially under the Roosevelt administration.
Generally, it can be. said that until 1929, the practice of extend-
ing financial aid to non-public schools would have violated the state
constitutional or statutory provision. For example, in 1922, the New
York court was faced with the first child-benefit textbook case which
103
It rejected. The following year, 1930, and later 1947, two major
cases came before the United States Supreme Court. They were Cochran
y^. Louisiana Board of Education and Everson y^. Board of Education .
Under the child-benefit theory in these two cases the line of consti-
tutionality permissible aid did not extend beyond these limits:
(1) No religious institution acquired new property through the
state action. The aid went directly to the child or to the parent.
No public funds went to the parochial schools directly or indirectly.
In Everson, the State had no contact or relationship with any church
or church school. Separation was maintained.
(2) The state kept complete control of the administration and
spending of all public funds. In Cochran, the state chose the books
and lent them to the children, and made no special arrangements for
those books used by children attending parochial schools. In Ever-
son, the local public authority made the rules and contracts for
transportation and the children rode on "regular buses operated by
the public transportation system."
(3) No religious use was made of what the state provided.
The
textbooks could not be adapted for religious instruction, and Black
noted that the permissible state provided services for church schools
were "so separate and so indisputably marked off from the religious
function. "^04
^^^Smith V. Donahue 195 N.Y. 715 (1922).
lO^George R. La Noue, "The Child Benefit- Theory Revised", Journal
of Public Law, 13:90 (1964).
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Instead of a clear concept of the child-benefit theory there was
confusion because of the five-four split of the Supreme Court in the
Everson decision. Those who challenge the child-benefit theory take
the position that the doctrine proves too much. Everything goes to
help the child, as the court in the case of Gurney v. Ferguson^ ^^
stated: "Practically every proper expenditure for school purposes aids
the child." There will be some political potential in any statute
that the legislature would pass according to Justice Burger:
Partisan aid to religious schools will promote and champion
political action to achieve their goals. Others will oppose on
the basis of constitutional religion, or other reasons. Prog-
matically, political candidates will be forced to choose which
side to take, and voters may align according to religious faith.
And further political fragmentation and deviseiveness on religious
lines is likely to be intensified.^0^
Others contend that public aid to the church-related schools can
ultimately mean the demise of the public school system. Whichever
side one may take, it is important that formulas be found that are
both constitutionally legitimate and educationally efficient. The ed-
itorial of America in 1970 stated that:
In the 1960's scholars and politicians discussed the relative
constitutionality of grants, loans, scholarships and tax benefits
(exemptions, deductions and credits). The financial form of as-
sistance, however, soon yielded in importance to the purposes for
which the assistance was given: health, safety, equality of op-
portunity and the achievement of excellence. Serious attention
was also paid to the nature of the immediate recipient of the as-
sistance: the school itself, the parent or guardian, the student,
or the teacher.
T05i9o Okla. 245 at 255 (1941).
^^^Lemon, op. cit., 2117.
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What we need are formulas that are both constitutionally legit-
imate and educationally efficient.
. . .The best type of formula
is one that treats education in public and non-public schools simi-
larly but not identically. (Perfect parity of support is undesir-
able, for constitutional, political and religious reasons.) ^07
George La Noue writes that the child-benefit theory, if refined,
will be the approach of the future. He stated:
Those who do not accept a child-benefit theory are left to
argue either that there are no barriers to public support of par-
ochial schools (a position flatly contradicted by the opinions of
the United States Supreme Court and the fifty state constitutions
and courts), or that any state action benefiting parochial schools
in any way is unconstitutional (a position of such forwarding con-
sequence and in conflict with so many practices that it is neither
administratively, politically, nor ethically tenable. Those who
adhere to the "anything goes" philosophy in church-state relations
can be called co-operationists and those who hold the "nothing
goes" position, absolutionists.^OS
To conclude. Lemon v. KurtzmanJ *^^ and their related cases, es-
tablished the three-test criteria; (1) the statute must have a secu-
lar legislative purpose; (2) its principal or primary effect must be
one that neither advances nor prohibits religion; (3) the statute must
not foster "an excessive government entanglement with religion."
The justices found that the statutes fostered an "impermissible
degree of entanglement". Thus, the statutes were found unconstitu-
tional. The important point here is that only those child-benefit
aspects were upheld by the court. The courts also showed a concern
for the separation of church and state doctrine not to be
destroyed.
^°®George R. La Noue, "The Child Benefit Theory", Journaj of
Public Law , 13:79 (1964).
’•0^403 U.S. 602 (1971).
^^^Walz Supra Id., 695. Justice Harlan concuring
in dissent.
either piecemeal by accommodating the partisans of religious schools
or with expedient legislative compromise that may set irreversible
precedents.
CHAPTER IV
STATUS OF THE CHILD-BENEFIT THEORY IN THE 1970'S
This chapter will focus on the period of the seventies to ascer-
tain whether the child-benefit theory has been strengthened or weakened
as a permissible form of federal and state aid to non-public elementary
and secondary schools. It will be divided into two parts:
1. A critique of selected federal acts that directly permit gov-
ernment funding to non-public education.
2. Examination of data generated by the opinions of selected
United States Supreme Court cases starting with those follow-
i ng Lemon y_. Kurtzman . 1
Since the Supreme Court litigations during the seventies challenged
the constitutionality of the federal and state assistance acts, six of
the major acts will be examined prior to the review of the court cases.
It is felt by some writers that as the result of the assistance act in
one manner or another, the federal government and all state governments
have made legal provisions of various kinds to assist the non-public
schools.
Historically, federal involvement in education dates back to 1785
when Congress began passing federal laws involving education. Edith
Green in 1963 stated "that the issue of federal involvement in educa-
tion was decided over a hundred years ago", and that presently we have
U03 U.S. 602 (1971 ).
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at least forty-two federal agencies providing aid to education in the
amount of two billion dollars a year."^ The most current figures show
the federal government spending 7.8 billion in 1978 for the elementary
and secondary schools.^ This vast federal expenditure for education
has had the effect of increasing the effort by legislatures, educators,
and religious leaders to obtain governmental aid for parochial schools.
The number of acts between 1785 to 1965 total 53.^ Prior to 1965
only six provided aid to elementary and secondary non-public schools.
They were: the Serviceman's Readjustment Act of 1944, the National
School Lunch Act of 1946, the Federal Property and Administration Ser-
vice Act of 1949, the Agriculture Act of 1954, the National Defense
Education Act of 1958, and the Economic Opportunity Act of 1964. Each
of these acts will be considered.
National School Lunch Act of 1946^
This act provided for both funds and surplus food allocations to
the state agency by the Department of Agriculture. The grants were to
provide wholesome, appetizing lunches to the public and non-public
school children of the nation. "Such meals shall be served without
^U.S., Congress, House, Committee on Education and Labor, The Fed-
eral Government and Education (Washington: Government Printing Office,
1963), p. 1.
^U.S., Department of Commerce, Statistical Abstract of th^ United
States-1978 , (99 ed. Washington: Government Printing
Office, 1978j,
p. 136.
^Congressional Research Service, What Shoujd ^ ;Uie_ Toward^
Fi nanci ng El ementary and Secondary Education jn Urnted^Sta^
(Washington: Government Printing Office, 1972), pp. 127-130.
^Public Law 79-396.
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cost or at a reduced cost to children who are determined by local
school authorities to be unable to pay the full cost of the lunch.
In addition to food, funds for the maintenance, operation, and expan-
sion of the non-profit school lunch program was to continue indefin-
itely. The cost of the program was set up in such a way that the state
would be involved on a matching basis, and where it was forbidden by
law to non-public schools, the Secretary of the Department of Agricul-
ture was authorized to forward aid directly to the schools.
Federal Property and Administration Service Act of 1949^
Under this act the administrator of the General Services was auth-
orized to dispose of surplus government property to tax-supported and
other non-profit schools. This property included books, equipment,
materials, buildings, fixtures, supplies, and other surplus property.
Agriculture Act of 1954^
By this act a program was enacted for the disposal of excess food
commodities to the school lunch program. Section 201 (c) was amended
by (P.L. 84-752) to extend the consumption of fluid milk by children
"in non-profit schools of high school grades and under, and in non-
profit nursery schools, day-care centers, settlement houses, summer
camps, and similar non-profit institutions devoted to the care and
training of children."
^Public Law 79-396, Sec. 9.
^Public Law 288-152.
^Public Law 83-690.
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National Defense Education Act of 1958^
This act allowed the State Commissioner of Education to make loans
to private non-profit elementary and secondary schools for the acquisi-
tion of laboratory and other special equipment including audio-visual
materials and equipment, printed materials (other than textbooks) suit-
able for use in providing education in science, mathematics, or modern
foreign language and minor remodeling of laboratory or other space used
for such materials or equipment. Later, history, civics, geography,
economics, industrial arts, and English or reading was added by Amend-
ment P.L. 88-665.
Title V provided, if authorized by state law, a program of guid-
ance and counseling so as to advise students of courses best suited to
their ability, aptitudes, and to encourage students with outstanding
aptitudes and ability to complete their secondary school education.
It further encouraged the same to take the necessary courses for ad-
mission to institutions of higher education. Amendment P.L. 88-665
extended this provision to private elementary schools.
Economic Opportunity Act of 1964^ ^
It is the purpose of this act to strengthen, supplement, and co-
ordinate efforts to furtherance the opportunity for everyone to obtain
an education and training, to work and to live in decency and dignity.
^Public Law 85-864 Sec. 301, 303, 305.
^^Public Law 88-452.
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Two amendments prepared the way for non-public involvement --
(P.L. 89-253) gave grants to non-public schools which provided commun-
ity action programs to eliminate educational deficiencies as the result
of poverty, and the Vista Amendment Title VIII (P.L. 89:794) provided
that non-profit organizations could request Vista volunteers to assist
them in their programs to combat educational inadequacy caused by pov-
erty.
Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965^^
The majority of the Federal Assistance Act up to 1964 contributed
a limited source of financial support to the non-public religiously-
affiliated elementary and secondary schools. However, in 1965 Presi-
dent Johnson launched a program under the Elementary and Secondary Ed-
ucation Act so broad that it constituted the first general aid-to-ed-
ucation program ever passed by Congress. It was intended to provide
aid to school districts on the basis of the number of children from
low-income families in the area. "Aid to the children" would include
government aid to non-public schools through programs such as shared
time and loans of federal financed textbooks. It was in stressing
aid to the children and not to schools, public or private, that he
overcame the opposition of the past. President Johnson s own words
show the significance of the act: "I urge that we now push ahead with
the number one business of the American people — the education
of our
Public Law 89-10
^^"Health Education and Welfare", Congress and^
II, 1965-68 (Washington: Congressional Quarterly Service,
1969), p
663.
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youth in pre-schools, elementary and secondary schools, and in the
colleges and universities. "13 Later at the signing he stated that no
measure he had "signed, or ever will sign, means more to the future of
America. With the signing of this act a new horizon dawned for the
parochial school. The federal government authorized more than fifteen
different forms through which aid would be allowable.
Title I, Sec. 205, provides that children enrolled in non-public
schools can participate in services of dual enrollment, educational
radio and television, and mobile educational services and equipment on
the premises of the school. All of these services and title of prop-
erty were to remain under the control of the public agency.
Title II, Sec. 203, makes funds available for the acquisitions
of library resources, e.i., books, periodicals, documents, audiovisual
materials, and other related library materials, textbooks, and printed
and published instructional materials for the use of children and
teachers in public and private elementary and secondary schools. All
of the materials are to correspond to that which was being approved
and used in the public schools.
Title III, Sec. 303, allows a number of services to non-public
school children. They are: guidance and counseling services, remed-
ial instruction, school health, physical education, recreation, psy-
chological and social work services. Specialized instruction and
‘l3"President Calls for Board Elementary, Secondary and College
Educational Aid Programs", Congressional Quarterj^ Alman^. HI,
(Washington: Congressional Quarterly service, 19d 5), p. 1374.
^^"Health Education and Welfare", op. cit., p. 710.
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equipment for students interested in studying advanced scientific sub-
jects, foreign languages, and other academic subjects which are not
taught in the local schools. In addition, it made available modern ed-
ucational equipment and specially qualified personnel, including art-
ists and musicians on a temporary basis, and the developing, producing
and transmitting of radio and television programs for classroom and
other educational use.
Finally, funds for maintenance, leasing or construction of the
necessary facilities, and to equipt the installation through which
these services can be provided to public and non-public school child-
ren.
While there has been a number of amendments, the basic structure
of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965 remains. Most
recently President Carter (1978 P.L. 95-561) extended the ESEA program
of federal assistance for an additional five year - through fiscal
1983 - thus leaving the massive general aid program to education as
the most important education assistance program that the federal gov-
ernment ever participated in.
Against this backdrop of federal government's involvement in ed-
ucation through the assistance acts, this study will investigate the
Supreme Court's decisions of the seventies relative to the child-ben-
efit theory.
With the conclusion of phase two of the governmental aid struggle
to non-public elementary and secondary schools in 1969 the Supreme
Court took a firm position on the religious clause of the First Amend-
ment. This position was formulated as a result of the statutes
of
115
Pennsylvania and Rhode Island fostering excessive entanglement between
church and state as summarized:
(1) Sectarian education has a religious purpose for direct or in-
direct indoctrination.
(2) The requirement of policing or serveil lance to insure that
the teacher's words, content of courses, and the specific
textbooks adhere to the restriction of secular instruction.
(3) The requirement of government to examine the records of ex-
penditures to determine what amount is attributable to sec-
ular education.
(4) The potential political divisiveness related to religious
belief and practice is aggravated, by possible continuing
annual appropriations of larger demands.
(5) That modern governmental programs have self-perpetuating
and self-expanding propensities.
(6) Constitutional adjudication approaching "the verge" may be-
come the platform for further steps.
Before proceeding it should be noted that two cases had an impor-
tant function assisting in the decision of the Lemon case. They were
not child benefit cases per se, but added to the total argument that
influenced the court's conclusion.
In Walz V. Tax Commissi on^ ^ the Establishment and Free Exercise
clauses of the First Amendment came under attack. In essence the con-
tention was that a tax exemption of church property indirectly requires
the appellant to contribute aid to religious bodies and thereby vio-
lates the establishment clause. Concerning the nature of this case,
the justices used the arguments that were recommended in opinions of
^^403 U.S. 602 (1971).
1^397 U.S. 664 (1970).
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building at Fairfield; and (5) a language laboratory at Albertus Magnus
College. The taxpayers challenged the constitutionality of the Higher
Education Facilities Act of 1963 in granting these funds, authorized
to be used for secular educational purposes. The appellants argued
that aid in any form, direct or indirect, would aid the religious pur-
pose of the institutions since it operates on one budget. Further,
money not spent for one purpose becomes available for other purposes.
Finally, to avoid any excessive entanglement, a system of strict
supervision and surveillance would be necessary to determine the aca-
demic activities of the facilities which in turn would violate the
Establishment and Free Exercise clauses. Chief Justice Burger pro-
nounced the judgment of the court by expressing the following:
(1) The acts did not have the primary effect of aiding a sectar-
ian organization even though some benefits accrued to the
institution.
(2) There was no evidence of religious use of these facilities,
and the act would not be declared unconstitutional based on
a hypothetical "composite profile" that was constructed of
the "typical sectarian" institution of higher education.
(3) The act would not be invalidated because of the twenty-year-
use period.
(4) The record would support that religious indoctrination is
not a substantial purpose or activity of the church-related
institution, and since the government aid is a one-time,
single-purpose construction grant, it can not result in ex-
cessive entanglement.
(5) The act does not violate the Religious Clause of the
First
Amendment though the plaintiff is compelled to pay taxes
which the proceeds in part finance grants under the act.
The court concluded that the Higher Education Facilities Act of
1963 was constitutional without violations, since the appellants were
unable to identify any coercion directed at the practice of their
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religious beliefs, or that their share of the collected taxes going
to finance the grants were distinguishable.
With tax exemption for religious facilities as expressed in Walz
Tax Commissioner^ ^ and construction grants in Tilton v. Richardsonj*^
the court gave additional principles so as to determine appropriate
government aid. The court sought to define the boundaries of the neu-
tral area between the Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses within
which the legislature may constitutionally act. It re-emphasized the
three-part test: sponsorship, financial support, and active involve-
ment in religious activities. These principles would receive atten-
tion in the child-benefit arguments of the future.
Following the Lemon cases, many of the opponents of governmental
aid to non-public schools acclaimed victory. Yet, with the position
of child benefit, tax credits, and auxiliary services noticeably weak-
ened in the Lemon decision, there continued to be an increasing number
of litigations reaching the Supreme Court.
The next case to reach the court following the Lemon-Walz-Tilton
decision was Johnson v. Sanders In this case the Connecticut Non-
public School Secular Education Act came under question in 1969. This
act authorizes the state to contract with sectarisn schools for secu-
lar educational services which are provided as part of the
curriculum
^^397 U.S. 664 (1970).
19403 U.S. 672 (1971).
2O 3 I 9 F. Supp. 421 (1970).
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of the public schools. The sum would be limited to twenty per cent of
the salaries of teachers in secular subjects, plus a pro-rated share
of the cost of the textbooks.
As a result of state support of secular courses taught in sur-
rounding religious schools, and the regulations of the sectarian
schools in the use of the subsidy, this act was found unconstitu-
tional. The court said that this would result in violation of the
Establishment Clause of the First Amendment and would be excessive
entanglement between church and state.
In 1973 Lemon v. Kurtzman,^ ^ Lemon II came before the Supreme
Court. This case involved the extension of the Pennsylvania statute
to reimburse educational services to non-public elementary and sec-
ondary schools. Following the court's decision on Lemon I, the state
was' restricted from rendering payments to sectarian schools, but
could reimburse prior services. The judgment was affirmed, based on:
(1) Constitutional interest would not be undermined if there
would be a minimal contact in the final audit of school
records.
(2) The final payment implicated interest only once under non-
recurring special circumstances. That constitutional norm
would be offset by the reliance of the parochial schools on
statutory promises of expense incurred before the Supreme
Court's decision.
(3) The plaintiffs had withdrawn their original motion until
after the Supreme Court's decision.
(4) That the schools and state officials did not act unwisely
in relying on the statute, since its unconstitutionality
could not have been predicted.
21411 U.S. 192 (1973).
120
In the Lemon cases the court appeared to reverse the Pierce-
Cochran-Everson-Allen line of aid to sectarian schools. In Lemon,
the aid was not to both public and non-public school children, but
direct aid to private schools. 22 However, the court made a distinc-
tion between aid to teachers and instructional materials. The court
held that the programs which aid religiously-affiliated non-public
elementary and secondary schools will engender impermissible religious
partisanship. 23 with requirement of the statutes for surveillance of
school records to determine if the appropriation was properly used,
an excessive, as well as unconstitutional, entanglement occurred.
In the analysis of the court, three tests were applied:
Schempp's "purpose and primary effect" and Walz's "excessive entan-
glement".^^ The first two tests proved that the statute passed the
"secular purpose". However, the court viewed the reimbursement to
schools for the costs of purchasing secular textbooks and instruc-
tional materials according to the Pennsylvania statute exceeding the
bounds of the Allen case in providing free textbooks.
From the Lemon case the conclusion may be drawn that, in order
for a statute to be successful, it must meet three criteria: "the
character and purpose of the institutions that are benefited, the
nature of the aid that the state provides, and the resulting
^^Arkansas Law Review 25:538 (1972).
23403 U.S. 602 at 622-24 (1971).
2^Fordham Law Review 40:376 (1971).
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relationship between the government and the religious authority. "25
Although the Lemon cases were significant to the interpretation
of the child-benefit theory, later the court would be obliged to ren-
der judgment on new proposals as a result of the financial problems
faced by the non-public schools. One of those proposals, the consti-
tutionality of reimbursement of state-mandated services, would become
prominent during the remainder of the seventies. These services would
permit the state to determine if proper education was being received
by all pupils, especially the ones needing diagnostic and remedial
assistance. To accomplish this, several states drafted statutes which
would permit non-public schools to benefit from the financial relief.
The first case was Levitt v. Committee for Public Education and Relig-
ious Liberty26 which challenged the New York 1970 Statute, Chapter 138,
as unconstitutional under the Establishment Clause of the First Amend-
ment. This statute permitted reimbursement for mandated services for
examination and inspection in connection with administration; grading
and the compiling and reporting of the results of tests and examina-
tions; maintenance of records of pupil enrollment and reporting
thereon; maintenance of pupil health records; recording of personnel
qualifications and characteristics; and the preparation and submission
to the state of various other reports. . ."27 Of these services, two
25403 U.S. 672 at 615 (1971).
26413 U.S. 472 (1973).
2793 S. Ct. 2814 (1973).
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types of tests were the most expensive: the state-prepared test, i.e.,
"Regents Examination", "Pupil Evaluation Program Tests", and the inter-
nal teacher test. Each year qualifying schools received a lump sum of
wenty-seven dollars per pupil for students in grades one through six,
and forty-five dollars per pupil for students in grades seven through
twelve. In addition, the schools were not required to account for the
distribution of the appropriation.
In its arguments the court reiterated that permissible government
aid was set by the Everson and Allen cases. The Everson court upheld
reimbursement for bus fares. However, it was felt by Chief Justice
Burger that the Everson decision carried permissible aid to the "verge"
of the forbidden territory under the religious clauses as argued in the
Lemon case.^® In reaching its decision, the court rejected the argu-
ment that: "Nothing contained in this act shall be construed to au-
thorize the making of any payment under this act for religious worship
or instruction."^^ The justices stated that sooner or later the state
would have to institute some system of surveillance and controls which
was denied in the Lemon case. They further stated:
For if no system of audit or control is to be instituted, this
will leave the schools free, as they apparently are now, to keep
their shares of the apportioned moneys regardless of whether their
expenses are as great as their receipts, and to use any excess for
the general purposes of their religious missions. The dilemma we
have outlined is insoluble. Either the statute falls because a
28342 F. Supp. 439 at 442 (1972).
29n.Y. Law (1970) Chapter 138 Sec. 8.
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system of surveillance and control would create excessive entangle-
ment, or, without such a system, the schools would be free to use
funds for religious purposes. The constitution is breached which-
ever route is chosen. 30
One final argument the court urged:
. . . that in a community with a large number of pupils served
by church-related schools (surely true in the present case) it is
reasonable to assume that state assistance will result in aggrava-
tion of divisive political activity on the part of supporters and
opponents of the annual appropriation legislation. 3>
On direct appeal, the United States Supreme Court affirmed the de-
cision of the District Court. It held that Chapter 138 of the New York
Statute was unconstitutional, because the aid for secular functions is
not identifiable and separable from aid to sectarian activities.
Another case that was decided about the same time was Commi ttee
Public Education and Religious Liberty v. Nyquist .32 In 1972 the Gov-
ernor of New York signed several amendments to the Education and Tax
laws, establishing three financial aid programs to non-public schools:
1. Direct money grants for "qualifying" non-public schools to
be used for "maintenance and repair of facilities and equip-
ment to ensure the students "health, welfare, and safety".
(For the school to qualify it had to serve a high concen-
tration of low-income families).
2. Tuition reimbursement plan to parents for children attending
non-public schools. (To qualify the parent's taxable income
must be below $5,000.).
3. Tax credit plan for those parents who failed to qualify for
tuition reimbursement. 33
30342 F. Supp. 439 at 444 (1972).
31 Id.
,
at 445.
2^413 U.S. 756 (1973).
33id.
,
at 756.
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As early as 1970, New York legislature feared the collapse of its
parochial school system, thus creating a hardship on the public system.
This strain would be both physical and economical, due to the over-
crowded, outdated, and understaffed facilities, especially of the urban
districts.'^^ Seeking to relieve this problem, the above mentioned act
and its amendments were enacted.
In analyzing the case, the court applied the three criteria of
Lemon v. Kurtzman^ ^ to determine whether specific aid to church-affili-
ated institutions would violate the Establishment Clause of the First
Amendment. According to the criteria, the statute must serve a legiti-
mate, secular, and legislative purpose; further, it must have a primary
effect that neither advances nor inhibits religion, and must not foster
"an excessive government entanglement in religion. "36
The legislation in question was designed with the view in mind to
satisfy the test of the court's criteria. Only direct aid for mainten-
ance and repair was reimbursed to schools that educated low-income
children. The remainder was indirect financial assistance to parents
of pupils enrolled in non-public schools. It was hoped that the court
would apply the child-benefit theory as established in Pierce-Cochran-
3
Everson-Alien as the beneficiary other than the religious institution.
^^"Constitutional Law", Harvard Law Review 86:1068 (1973).
35403 U.S. 602 (1971).
35id., at 612-13.
37"Case Comments", Minnesota Law Review 58:661 (1979).
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However, the court's analysis of the maintenance and repair grants
tended to focus on the absence of restrictions as to the use of the
money, indicating a violation of the Establishment Clause because the
aid will inevitably "subsidize and advance the religious mission of the
sectarian schools."^® The tuition reimbursement was denied for the
same reason - that of being unrestricted. "The recipient is the par-
ochial school. The source is the state tax-derived money. The parent
is simply a conduit, "39 as a means used to transport the aid from the
government to the parochial school.
Finally, the tax relief provision as approved by the lower court
was reversed. The findings were substantially no different from the
tuition reimbursement plan which was handled in one of two ways:
either a cash payment to the parent or a reduction of the amount owed
to the state.
The Minnesota Law Review made this comment on the decision of
Nyquist court:
These decisions indicate that the future of aid to non-public
schools is not bright. The child-benefit theory has failed to win
the acceptance of a majority of the court, as has the theory that
a tax benefit is inherently different from a direct subsidy. Any
plan which provides significant aid to parochial schools will have
to be ingenious indeed if it is to withstand the scrutiny of the
establishment clause as presently interpreted. ^0
The next case, Sloan v. Lemon, was subject to the same arguments
38403 U.S. 756 at 779 (971).
2^350 F. Supp. 655 at 668 (1972).
^^58 Minnesota Law Review 661 at 665-67 (1974).
41413 U.S. 825 (1973).
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as in the Nyquist case. Several journals treat the two cases at the
same time indicating their similarity. Pennsylvania taxpayers con-
tested the constitutionality of the state's Parent Reimbursement Act
which allowed tuition reimbursement to parents whose pupils were en-
rolled in parochial schools. Justice Powell gave the opinion of six
members of the court which held that the statute was unconstitutional
by supporting religious institutions, and could not be justified under
the equal protection clause allowing tuition reimbursement to both
secular and sectarian non-public school pupils. With the Sloan de-
cision, tuition reimbursement was identified as direct aid to non-pub-
lic schools, making it the most advanced proposal of the child-benefit
theory.
Turning now to mandated services, again Justice Blackman delivered
the opinion in Wheeler v. Barrera^^ on a significant phase of the Ele-
mentary and Secondary Education Act of 1965. He designates that:
"Title I is the first federal -aid-to-educati on program authorizing as-
sistance for private school children as well as for public school child-
ren. It was to be administered by the local state agency which was
authorized to design special education programs. These programs were
to meet the needs of educationally deprived children from a high con-
centration of low income families. The plaintiff claimed that the
Missouri Board of Education "arbitrarily and illegally were
approving
42417 U.S. 402 (1974).
43417 U.S. 402 at 405.
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Title I programs"^^ that discriminated against eligible non-public
school pupils in the district.
The. lower court reasoned that, since it was not under obligation
to provide on-the-premises non-public school instruction by Missouri
statute, it was not obligated to furnish special educational programs.
The defendants also argued that public school personnel on non-public
religiously-affiliated schools would be unconstitutional under the
First Amendment.
The Court of Appeals denied the reasoning of the defendants by the
following:
A state could conceivably pass a law that would prohibit the
use of any Title I funds in a private school. Thus, we find that
when the need of educationally disadvantaged children requires it.
Title I authorizes special teaching services, as contemplated with-
in the act and regulations, to be furnished by the public agency as
well as public-school premises. In other words, we think it clear
that the Act demands that if such special services are furnished
public school children, then comparable programs, if needed, must
be provided the disadvantaged private school children.
In conclusion, the Appeals Court reasoned that the plaintiffs were
entitled to Title I funds even if the local agency did not request them
for non-public school children, and "if the state is to participate in
Title I programs, the state has the responsibility to seek out the dis-
advantaged child and discover his needs.
Justice Blackman gave three options to the Missouri Board of Edu-
cation:
^^Id., at 408.
^^475 F. Rep. 2d 1338 at 1352-53 (1973).
^6id., at 1355.
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First, the State may approve plans that do not utilize on-the-
premises private school Title I instruction but, nonetheless, still
measure up to the requirement of comparability.
Second, if the State is unwilling or unable to develop a plan
which is comparable, while using Title I teacher in public but not
in private schools, it may develop and submit an acceptable plan
which eliminates the use of on-the-premises instruction in the
public schools and, instead, resorts to other means, such as neut-
ral sites or summer programs that are less likely to give rise to
the gross disparity present in this case.
Third, and undoubtedly least attractive for the educationally
deprived children, is nonparticipation in the program. 47
Justice Powell, concurring, felt that since Title I did not man-
date on-the-premises instruction, there would not be a violation of
the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment. The Supreme Court
then instructed the Missouri agencies that "comparable" but not nec-
essarily "identical" programs be developed for the eligible non-public
school children. 48
In his dissent Justice Douglas considers that the case comes to
the court "in an attractive posture". However, he fears that "the
judiciary has been reduced." He maintains a position that any form of
aid is an abridgment of church and state, that "no programs serving,
students in parochial schools could be designed under this Act" to be
constitutional. He concludes that the "case is plainly not Moot;
and that a "controversy exists. .
47417 U.S. 402 at 423-25 (1974).
48id., at 419.
49id., at 432.
129
Charl6s M. Whslan, a prof6ssor at Fordham Law School, rocognizos
this case as an opportunity to expand aid to non-public schools. He
states:
By the firmness of its mandates in Barrera, the Court has pro-
vided a solid basis for hope that the justices are now ready to
sustain the constitutionality of many types of special educational
programs for all disadvantaged children, regardless of the school
they attend. . . .We have a solid chance now, if we sustain our
efforts and pay attention to what the Supreme Court has told us,
to expand the list of unquestionably constitutional auxiliary ser-
vices. 50
This case defined one possible direction for the child-benefit
theory in permissible auxiliary service that may be mandated in federal
acts. These services and acts are provided for all children whether
they attend public or non-public schools.
Following the Wheeler case the Supreme Court on 19 May, 1975 con-
sidered a second case to ascertain the constitutionality of auxiliary
services. In Meek v. Pettenqer,5 1 the plaintiff Sylvia Meek brought
r p
action claiming that two Pennsylvania statutes (Acts 194 and 195)^
violated the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment. These stat-
utes were authorized by the legislation of Pennsylvania to assist in'
the relief of the financial problems of the non-public schools. Under
these statutes the Board of Education was authorized to provide all
children enrolled in qualifying non-public elementary and secondary
schools auxiliary services:
50charles M. Whelan, "'Barrera': Hope for the Children,"
Americj.,
Vol. 130, June 1974, pp. 514, 516.
^''421 U.S. 349 (1975).
52pa. Law 194 and 195 (1972).
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Act 194 provides professional staff and services (guidance;
counseling; testing; psychological; remedial and therapeutic;
speech and hearing; services for the exceptional children; ser-
vices for the improvement of educationally disadvantaged, and
other secular, neutral, non-ideological service.
. .
Act 195 provides the loaning of textbooks (books, reusable
workbooks and manuals), and instructional materials and equipment
(material means books, periodicals, documents, pamphlets, photo-
graphs, reproductions, pictorial or graphic works, musical scores,
maps, charts, globes, sound recordings, including but not limited
to those on discs and tapes, processed slides, transparencies,
films, filmstrips, kinescopes, and video tapes, or any printed
and published material of a similar nature. . . .(Equipment means
projection, recording, laboratory, and any other educational secu-
lar, neutral, non-ideological equipment. )53
Upon request by non-public institutions meeting the compulsory
attendance law, state-employed staff members provided free-on-the
premise services and materials to qualified pupils with special edu-
cational needs. The court considered that the statute provided four
separate programs: •(!) auxiliary services; (2) textbook loans; (3)
instructional material loans; (4) instructional equipment loans.
In delivering the majority opinion. Justice Stewart said "that the
direct loan of instructional material and equipment has the uncon-
stitutional primary effect of advancing religion because of the pre-
dominantly religious character of the schools benefiting from the
act."^^ His findings were based on Lemon v . Kurtzman '
s^^ argument
that direct loan of material advances religion.
53374 F. Supp. 639 at 645-46 (1974).
54ld., at 646.
5595 S. Ct. 1753 at 1762 (1975).
^^403 U.S. 602 at 619 (1971).
The court felt that
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in light of the massive aid of the Statute Act 195, which was neither
indirect or incidental, it would be ignoring reality to attempt to di-
vide the secular educational functions performed by the religiously-
affiliated elementary and secondary schools of Pennsylvania.
The Harvard Law Review identifies a new court theory that was
adopted in the Meek case.
... it (the court) recognized that since secular education is
just one function of an institution whose very reason for being is
religious, aid to secular education inevitably advances religion.
In adopting this aid-to-the enterprise theory, the court implicitly
drew back from its previous assumption that some form of aid may
be channeled to the secular [educational functions] without pro-
viding cirect aid to the sectarian. 57
If this aid-to-the-enterprise theory is to be used, then the court
would have little difficulty in recognizing that all four programs
aided the sectarian schools and the students, causing an excessive
entanglement. Some feel that the "aid-to-the-enterprise, if systemat-
ically applied",^® may hold the answer to the governmental aid program
to non-public education.
The court reaffirmed their traditional position of the Pierce-
Cochran-Allen-Everson opinion in allowing only those services of the
Pennsylvania Acts 194, 195, in loaning textbooks to aiding the child
and the parents and not the non-public school.
Turning to the entanglement issue, the court held to the Nyquist
decision that the act would "provide successive opportunities for
^^"State Aid to Religious Schools and Their Students", Harvard
Law Review 89:104 at 106 (1975).
58id., at 110.
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political fragmentation and division along religious lines. It was
also found that the potential political and administrative entanglement
in the event to insure the strictly neutral and nonideological position
of the auxiliary service personnel, would further violate the "estab-
lishment of religion" clause of the First Amendment.
The traditional position of child benefit, i.e., textbooks loaned
to children in the non-public schools, was upheld in the Meek case.
They denied, however, auxiliary or mandated services of various forms
and methods of implementation. The court had repeatedly affirmed that
secular and religious functions of non-public elementary and secondary
schools cannot be identified separately and that aid to secular in-
struction provides financial relief and thus causes excessive entan-
glement. The court had never been challenged before the Meek case on
the validity of this assumption. Many of the instructional materials
and services were strictly secular in nature, and they were provided
only as a loan to the elementary and secondary non-public schools.
It was this problem that caused the court to develop a new prin-
ciple in the Meek case - that being aid-to-the-enterprise - drawing
back from its previous position that allowed some forms of aid to be
channeled into secular educational functions without providing direct
aid to the non-public schools.
If the court would systematically follow this new principle of
aid-to-the-enterprise theory without needless limitation, a key for a
solution to parochial aid may yet be found.
S. Ct. 1753 at 1767 (1975).
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The next case which concerned the issue of the constitutionality
of governmental aid to parochial schools was Wolman v. Wal ter .^^ Its
findings revealed a significant unity among the justices of the Supreme
Court regarding the application of the traditional three-part test.
The Wolman case involved an Ohio statute^^ which authorized financial
aid to either children or their parents in non-public schools within
public school districts. This aid was in the form of (1) secular text-
books, instructional materials and equipment, tests, and scoring ser-
vices; (2) diagnostic and therapeutic services; (3) field trip trans-
portation service. The aid allocation was based upon an estimate of
the average daily attendance per annum in non-public schools. Then it
was forwarded to the public school districts semi-annually to be uti-
lized according to the stipulation of the statute. The aid was author-
ized to benefit those schools whose admission policies made no distinc-
tion as to race, creed, color, or national origin of either its pupils
or its teachers.
Again the court applied the three-test criteria developed through
the years, in reaching the opinion of the constitutionality of the Ohio
statutes. In contrast to Meek v . Pettenger ,^^ the Wolman court gave a
majority opinion regarding textbook, diagnostic and theropeutic services
as constitutional, and held that material and equipment loans,
and re-
imbursement for field trip transportation was unconstitutional.
The
court upheld the textbook provision of the Ohio statute
on the basis
6O97 S. Ct. 2593 (1977).
^^Ohio Rev. Code Sec. 3317.06 (Supp. 1976).
6295 S. Ct. 1753 (1975).
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that it was "constitutionally indistinguishable" from the provision
in two previous cases - Allen and Meek. Thus, the court refused to
overrule the textbook provision of the statute.
The testing and scoring services were likewise upheld in the wake
of the argument that neither non-public school personnel were involved
in drafting and scoring the standardized test nor did they receive pay-
ment to administer them.
Further, the court defended their position on the basis of the
Levitt decision, stating that the reasoning behind their decision was
straight forward and since "no means are available to assure that in-
ternally prepared tests are free of religious instruction."
The next affirmative opinion dealt with the diagnostic services
of the statute. The court upheld these services on three points,
first classifying the services on the grounds of the Meek decision as
falling into the "general welfare services for children that the State
provided regardless of the incidental benefit which accrues to church-
related schools. Second, the court declared that diagnostic service
had little or no educational content and therefore is not a part of
the religious mission of the non-public school. Third, it was stated
that the diagnostician had limited contact with the child and would
not have a good opportunity to transmit sectarian views as a teacher
or counselor.
6^97 s. Ct. 2593 at 2601 (1977).
6
^Id., at 2603.
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This classification of diagnostic services as "general welfare
services" and the emphasis of the minimal relationship of the diagnost-
ician, indicates the low profile given by the court to the total re-
lationship of the public services to the mission of the schools.
Therapeutic, psychological, speech, and hearing services; guidance
and counseling services; and remedial services were not classified into
the "general services" category because the services were administered
by public school personnel at religiously neutral locations.^^ In this
ruling the court rejected the excessive entanglement argument since
there was no need for surveillance of public employees performing a
public function to insure that they maintained a neutral position to-
ward the religious mission of the non-public schools that the pupil
attended.
Turning next to the materials and equipment provision of the Ohio
statute, the court found that to permit an indirect loan of materials
to the child or his parents would be no different than a direct grant
to the non-public school and would only "exalt form over substance.
This reasoning was in harmony with the Nyquist decision which held
that indirect aid could have a primary effect of impermissibly ad-
vancing religion. Also, the court reasoned that the secular and
sectarian mission of the non-public school was so integrated into its
educational objective that, even though any loan was limited ostensibly
65id., at 2605.
^^Id.
,
at 2606.
67413 u.S. 756 at 785-86 (1973).
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to neutral and secular instructional material and equipment,^® the
financial relief would inevitably advance the sectarian mission of the
school. In applying the traditional three-part test, the instructional
and equipment clause, as well as field-trip transportation funding, was
invalidated. The court's reasoning on the final provision declared that
field-trip funding would be provided in the same way as maps and charts
in Meek v. Pettenger
,
supra, buildings and tuition in Committee for
Public Education v. Nyquist
,
supra, and teacher-prepared tests in
Levitt V. Committee for Public Education
,
and would create excessive
CQ
entanglement with direct aid to sectarian schools. Moreover, the
inadequate supervision of the secular use of the field trip funds,
and the form of instruction that the teacher provided during the field
trips convinced the court that the school received direct benefit and
violated the primary effect test.
The judgment of the court was that those portions of the Ohio
statute providing books, standardized testing and scoring, therapeutic
and remedial services and diagnostic services were constitutional;
however, as has been noted, those parts having to do with instructional
materials and equipment and field trip services, were determined to be
unconstitutional
.
The most recent case. New York v. Cathedral Academy , was decided
^®Id., at 2606.
^^Id., at 2609.
7098 S. Ct. 547 (1977).
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by th© SuprBme Court on 6 Decembor
» 1977. This C3 S 6 concornod tho
New York statute^^ authorizing reimbursement of mandated recordkeeping
and testing services to non-public schools. The statute was found un-
constitutional, the court ruling that all expenses incurred by the non-
public school during the last half of 1971-72 could not be reimbursed.
In 1972, the New York legislature enacted the New York laws, Ch. 996,
authorizing non-public schools to be reimbursed for expenses prior to
13 June, 1972. Thus, the statute explicitly allowed what the District
Court in Committee for Public Education v. Levi tt^ ^ and later by the
United States Supreme Court in Levitt v. Committee for Public Education
had prohibited as unconstitutional.
The court based its opinion on the following:
1. The New York legislature cannot effectively modify a fed-
eral court's injunction.
2. If the statute authorized reimbursement for identical ser-
vice, it would be unconstitutional.
3. Examination and surveillance of audits and other leading
activities that would be implemented to determine the
validity of the clauses, would itself constitute an en-
croachment of the First and Fourteenth Amendments.
4. While a degree of constitutional infirmity may be toler-
ated by state law when other equitable consideration pre-
dominates, those equities would not allow for what the
legislation had done. 74
The court ruled that the New York law violated the First and Four
teenth Amendments, and that the equities do not allow for the state
7^N.Y. Laws, Chap. 138 (1970).
^^342 F. Supp. 439 (1972).
7^413 U.S. 472 (1973).
^^98 S. Ct. 340 at 343-346 (1977).
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legislation to overrule the District Court by enacting a new statute.
Moreover the action constitutes a new and independently significant
infringement on the Constitution.
Summary
President Johnson's Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965
prepared the way for aid to auxiliary services as considered a part of
secular education in the non-public school. The state legislatures,
recognizing their responsibility to provide education for its citizens,
passed during the seventies a number of aid-the-children statutes to
financially assist both public and non-public school systems.
The lower courts upheld many of these statutes viewing them either
as a child-benefit theory developed by the Pierce-Cochran-Allen-Everson
cases, or as a secular function of the school. In 1973 the Supreme
Court in the Levitt case ruled that mandated services, i.e., student
tests, and maintenance of student records, amounted to excessive en-
tanglement under the First Amendment. Following this decision, the
Supreme Court ruled against auxiliary services, with the exception of
Violman v. Walter 97 S. Ct. 2593. The court historically has not been
able to divide the secular and the sectarian functions of the relig-
iously-affiliated elementary and secondary schools. It has repeatedly
relied on the three-point test, and most often found the statute to
violate the excessive entanglement clause between church and
state.
Another test developed out of Meek v. Pettenger 421 U.S.
349
that is "aid-to-the-enterprise, which would fortify the
previous court
decision that all aid, large or small, given to the
parochial school
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advances the religious tenets of the church. Also, that the relief
of financial expense in the secular education of the school provides
funds for the mission and purposes of the non-public school.
During the seventies, the majority of the cases have dealt with
those provisions included in the Elementary and Secondary Education
Act of 1965 and its amendment, i.e., services, and shared time. In
each case the state laws that were challenged were done so on the
clarity of its wording to determine whether it would withstand the
three-part test as was developed over the years from 1930-1968.
CHAPTER V
SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS
No legislation relating to religion and school has produced such
persistent church-state controversy as that of child-benefit. All
levels of government share in the search for a middle ground, designed
both to strengthen the educational systems and at the same time main-
tain religious freedom. The government's involvement in education
dates back to the Colonial days, and later with the enactment of the
Land Ordinance of 1785 which set aside a portion of public lands for
the endowment of education. The exact role of government has become
even more abstract with numerous educational laws, statutes, and acts
legislated by the federal and state congresses. The earliest act, the
Old Deluder Law of 1642, laid the groundwork for establishing compuls-
ory education and free public schools. Later the Land Grant College
Act of 1862, National Defense Education Act of 1958, and the massive
Assistance Act, i.e.. Elementary and Secondary Educational Act of 1965,
all add up to a significant involvement of government in education.
To complicate the issue even more, the state assumed that it was
responsible for both the moral and intellectual development of the
children. The church, on the other hand, refused to accept
this posi-
tion and a dual educational system developed with many
of the denomi-
nations organizing parochial schools. Leadership in
parochial education
by the Catholic Church was due to its rapid growth
in the early 1800's.
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This led to the first major educational financial struggle between
church and state.
Following phase one of the struggle for governmental financial aid,
the Catholic Church withdrew and strengthened their educational system
by compulsory school construction, student enrollment, and membership
assessment. The church maintained this position until 1930.
In the late 1920's the state of Louisiana made provisions to loan
secular textbooks to all school children of the state, including those
enrolled in non-public religiously affiliated elementary and secondary
schools. This statute was later argued in the United States Supreme
Court in Cochran v. Louisiana .^ The court's opinion gave birth to the
child-benefit theory, which many legislators, educators, and religious
leaders viewed enthusiastically as a means to provide financial relief
to the troubled non-public schools.
For fifty years the Supreme Court has attempted to discover some
fair and workable guidlines for financial assistance to non-public
schools. As the pendulum of legislative opinion swung from side to
side, the court fluctuated from allowing states to provide textbooks
and busing, i.e., the two major options of the child benefit, to a
complete obstruction of any form of governmental aid to non-public
schools as an infringement of the First Amendment.
In summarizing the findings of this study, consideration should
be
given to the three major issues that have been challenged under the
child-benefit theory: textbooks, transportation, and auxiliary
services
1281 U.S. 370 (1930).
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Textbook - statutes that allow the loaning of secular textbooks to non-
public elementary and secondary school students are usually permissible
since aid to the children benefits the state. The argument is that the
children are citizens of the state— that the state is obligated to pro-
vide equal educational opportunities, irregardless of the students' re-
ligious creed. Further, if the student meets the attendance requirements
by his attendance at a non-public school, the state should assist him in
his acquisition for learning. Some textbook programs have been denied
due to the wording of the state statute, which may hold the entanglement
clause somewhat higher than others. The Supreme Court's decision in the
Board of Education v. Allen^ in 1968 clearly implies that a more aggress-
ive position would be allowable for those programs supporting the secular
educational activities of parochial schools, and textbooks would be a
major consideration for governmental aid.
Transportation has received a favorable ruling by the Supreme Court since
the Everson case. The court has maintained that transportation aid is a
heal th-and-safety measure to benefit the student, and that "incidental"
aid to non-public schools would be the same as police and fire protec-
tion. As in the textbook statutes, the education of the pupils was the
main concern of the state, and not his religious beliefs, nor the finan-
cial relief that his guardian may benefit by a reimbursement for
trans-
portation to non-public schools. It is therefore held that
transporta-
tion programs are constitutional if the wording of the
state constitu-
tion does not infringe on the prohibition of the First
Amendment.
^392 U.S. 236 (1968).
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Auxiliary Services were considered by many of the state courts prior to
1973 as a secular educational function. Their decision was based on
the same as free busing and loaning textbooks to non-public school stu-
dents. In 1973 the Supreme Court in the Levitt case ruled that mandated
services, i.e., student tests and maintenance of student records, a-
mounted to excessive entanglement under the First Amendment. Following
this decision, the Supreme Court ruled against auxiliary services, with
the exception of the Wolman case. The court historically has not been
able to divide the secular and sectarian function of the religiously-
affiliated elementary and secondary schools.
An indisputable failure of the court to draw a clear line of al-
lowable aid in child benefit has caused a battle to emerge between the
civil Libertarians and the Catholic Hierarchy. Both sides advanced the
moral responsibility of government on the issue. George R. La Noue,
a champion of the concept of child benefits, believes that the theory,
if properly defined, is legally justifiable and politically useful in
3
generating an equitable distribution of government welfare benefits.
William B. Ball agrees with La Noue that the child benefit employs the
idea that welfare, apart from pure education, is constitutional and
that the government has a responsibility in assisting secular educa-
4
tion.
^George R. La Noue, "The Child Benefit Theory", The^ Iri^^
tice February 4, 1965, p. 19.
^AASA Official Report (1965), p. 97.
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According to others such as Leo Pfeffer, Phillip Jacobson, and
Chester Nolts, it is impossible to benefit the child or his guardian
without benefiting the non-public school, and that all students can re-
ceive secular instruction in the public school. If the guardians choose
that their students attend a religiously-affiliated school, then they
must assume the financial obligation of those schools.
Thus, with each case that comes before either the state or federal
courts, the struggle goes on between the two major philosophies--those
who would have no governmental funds given to a sectarian school, not-
withstanding the fact that the school is merely a conveyance and re-
ceives no financial aid or support therefrom, and those who would take
a more practical look at the facts and circumstances of the issue and
analyze the situation to see if there is any violation of state or fed-
eral constitutional prohibitions.
In the course of its gyrations, however, the Supreme Court has
developed a set of tests in deciding how far a state may advance in
providing aid to non-public schools. For some years the criteria has
been: (1) Schempp's "purpose and primary effect", i.e., does the stat-
ute in question meet a secular, rather than a religious, purpose; (2)
what will be the primary effect of the financial aid, and will it ad-
vance or inhibit religion; (3) Walz test i.e., will the programs pro-
vided by the statutes create an excessive governmental entanglement
with religion.
Finally, a relatively new test developed in the Meek case,
aid-
to-the-enterpri se , i.e., if the aid, direct or indirect,
gives finan
cial relief, it is then unconstitutional.
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In conclusion, the child-benefit theory is the result of "case
law" as opposed to "statute law". Legislators, educators, and relig-
ious leaders can trace a series of opinions by the court to determine
what proposals of the future would be allowable aid for non-public ed-
ucation. The most typical examples of allowable aid are:
1. loaning of secular textbooks to non-public pupils;^
2. reimbursement to parent for bus transportation of non-public
school pupils;^
3. tax exemption for non-profit sectarian institutions;^
4. standardized tests and scoring services as used by the public
school
5. providing diagnostic and psychological services administered
by public school personnel*,^
6. therapeutic guidance and remedial services by public school
personnel on the premises of non-public schools.
The most typical examples of non-allowable aid are:
1. instructional materials, equipment or services to non-public
schools;^^
^Cochran v. Louisiana State Board of Education, 281 U.S. 370
(1930); Board of Education v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236 (1968); Meek v.
Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349 (1975); Wolman v. Walter, 45 U.S.L.W. 4861
(1977).
^Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
^Walz V. Tax Commissioner, 397 U.S. 644 (1970).
^Wolman v. Walter, 45 U.S.L.W. 4861 (1977).
9ld.
lOld.
^^Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349 (1975); Wolman v. Walter,
45
U.S.L.W. 4861 (1977).
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2. direct "maintenance and repair" grants, tuition reimbursement
or income tax credits to parents of non-public school pupils;^^
3. partial tuition reimbursements to parents for students in non-
public schools;^3
4. reimbursement for mandated student services
5. salary supplement for teachers of secular subjects in non-pub-
lic schools;'^
6. reimbursement of expenses to parochial schools for teaching
of secular subjects;^^
7. any statute that may have a sectarian purpose or primary ef-
fect, or which may create an excessive governmental entangle-
ment in religion.
In some cases there is an apparent conflict. Why would the court
allow secular textbooks, but not allow instructional material? It can
only be understood that the instructors may put their own interpretation
or sectarian opinions on the instructional materials. It is this argu-
ment that caused the federal court to allow the one and reject the other.
Clearly, no definitive guidelines have yet been found to solve the
dilemma of financial aid to parochial schools, nor can it be determined
that the position of child benefit litigations of the seventies has
strengthened or weakened the theory.
^
^Committee for Public Education and Religious Liberty v. Nyguist,
413 U.S. 756 (1973).
^^Sloan V. Lemon, 413 U.S. 825 (1973).
^^Levitt V. Commission for Public Education and Religious Liberty,
413 U.S. 472 (1973); Wolman v. Walter, 45 U.S.L.W. 4861 (1977).
^^Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
l^Id.; Johnson v. Sanders, 403 U.S. 955 (1971).
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RECOMMENDATIONS
Since the birth of the child-benefit theory in 1930, a number of
position papers and investigations exploring avenues of governmental
aid to non-public schools have been conducted. Because of the nature
of the subject, infringement of the religion clause of the First Amend-
ment is often referred to.
The significance of this study is three-fold:
(1) historical evolution of education leading to the federal aid
struggles;
(2) a chronological review of litigations leading up to the de-
velopment of the child-benefit theory and its precarious po-
sition from 1930-1979;
(3) the historical development of guidelines and tests of the
theory shown by "case law".
The writer would like to suggest that from findings in this study,
child benefit was not necessarily a new concept instituted in 1930, but
can be traced to the Colonial days when a revolution in education took
place in the New World, for it is noted that the legislature from 1642
forward was in the broad sense, child benefit.
From this study, the following recommendations are made for further
study:
(1 ) A study should be made to define direct and indirect aid to
non-public schools : This would entail classification of types
of allowable aid and to ascertain their purpose and effect to
the non-public school.
(2) An investigation of the feasibility of an agency, independent
of government, providing service to non-public schools: In
several of the Law Reviews , it was mentioned that perhaps one
way to solve the problem of aid to education would be to con-
tract an independent agency to handle the auxiliary services.
If this was accomplished it would be classified as general
welfare instead of parochial aid.
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(3) Further research to define the public or general welfare con-
cept as a means to provide financial relief to parochial
schools: If the assistance programs to education in all
forms could be classified under public or general welfare,
then legislators, educators, and religious leaders would
have an opportunity to draft proposals that would not cause
the conflict that child-benefit theory seems to create.
(4) An exploration of acceptable alternative forms of financial
aid to non-public schools: The conflict seems to be a con-
stant battle between the civil libertarians and the Catholic
hierarchy. With rising costs, there are greater demands for
a solution to the problem. Therefore, alternative forms of
aid: tax credits, discounts, vouchers, etc., might be the
answer.
(5) A study to trace the history of tax credits and their possible
acceptance under the prohibition of the Constitution : In the
research for this study, little was found on tax credits. An
historical search would be relevant in light of the present
battle in Congress by Senator Bob Packwood.
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